India India - China Relations

[Ryder]

This video explains a lot, but none of it is surprising considering China's expansion policies. China will deny it, but considering the "countries" they invade and annex culturally without doing it publicly shows the "forked tongue" they use in politics.

China has lots of territorial claims with its neighbours.

 

[Nilgiri]

Anyway my point is that you need institutions and organizations that exist outside the bickering of democratic leaders who are responsible for making the country grow and develop.

You can't have a government that polarizes the nation because then you're setting your own people up against each other, instead of focusing on unity and growth.

Took the words right out of my mouth....discussed this very kind of thing with @Joe Shearer some time ago this year.

 

[Joe Shearer]

Took the words right out of my mouth....discussed this very kind of thing with @Joe Shearer some time ago this year.

That, at the cost of sounding politically intransigent, is why I oppose the BJP/RSS combination. They have alienated 15% of our population in a brutally direct fashion, and potentially stand to alienate another 20%; to hide that inbuilt contradiction between caste Hindus and the Dalit (20%), they have to play the Islamophobia card again and again and again, until they actually have started getting less and less returns on that effort.

Besides, at the level that you and @Saithan are discussing the issue, there has indeed got to be a permanent direction that goes on irrespective of the change of government. The Anglo-Saxons - the British and the Americans - had mastered it and made it work until very recently, when the edge that politics has acquired has become ugly and has led to major interference with the permanent directions of state. Turkey, I think, not being too familiar with the workings of state power there, seemed to have had a similar 'understanding' among all political and administrative elements, until RTE. India has never had a centralised policy direction, for historical reasons, so there is nothing to be defended against the other side. Both the government and the opposition are forced to form their own outline policy, and they manage to do it in very amateurish and half-baked fashion.

The historical reasons include a deadly fear of 'Bonapartism' on the part of the Indian National Congress, that was only reinforced by their ring-side view of goings-on in Pakistan. This made the entire administration work actively to suppress any slight effort by the military to form long-term policy. It is infamous and true that the Indian military is never, ever involved in state policy-making, of any serious kind. That is changing, but slowly.

It also did not help that two very powerful men were custodians of this civilian supreme command over the military, and that their effect has not been shaken off yet. These were the first Defence Secretary, a cussed old man who thoroughly ruined the relationship between the bureaucracy and the military leadership, H. M. Patel; and the very powerful V. K. Krishna Menon, Defence Minister until 1963, who had Nehru's complete confidence, and who used it in a petty and vindictive manner to make the generals (and the admirals and the air marshals) quarrel with each other.

Net result:

1. No involvement of military leadership in foreign policy or in domestic policy;
2. No fair and reasonable assessment of military (army, navy and air force) support for either of these, or of military linkages with industry for manufacture of military materiel;
3. No analysis of world-wide trends in military matters, either by military or by civilian experts or ana;ysts;
4. No medium term plans for Army, Navy or Air Force;
5. No systematic development of any of these three.

Pathetic.

 

[Nilgiri]

That, at the cost of sounding politically intransigent, is why I oppose the BJP/RSS combination. They have alienated 15% of our population in a brutally direct fashion, and potentially stand to alienate another 20%; to hide that inbuilt contradiction between caste Hindus and the Dalit (20%), they have to play the Islamophobia card again and again and again, until they actually have started getting less and less returns on that effort.

Besides, at the level that you and @Saithan are discussing the issue, there has indeed got to be a permanent direction that goes on irrespective of the change of government. The Anglo-Saxons - the British and the Americans - had mastered it and made it work until very recently, when the edge that politics has acquired has become ugly and has led to major interference with the permanent directions of state. Turkey, I think, not being too familiar with the workings of state power there, seemed to have had a similar 'understanding' among all political and administrative elements, until RTE. India has never had a centralised policy direction, for historical reasons, so there is nothing to be defended against the other side. Both the government and the opposition are forced to form their own outline policy, and they manage to do it in very amateurish and half-baked fashion.

The historical reasons include a deadly fear of 'Bonapartism' on the part of the Indian National Congress, that was only reinforced by their ring-side view of goings-on in Pakistan. This made the entire administration work actively to suppress any slight effort by the military to form long-term policy. It is infamous and true that the Indian military is never, ever involved in state policy-making, of any serious kind. That is changing, but slowly.

It also did not help that two very powerful men were custodians of this civilian supreme command over the military, and that their effect has not been shaken off yet. These were the first Defence Secretary, a cussed old man who thoroughly ruined the relationship between the bureaucracy and the military leadership, H. M. Patel; and the very powerful V. K. Krishna Menon, Defence Minister until 1963, who had Nehru's complete confidence, and who used it in a petty and vindictive manner to make the generals (and the admirals and the air marshals) quarrel with each other.

Net result:

1. No involvement of military leadership in foreign policy or in domestic policy;
2. No fair and reasonable assessment of military (army, navy and air force) support for either of these, or of military linkages with industry for manufacture of military materiel;
3. No analysis of world-wide trends in military matters, either by military or by civilian experts or ana;ysts;
4. No medium term plans for Army, Navy or Air Force;
5. No systematic development of any of these three.

Pathetic.

100% agree. I really couldn't put it better than this.

 

[Nilgiri]

There are already reports of SAM engagement of PLAAF planes near Taiwan, and of a casualty.

Its been dismissed as fake news from the ROC side (as far as their supposed involvement goes):

中華民國國防部-全球資訊網-即時新聞澄清專區

國防部國防資訊網

www.mnd.gov.tw

The footage is likely of a PLAAF a/c that has crashed in an inhabited area in southern China very recently from some kind of other issue...given the footage is definitely not recycled and does seem to show a crash of some variety with an injured pilot etc.

 

[Joe Shearer]

Its been dismissed as fake news from the ROC side (as far as their supposed involvement goes):

中華民國國防部-全球資訊網-即時新聞澄清專區

國防部國防資訊網

www.mnd.gov.tw

The footage is likely of a PLAAF a/c that has crashed in an inhabited area in southern China very recently from some kind of other issue...given the footage is definitely not recycled and does seem to show a crash of some variety with an injured pilot etc.

LOL.

I've just got off the phone with my financial analyst cousin, who rang me up to enquire about this incident. Apparently rumours are flying around Bombay, and they have affected the Stock Market; shares have fallen.

Shades of Danglars and the telegraph!

 

[Nilgiri]

but can anyone shed light on how the area became disputed ?

Here is a succinct write-up that may be of interest to readers here of how the events of 1962 unfolded on the ground w.r.t this specific area (Eastern Ladakh):

Battle of Eastern Ladakh : 1962 Sino-Indian Conflict

Sino-Indian conflict of 1962 in Eastern Ladakh was fought in the area between Karakoram Pass in the North to Demchok in the South East. The area under territorial dispute at that time

usiofindia.org

@Joe Shearer

 

[Nilgiri]

"untraceable"...whatever that means, I guess it is all relative....

BRO's new highway untraceable by enemy, saves hours and gives 365-day connectivity amid tension with China

This road will give strategic connectivity to security forces as it will be untraceable for the neighbouring countries. The two other roads-- Srinagar-Kargil-Leh and Manali Sarchu-Leh roads-- are exposed as they are close to the International Border which makes it easy for the enemy to keep a...

economictimes.indiatimes.com

BRO's new highway untraceable by enemy, saves hours and gives 365-day connectivity amid tension with China


Synopsis
This road will give strategic connectivity to security forces as it will be untraceable for the neighbouring countries. The two other roads-- Srinagar-Kargil-Leh and Manali Sarchu-Leh roads-- are exposed as they are close to the International Border which makes it easy for the enemy to keep a watch on them.

LEH (LADAKH) [INDIA]: Amid ongoing tensions at the India-China border, the Border Roads Organisation (BRO) has almost finished work on the third road, also known as the Nimmu-Padam-Darcha road.

This road will give strategic connectivity to security forces as it will be untraceable for the neighbouring countries. The two other roads-- Srinagar-Kargil-Leh and Manali Sarchu-Leh roads-- are exposed as they are close to the International Border which makes it easy for the enemy to keep a watch on them.

Further, this road will also save a lot of time as the old ones took almost 12-14 hours to reach Leh from Manali, but on the new road it will take only 6-7 hours.

One of the most important aspects of this road is that unlike others it can remain open almost throughout the year, whereas, the two other roads used to stay open for only 6-7 months and were usually closed for a six-month period from November.

BRO engineers said this road is functional now and is ready for heavy vehicles weighing multiple tonnes.

"This road is ready except for a 30-kilometre stretch. Now the Army can use this road. The importance of this road is that the Army can save almost 5-6 hours in transit from Manali to Leh. Also, because this road is untraceable by other countries, Army movement can happen without much security risk. This road is not close to any border," superintendent engineer, Commander 16 BRTF, MK Jain said.

"Moreover, as this road is at low altitudes, it can be opened for almost 10-11 months for vehicle movement. This road is 258 kilometres long. We have given connectivity by diverting and connecting it to a different road as 30-kilometre stretch is yet to be completed," he added.

The route mainly used for transportation of goods and personnel is the one from Zojila, which passes through the Drass-Kargil axis to Leh.

The same route was targeted heavily by the Pakistanis during the Kargil war in 1999 and was subjected to frequent bombarding and shelling by their troops from positions in high altitude mountains alongside the road.

 

[Maximilian Veers]

Indian offensive to retake Chinese seized territory: The hidden story - The Sunday Guardian Live

The annihilation of Moldo garrison was assured for the Chinese had clashes erupted. New Delhi: On 3 July, the Prime Minister of India arrived at

www.sundayguardianlive.com

New Delhi: On 3 July, the Prime Minister of India arrived at Leh on a surprise visit. Flanked by his Army Chief and the Chief of Defence Staff, he was received by the Army Commander of Northern Command, Lt Gen Y.K. Joshi and the GOC 14 Corps, Lt Gen Harinder Singh. Both of them are responsible for the defence of Ladakh at strategic and operational levels, respectively.

This visit came in the backdrop of the unfortunate incident at Galwan on the night of 14-15 June. The nation was outraged. The death of 20 soldiers sent shockwaves through the country. The situation was really grim. The world was eager to hear Narendra Modi. The nightmarish thought of a repeat of 1962 was on everyone’s mind.

The Dragon appeared to be too aggressive and dangerous. He had moved up and close with 20,000 troops of the 4th Motorized Division and 6th Mechanized Division, equipped with light tanks, rockets and heavy artillery, ready to strike deep. India was caught off guard.

Soon after his arrival at Nimu, Prime Minister Modi was briefed by the Generals on the ground. Lt Gen Harinder Singh briefed him about what action the Chinese army had taken and what they were likely to do next. The Prime Minister listened to his General and somewhere during the course of the briefing he said, “I am not interested in what the Chinese have done and what they will do, I am interested in what you have done and what you will do.” The interjection was set to alter the future course.

He, after being updated, addressed the freshly inducted troops of 17 Corps acclimatizing at Nimu. These were the troops of India’s only mountain strike corps. They were inducted recently to deal with the dual-threat from China and Pakistan. The PM’s message was for the world, India’s belligerent neighbour and his mighty military machine.

He quoted a shloka to convey that message. It was heard all across the globe. He said, “A brave-heart protects the motherland with the power of his weapons. This land is for the brave. Our support, strength and resolve for its defence and security are as high as the Himalayas. I can see this ability and resolve in your eyes right now. It is clearly visible on your faces. You are the heroes of the same land that has repulsed the attacks and atrocities of many invaders for thousands of years. This is our identity. We are the people who worship Lord Krishna who plays the flute. We are also the same people who follow Sudarshan Chakradhari Krishna as an ideal. With this inspiration, India has emerged stronger after every attack.”

TIME TO REWRITE HISTORY

This morale-boosting message was signalling India’s strategic intent that ran too deep. More than anyone else, they were the Indian Army Generals who were listening very carefully.

It was time to rewrite history. The unthinkable so far was to be done. It was to be an offensive action of quid pro quo into Chinese-seized territory. The Prime Minister in his address had also said that “the weak cannot initiate peace. Bravery is a precondition to peace.” The Generals were quick to understand the shifting paradigm.

From the initial stages of these border tensions, the Chinese had successfully drawn the Indian troops into various face-offs, spreading in penny packets and minor tactical manoeuvres. Indians were caught in a reactive mode. Indian troops were tied down at a number of places over wide frontages. Stretching from Daulat Beg Oldi (DBO) in the north to Pangong Lake in the south, this was roughly 300 kilometres in extent. The initiative was complete with the Dragon.

By early July, India had also deployed its troops from the Northern Command reserve. Soon after the Galwan clashes this Division was moved up from Himachal Pradesh, directly into the frontlines in Ladakh, thus beefing up the defences. The holding 14 Corps, however, demanded more and more troops that were ever insufficient—a typical defender’s syndrome where the troops are never enough and there is always a piece of ground left to be occupied.

But this was exactly the way Indian Army was made to behave while dealing with the Chinese, right from the 1950s onward. The debacle of 1962 had forced upon us a strong defensive mindset. India stood psychologically paralysed in the aftermath. The Chinese exploited this state and made transgressions and intrusions with impunity: an annual feature of sorts.

The differing perceptions of the LAC worked to China’s advantage. They would come forward by two steps and retreat by one; thus in five decades we lost hundreds of square kilometres to their salami-slicing tactics.

STATIC DEFENCE IS A THING OF THE PAST

However, the Doklam crisis of June 2017 changed all that. The handling of this crisis with alacrity instilled the much-needed confidence into our establishment. The Chinese were dealt with firmly from a position of strength. Indians had pre-empted the PLA’s move by occupying the dominating ridge line and stalling their planned ingress. General Bipin Rawat was the Army Chief at the helm of affairs and is now India’s first CDS.

Presently, General Mukund Naravane, Chief of Army Staff, is handling the current crisis. His vast hands-on experience in dealing with the Chinese is a blessing. Offensive plans were drawn under his watch and vetted at the highest levels. The strategy of static defence was an antiquated idea by now.

Concurrently to this planning, defences were bolstered all across the LAC. Additional divisions were mobilised, building upon the existing force levels already deployed right across to the last bend of Arunachal Pradesh.

To deny the Chinese any surprises from air, Indian Air Force was conducting round the clock airspace domination. Indian Army had also carried operational deployment of various strategic assets like the land version of Brahmos cruise missiles by the end of June. All avenues of Chinese ingress, if any, were plugged by now.

The LAC held firmly in strength, the defensive plans over land were all in place, complemented by those at sea and in the air. This seriousness and resolve beckoned India’s intention to defend every inch of her territory.

Indian Navy had also set sail into the deep blue waters of Indian Ocean. Our warships were well poised, threatening the Chinese supply lines passing through the Malaca Strait, just in case the balloon went up. In the Far East, Indian naval warships were also carrying sea manoeuvres alongside the ships of friendly world powers in the disputed waters of South China Sea. Global support had been mobilised in India’s favour.

Earlier in Ladakh, a brigade had been pulled out of the Army Headquarters’ reserve Mountain Division and brought into 14 Corps zone. The great strategic airlift by C-17 Globe Masters of Indian Air Force was executed. These gigantic machines ferried tons weapons, ammunition and logistics alongside the troop build-up throughout May and June.

On 21 May, the first brigade of this reserve arrived in Leh. Initially, they were tasked to augment the existing resources of 14 Corps in holding role. However, the Galwan incident of mid-June changed the dynamics. Since an offensive action was on the table, it was decided to bring in the rest of this Mountain Division. The air lift began soon thereafter and this Division closed in by 20 June, now armed with fresh operational mandate.

The 17 Corps, India’s sole strike corps, was fully acclimatized and prepared for any eventuality, though not to be committed at this early stage. However, the GOC 17 Corps, Lt General Sawneet Singh was given an additional task: to exercise operational control of this newly inducted crack Mountain Division. Trained to infiltrate and strike deep behind enemy lines. They were capable of turning the enemy’s defences.

By now, the reserve Division of Northern Command was also deployed, beefing up the entire defences along the LAC in Ladakh. Deployments were from the Depsang plains to the occupying heights around Galwan, providing depth to the Shyok-Dubruk-DBO road and strengthening the Dungti-Demchok corridor.

The military to military negotiations continued. A number of rounds were conducted, with each talk lasting for hours. The efforts were to amicably resolve the dispute through talks. Unfortunately, all these talks failed to make any substantial headway. In the meanwhile, our plans for a quid pro quo were in place with multiple options.

OVER OPTIMISTIC CHINA

The haplessness of the Indian establishment was also clearly manifesting with each failed talk. This in turn made the Chinese over-optimistic of their strategy. Their grand plan appeared to be to hold fast and not relent to the Indian demand of pre-April positions. The idea seemed to be to exhaust the Indian Army through the winter deployments. The huge economic cost of prolonged military mobilization was likely to prove unsustainable for a de-growing economy in these Covid times. Thus China would win this war without firing a single shot.

On our side, amongst other challenges, there was strong unhappiness in the rank and file of the Indian Army. They were unhappy in the manner they were used at Pangong and Galwan, fighting the PLA with sticks and stones.

This failed strategy had led to the death of 20 soldiers, with an equal or a greater number of casualties on the other side. The scenes of soldiers throwing stones and using clubs to defend themselves had brought a lot of embarrassment to the professional Army. It was now the time to test our tactical acumen and flex our muscles.

OFFENSIVE PLANS

In early August, this newly inducted Mountain Division was fully acclimatized. They had started to carry out reconnaissance and validate their offensive plans. These plans were so secret that even the holding formation troops were unaware of what was going on. Options were carefully drawn and diligently vetted.

By 24 August, one plan was finally given the go ahead. Simultaneously, the Chief of Defence Staff, General Bipin Rawat also cautioned the nation to stay prepared for any eventuality, even if that meant war.

At ground zero, the company commanders and platoon commanders of this elite mountain division had by now selected their routes of infiltration, identified tactical heights to be occupied and timed their paces for speedy retaking.

From the word go, the final phase of the retaking was planned to be completed in 120 minutes flat. Artillery was put in place, ready to support the infiltrating troops should the need arose. Armoured elements were well poised, ready to out-manoeuvre and destroy any PLA attempt, if they thrust into the Chushul valley. Air defence troops were also deployed with shoulder fired anti-aircraft Igla missiles, networked and coordinated to shoot down any Chinese aircraft interfering with our advancing troops.

The Chinese on their side had their mechanized Combat Team located in Spangur near Moldo. They had 33-ton T15 light tanks designed to fight a battle in this high-altitude region.

GEARED FOR ACTION

The Indian troops were fully geared for action, all ends tied, contingencies catered for and rehearsed. We were ready to strike. The objective was Spangur Bowl, an area south of Pangong and east of Chushul.

The features dominating the Spangur gap provided great tactical dominance and huge strategic advantages. Black Top, Helmet, Magar and Gurung Hills stretching right up to Rezang La were these features. Under the cover of darkness, Indian infiltrating troops moved up to the LAC, established their release points and waited for the green signal. Some troops mounted on high mobility vehicles and drove straight up to the objective—the 3 km ridgeline on the hill alongside Requin.

At the word go, these troops crossed over into the enemy claimed territory with lightning speed. The mountain division of Tibetan troops of the Special Frontier Force occupied the hill features, beating their own planned timings well under 120 minutes.

Before the break of dawn, one complete infantry brigade with over 2,000 troops was holding the heights overlooking the Spangur Bowl. Armed with French Milan anti-tank missiles and Carl Gustav rocket launchers, the Indians had literally rendered the Chinese armoured tanks at Moldo redundant and outmanoeuvred. On 31 August, the garrison at Moldo was virtually under siege.

Surprised and shocked, the Chinese mustered their club-wielding troops and advanced towards the positions now held by the Indians. More shock was in wait. The Indians troops warned the advancing troops, but the PLA men continued with their advance. The Indians had to fire a few warning shots in the air, and this brought in new realities to the fore. The Chinese, on seeing the aggressive posture, fled, only to return a little later.

This time they came with their armoured personnel carriers, driving on their cemented road from Moldo to Rezang La. But this advance also came to a halt and was followed by a hasty retreat. The Indian troops were at a stone’s throw from the Moldo garrison, dominating each and every move of the PLA. The sight of anti-tank missiles and rocket launchers had deterred the move of the Chinese armoured personnel carrier and halted them in their tracks.

The Chinese had realised by now that they were not only outnumbered but totally out-flanked, making their position untenable. Any armed clash hereafter would prove suicidal. The annihilation of Moldo garrison was assured for the Chinese had clashes erupted. The Indians by now were firmly dug in.

The way of doing business on the borders with China has undergone a paradigm shift. In the past five decades, this was the first-ever offensive operation carried out against the Chinese. The initiative is now with India; the shoe is on the other foot. Having enhanced India’s negotiating power manifold, the unthinkable so far is now a new reality.

------------------------------------------------


@Nilgiri @kaykay @JanjaWeed @Saithan and others. This is a very good read. Initially, I thought of marking the important points. But then I would have to mark almost everything.

 

[Saithan]

"untraceable"...whatever that means, I guess it is all relative....

BRO's new highway untraceable by enemy, saves hours and gives 365-day connectivity amid tension with China

This road will give strategic connectivity to security forces as it will be untraceable for the neighbouring countries. The two other roads-- Srinagar-Kargil-Leh and Manali Sarchu-Leh roads-- are exposed as they are close to the International Border which makes it easy for the enemy to keep a...

economictimes.indiatimes.com

BRO's new highway untraceable by enemy, saves hours and gives 365-day connectivity amid tension with China


Synopsis
This road will give strategic connectivity to security forces as it will be untraceable for the neighbouring countries. The two other roads-- Srinagar-Kargil-Leh and Manali Sarchu-Leh roads-- are exposed as they are close to the International Border which makes it easy for the enemy to keep a watch on them.

LEH (LADAKH) [INDIA]: Amid ongoing tensions at the India-China border, the Border Roads Organisation (BRO) has almost finished work on the third road, also known as the Nimmu-Padam-Darcha road.

This road will give strategic connectivity to security forces as it will be untraceable for the neighbouring countries. The two other roads-- Srinagar-Kargil-Leh and Manali Sarchu-Leh roads-- are exposed as they are close to the International Border which makes it easy for the enemy to keep a watch on them.

Further, this road will also save a lot of time as the old ones took almost 12-14 hours to reach Leh from Manali, but on the new road it will take only 6-7 hours.

One of the most important aspects of this road is that unlike others it can remain open almost throughout the year, whereas, the two other roads used to stay open for only 6-7 months and were usually closed for a six-month period from November.

BRO engineers said this road is functional now and is ready for heavy vehicles weighing multiple tonnes.

"This road is ready except for a 30-kilometre stretch. Now the Army can use this road. The importance of this road is that the Army can save almost 5-6 hours in transit from Manali to Leh. Also, because this road is untraceable by other countries, Army movement can happen without much security risk. This road is not close to any border," superintendent engineer, Commander 16 BRTF, MK Jain said.

"Moreover, as this road is at low altitudes, it can be opened for almost 10-11 months for vehicle movement. This road is 258 kilometres long. We have given connectivity by diverting and connecting it to a different road as 30-kilometre stretch is yet to be completed," he added.

The route mainly used for transportation of goods and personnel is the one from Zojila, which passes through the Drass-Kargil axis to Leh.

The same route was targeted heavily by the Pakistanis during the Kargil war in 1999 and was subjected to frequent bombarding and shelling by their troops from positions in high altitude mountains alongside the road.

You have to use the third eye...

 

[JanjaWeed]

Indian offensive to retake Chinese seized territory: The hidden story - The Sunday Guardian Live

The annihilation of Moldo garrison was assured for the Chinese had clashes erupted. New Delhi: On 3 July, the Prime Minister of India arrived at

www.sundayguardianlive.com

New Delhi: On 3 July, the Prime Minister of India arrived at Leh on a surprise visit. Flanked by his Army Chief and the Chief of Defence Staff, he was received by the Army Commander of Northern Command, Lt Gen Y.K. Joshi and the GOC 14 Corps, Lt Gen Harinder Singh. Both of them are responsible for the defence of Ladakh at strategic and operational levels, respectively.

This visit came in the backdrop of the unfortunate incident at Galwan on the night of 14-15 June. The nation was outraged. The death of 20 soldiers sent shockwaves through the country. The situation was really grim. The world was eager to hear Narendra Modi. The nightmarish thought of a repeat of 1962 was on everyone’s mind.

The Dragon appeared to be too aggressive and dangerous. He had moved up and close with 20,000 troops of the 4th Motorized Division and 6th Mechanized Division, equipped with light tanks, rockets and heavy artillery, ready to strike deep. India was caught off guard.

Soon after his arrival at Nimu, Prime Minister Modi was briefed by the Generals on the ground. Lt Gen Harinder Singh briefed him about what action the Chinese army had taken and what they were likely to do next. The Prime Minister listened to his General and somewhere during the course of the briefing he said, “I am not interested in what the Chinese have done and what they will do, I am interested in what you have done and what you will do.” The interjection was set to alter the future course.

He, after being updated, addressed the freshly inducted troops of 17 Corps acclimatizing at Nimu. These were the troops of India’s only mountain strike corps. They were inducted recently to deal with the dual-threat from China and Pakistan. The PM’s message was for the world, India’s belligerent neighbour and his mighty military machine.

He quoted a shloka to convey that message. It was heard all across the globe. He said, “A brave-heart protects the motherland with the power of his weapons. This land is for the brave. Our support, strength and resolve for its defence and security are as high as the Himalayas. I can see this ability and resolve in your eyes right now. It is clearly visible on your faces. You are the heroes of the same land that has repulsed the attacks and atrocities of many invaders for thousands of years. This is our identity. We are the people who worship Lord Krishna who plays the flute. We are also the same people who follow Sudarshan Chakradhari Krishna as an ideal. With this inspiration, India has emerged stronger after every attack.”

TIME TO REWRITE HISTORY

This morale-boosting message was signalling India’s strategic intent that ran too deep. More than anyone else, they were the Indian Army Generals who were listening very carefully.

It was time to rewrite history. The unthinkable so far was to be done. It was to be an offensive action of quid pro quo into Chinese-seized territory. The Prime Minister in his address had also said that “the weak cannot initiate peace. Bravery is a precondition to peace.” The Generals were quick to understand the shifting paradigm.

From the initial stages of these border tensions, the Chinese had successfully drawn the Indian troops into various face-offs, spreading in penny packets and minor tactical manoeuvres. Indians were caught in a reactive mode. Indian troops were tied down at a number of places over wide frontages. Stretching from Daulat Beg Oldi (DBO) in the north to Pangong Lake in the south, this was roughly 300 kilometres in extent. The initiative was complete with the Dragon.

By early July, India had also deployed its troops from the Northern Command reserve. Soon after the Galwan clashes this Division was moved up from Himachal Pradesh, directly into the frontlines in Ladakh, thus beefing up the defences. The holding 14 Corps, however, demanded more and more troops that were ever insufficient—a typical defender’s syndrome where the troops are never enough and there is always a piece of ground left to be occupied.

But this was exactly the way Indian Army was made to behave while dealing with the Chinese, right from the 1950s onward. The debacle of 1962 had forced upon us a strong defensive mindset. India stood psychologically paralysed in the aftermath. The Chinese exploited this state and made transgressions and intrusions with impunity: an annual feature of sorts.

The differing perceptions of the LAC worked to China’s advantage. They would come forward by two steps and retreat by one; thus in five decades we lost hundreds of square kilometres to their salami-slicing tactics.

STATIC DEFENCE IS A THING OF THE PAST

However, the Doklam crisis of June 2017 changed all that. The handling of this crisis with alacrity instilled the much-needed confidence into our establishment. The Chinese were dealt with firmly from a position of strength. Indians had pre-empted the PLA’s move by occupying the dominating ridge line and stalling their planned ingress. General Bipin Rawat was the Army Chief at the helm of affairs and is now India’s first CDS.

Presently, General Mukund Naravane, Chief of Army Staff, is handling the current crisis. His vast hands-on experience in dealing with the Chinese is a blessing. Offensive plans were drawn under his watch and vetted at the highest levels. The strategy of static defence was an antiquated idea by now.

Concurrently to this planning, defences were bolstered all across the LAC. Additional divisions were mobilised, building upon the existing force levels already deployed right across to the last bend of Arunachal Pradesh.

To deny the Chinese any surprises from air, Indian Air Force was conducting round the clock airspace domination. Indian Army had also carried operational deployment of various strategic assets like the land version of Brahmos cruise missiles by the end of June. All avenues of Chinese ingress, if any, were plugged by now.

The LAC held firmly in strength, the defensive plans over land were all in place, complemented by those at sea and in the air. This seriousness and resolve beckoned India’s intention to defend every inch of her territory.

Indian Navy had also set sail into the deep blue waters of Indian Ocean. Our warships were well poised, threatening the Chinese supply lines passing through the Malaca Strait, just in case the balloon went up. In the Far East, Indian naval warships were also carrying sea manoeuvres alongside the ships of friendly world powers in the disputed waters of South China Sea. Global support had been mobilised in India’s favour.

Earlier in Ladakh, a brigade had been pulled out of the Army Headquarters’ reserve Mountain Division and brought into 14 Corps zone. The great strategic airlift by C-17 Globe Masters of Indian Air Force was executed. These gigantic machines ferried tons weapons, ammunition and logistics alongside the troop build-up throughout May and June.

On 21 May, the first brigade of this reserve arrived in Leh. Initially, they were tasked to augment the existing resources of 14 Corps in holding role. However, the Galwan incident of mid-June changed the dynamics. Since an offensive action was on the table, it was decided to bring in the rest of this Mountain Division. The air lift began soon thereafter and this Division closed in by 20 June, now armed with fresh operational mandate.

The 17 Corps, India’s sole strike corps, was fully acclimatized and prepared for any eventuality, though not to be committed at this early stage. However, the GOC 17 Corps, Lt General Sawneet Singh was given an additional task: to exercise operational control of this newly inducted crack Mountain Division. Trained to infiltrate and strike deep behind enemy lines. They were capable of turning the enemy’s defences.

By now, the reserve Division of Northern Command was also deployed, beefing up the entire defences along the LAC in Ladakh. Deployments were from the Depsang plains to the occupying heights around Galwan, providing depth to the Shyok-Dubruk-DBO road and strengthening the Dungti-Demchok corridor.

The military to military negotiations continued. A number of rounds were conducted, with each talk lasting for hours. The efforts were to amicably resolve the dispute through talks. Unfortunately, all these talks failed to make any substantial headway. In the meanwhile, our plans for a quid pro quo were in place with multiple options.

OVER OPTIMISTIC CHINA

The haplessness of the Indian establishment was also clearly manifesting with each failed talk. This in turn made the Chinese over-optimistic of their strategy. Their grand plan appeared to be to hold fast and not relent to the Indian demand of pre-April positions. The idea seemed to be to exhaust the Indian Army through the winter deployments. The huge economic cost of prolonged military mobilization was likely to prove unsustainable for a de-growing economy in these Covid times. Thus China would win this war without firing a single shot.

On our side, amongst other challenges, there was strong unhappiness in the rank and file of the Indian Army. They were unhappy in the manner they were used at Pangong and Galwan, fighting the PLA with sticks and stones.

This failed strategy had led to the death of 20 soldiers, with an equal or a greater number of casualties on the other side. The scenes of soldiers throwing stones and using clubs to defend themselves had brought a lot of embarrassment to the professional Army. It was now the time to test our tactical acumen and flex our muscles.

OFFENSIVE PLANS

In early August, this newly inducted Mountain Division was fully acclimatized. They had started to carry out reconnaissance and validate their offensive plans. These plans were so secret that even the holding formation troops were unaware of what was going on. Options were carefully drawn and diligently vetted.

By 24 August, one plan was finally given the go ahead. Simultaneously, the Chief of Defence Staff, General Bipin Rawat also cautioned the nation to stay prepared for any eventuality, even if that meant war.

At ground zero, the company commanders and platoon commanders of this elite mountain division had by now selected their routes of infiltration, identified tactical heights to be occupied and timed their paces for speedy retaking.

From the word go, the final phase of the retaking was planned to be completed in 120 minutes flat. Artillery was put in place, ready to support the infiltrating troops should the need arose. Armoured elements were well poised, ready to out-manoeuvre and destroy any PLA attempt, if they thrust into the Chushul valley. Air defence troops were also deployed with shoulder fired anti-aircraft Igla missiles, networked and coordinated to shoot down any Chinese aircraft interfering with our advancing troops.

The Chinese on their side had their mechanized Combat Team located in Spangur near Moldo. They had 33-ton T15 light tanks designed to fight a battle in this high-altitude region.

GEARED FOR ACTION

The Indian troops were fully geared for action, all ends tied, contingencies catered for and rehearsed. We were ready to strike. The objective was Spangur Bowl, an area south of Pangong and east of Chushul.

The features dominating the Spangur gap provided great tactical dominance and huge strategic advantages. Black Top, Helmet, Magar and Gurung Hills stretching right up to Rezang La were these features. Under the cover of darkness, Indian infiltrating troops moved up to the LAC, established their release points and waited for the green signal. Some troops mounted on high mobility vehicles and drove straight up to the objective—the 3 km ridgeline on the hill alongside Requin.

At the word go, these troops crossed over into the enemy claimed territory with lightning speed. The mountain division of Tibetan troops of the Special Frontier Force occupied the hill features, beating their own planned timings well under 120 minutes.

Before the break of dawn, one complete infantry brigade with over 2,000 troops was holding the heights overlooking the Spangur Bowl. Armed with French Milan anti-tank missiles and Carl Gustav rocket launchers, the Indians had literally rendered the Chinese armoured tanks at Moldo redundant and outmanoeuvred. On 31 August, the garrison at Moldo was virtually under siege.

Surprised and shocked, the Chinese mustered their club-wielding troops and advanced towards the positions now held by the Indians. More shock was in wait. The Indians troops warned the advancing troops, but the PLA men continued with their advance. The Indians had to fire a few warning shots in the air, and this brought in new realities to the fore. The Chinese, on seeing the aggressive posture, fled, only to return a little later.

This time they came with their armoured personnel carriers, driving on their cemented road from Moldo to Rezang La. But this advance also came to a halt and was followed by a hasty retreat. The Indian troops were at a stone’s throw from the Moldo garrison, dominating each and every move of the PLA. The sight of anti-tank missiles and rocket launchers had deterred the move of the Chinese armoured personnel carrier and halted them in their tracks.

The Chinese had realised by now that they were not only outnumbered but totally out-flanked, making their position untenable. Any armed clash hereafter would prove suicidal. The annihilation of Moldo garrison was assured for the Chinese had clashes erupted. The Indians by now were firmly dug in.

The way of doing business on the borders with China has undergone a paradigm shift. In the past five decades, this was the first-ever offensive operation carried out against the Chinese. The initiative is now with India; the shoe is on the other foot. Having enhanced India’s negotiating power manifold, the unthinkable so far is now a new reality.

------------------------------------------------


@Nilgiri @kaykay @JanjaWeed @Saithan and others. This is a very good read. Initially, I thought of marking the important points. But then I would have to mark almost everything.

just goes to show that afterall this wasn’t any preemptive action towards advancing Chinese move. Instead a well thought out & well rehearsed action plan to negate Chinese advantages at various points. Now.. the curious case to emerge.. are we going to hold on to these key areas like Siachin or is it going to be used as bargaining chip? I prefer first one...

 

[Nilgiri]

just goes to show that afterall this wasn’t any preemptive action towards advancing Chinese move. Instead a well thought out & well rehearsed action plan to negate Chinese advantages at various points. Now.. the curious case to emerge.. are we going to hold on to these key areas like Siachin or is it going to be used as bargaining chip? I prefer first one...

It should be held onto till appropriate purely verification-based regime for dealing w.r.t PLA/CCP is agreed to by them (and there are clear fail-safes in play)...their presence in this crucial area must be pushed back as far as possible.

Bunker down, be prepared and a keep strong vigil in meantime...enemy need pure business end for some time.

 

[Nilgiri]

BRO ropes in new machines, working 24x7 to provide faster passages to security forces in Ladakh
ANI | Updated: Sep 6, 2020, 20:14 IST

File photo used for representation

NEW DELHI: The Border Road Organisation (BRO) has started working round the clock to complete the work on all roads connecting Leh and clean the patches which have seen landslides or were blocked otherwise amid a tense stand-off with China.
The work will help facilitate the armed forces who have to move heavy machines and other weaponry to required locations.


According to the BRO officials, latest machines have been roped in costing crores of rupees to cut the road and frequent blasting is also being carried out.

Apart from this, BRO workers and hired labourers have been asked to work even on weekends and in double shifts.

The workforce has also been increased considerably, sensing the gravity of the current situation at the China border.

Keeping the current situation into account, the BRO is also deploying heavy machinery to clear the road ahead of the winters.

"In the current situation, to help the Army and other forces to transport any heavy pieces of machinery, BRO has adopted the latest machine which you won't find in any other part of India. These machines are also reducing human risk and we are also dealing with explosives to cut mountains to build the roads," B Kishan, Executive Engineer Officer commanding, 81 Road Construction Company, BRO told ANI.

"With this new machine, our speed of making roads has increased 10 times. We can now build roads very easily and swiftly as the machine helps us fix explosives to break rocks," Kishan added.

BRO has also been connecting the roads as per the requirement of forces.

Amid the current situation at the China border, BRO has linked a road to Ladakh through Padam-Yulchung-Sumdo to Khalsi on National Highway 1. This will allow security forces to immediately use this third access route for operational purposes.

India China border news: BRO ropes in new machines, working 24x7 to provide faster passages to security forces in Ladakh | India News - Times of India

India News: The Border Road Organisation has started working round the clock to complete the work on all roads connecting Leh and clean the patches which have see

timesofindia.indiatimes.com

 

[Maximilian Veers]

This is how I roughly see the situation.

- Send in the PLA in force into Ladakh and capture all the commanding points in Ladakh.
- Using India's defensive mindset to confuse IA and hold on to the territory throughout the winter while not giving in to any of the demands by India.
- Force India to stop all the road and Infrastructure work in Ladakh and the border areas.
- Chinese also possibly hoped the poor Infrastructure present on the Indian side would make it difficult for the IA to mobilize in large numbers.
- The COVID pandemic and its economic vows will make it expensive for India to maintain a large army there for a lengthy duration.
- This will force India to give in to a favourable agreement for the Chinese by next year giving a safe and stable border in the eastern front before the PLA can focus on SCS and Taiwan.

India's counter

- India massively expanded its Infrastructure in Ladakh hoping to finish all the due work in the fastest possible time.
- Massive economic attack on Chinese IT companies like Byte Dance and Tencent who had a massive hold in India.

TikTok predicts over $6 bn loss from India's ban: Report

Besides Tiktok, India banned on Monday 58 other apps with Chinese links, including the popular UC Browser, for engaging in activities "prejudicial to sovereignty and integrity of India, defence of India, security of state and public order".

economictimes.indiatimes.com

Tencent loses nearly $34 billion since the PUBG Mobile ban in India — its second-largest valuation dip this year | Business Insider India

Chinese technology company Tencent loses $34 billion in two days since Indian mobile app ban took away the largest set of users from its iconic game, PlayerUnknown's Battlegrounds (PUBG)

www.businessinsider.in

- India is hoping, the United States along with the QUAD and other countries will chip in and ban Chinese apps multiplying the problem for the Chinese.
- Change from a defensive mindset to an offensive mindset, confusing the PLA and forcing the PLA to focus its energies and ousting Indian troops from its fortified positions.
- Entire PLA camps other than the one in Shingzhang is in LOS of spotters and can come under direct artillery fire possibly cutting off the Chinese road in the bush area and S301 by IA troops in Rezang la and Reqin la

@Nilgiri @Joe Shearer @Saithan Updated Map, What do you guys think?

 

[Maximilian Veers]

None of what China does is surprising.

I think it is important to realize that if a country is run on pragmatic authorianism even though China calls it communism. They're capable of gathering a core members to galvanize the country to grow in a certain direction. And the country will grow, the infrastructure will grow. There will be many who will be poor or whatever, but if you have a masterplan, the peasents are pawns to be used up until you have kings and queens left.

The west were so convinced by their own superiority that they didn't think the Communist party would be able to hold on to continue if the west poured more money into the country.

Authoritative systems are only temporarily powerful, they never survive in the long run. Democracy, by far is the best system available in the long run for a country to survive. China is more or less succeeded in the past few decades, but communism will fail the very second the country goes into a real crisis.

 

[Nilgiri]

- Send in the PLA in force into Ladakh and capture all the commanding points in Ladakh.

I don't see them doing that, given the force levels and accumulations needed for that will be detected quite quickly and responded to.

I don't think CCP wants to escalate anymore, they will maybe revisit next year.

Updated Map, What do you guys think?

Many (like Nitin) are saying Black top and Helmet are in control of PLA and it is next ridge line that is now monitoring them closer from there.

As far as I understand it, the main changes of note were:

- Magar + gurung hill are now heavily operationalised and they are looking down on Moldo post and has it fully dominated.

- Rezang La and Reiqin La pass area have similarly been dominated on all sides and thus any ingress there by PLA (which they employed in november 1962) is countered early now.

The very feature of the arrangement of spanggur lake and the ridges on the Chinese side are a problem for them logistically to supply and maneuver in the area.

The LAC itself ends shortly south of this area so it is a good thing strategically for India here overall given its more of pressure on a "corner" rather than pressure on middle-line (which can cause problem of salient weakness) etc.

 

[Maximilian Veers]

I don't see them doing that, given the force levels and accumulations needed for that will be detected quite quickly and responded to.
I don't think CCP wants to escalate anymore, they will maybe revisit next year.

They did not want a war but ensure they have the advantage in Ladakh, get most of the advantageous positions and force India into a favorable agreement. They probably expected India not to escalate this thinking the economic and COVID impact would somehow reduce her ability to respond.

Many (like Nitin) are saying Black top and Helmet are in control of PLA and it is next ridge line that is now monitoring them closer from there.

I did hear, except it makes little sense to have the Chinese control those positions where they can direct artillery fire to Chusul Garrison, ALG, and other areas. You need Blacktop and Helmet to neutralize PLA armor and gain complete control of the Spangur Gap. Besides, some of my well known reliable sources like @hellfire_81 on twitter are claiming we have Blacktop and Helmet.

Keeping Black and Helmet, along with the other positions occupied turns the entire South Pangang So completely untenable to maintain once the conflict starts.

 

[Nilgiri]

They did not want a war but ensure they have the advantage in Ladakh, get most of the advantageous positions and force India into a favorable agreement. They probably expected India not to escalate this thinking the economic and COVID impact would somehow reduce her ability to respond.

Oh ok, you were coming at it from their earlier wargaming analysis on it. Gotcha.

I did hear, except it makes little sense to have the Chinese control those positions where they can direct artillery fire to Chusul Garrison, ALG, and other areas. You need Blacktop and Helmet to neutralize PLA armor and gain complete control of the Spangur Gap. Besides, some of my well known reliable sources like @hellfire_81 on twitter are claiming we have Blacktop and Helmet.

Keeping Black and Helmet, along with the other positions occupied turns the entire South Pangang So completely untenable to maintain once the conflict starts.

Let's see, there should be some osint and further analysis on all of this coming up.

 

[Gary]

the stakes are very high not just for India but the whole Indo-Pacific Countries, if India were to kowtow to Chinese coercion it'll send a clear signal to China's other smaller less capable nations, in particular the SouthEast Asian states to submit to China's version of might makes right. not only that it'll also serves as a deterrent of a potential military alliance such as the Quad and what comes after it.

the logic is simple, if India can't, so do you

But (at least for now) India appears not to back down and in return China now faces a stiff willing opponents on it's other side of the border. this could either be a gross miscalculations or a brilliant geopolitical maneuver by Beijing, depends on how India would deal with it.

ps: Appeasement never works with a revisionist power, the thing is while people who understand history tends to realize the threats, the people in power don't

 

[Gary]

China's so called string of pearls are in fact a fragile links , almost to the point of imaginary, no nations surrounding India where China plans to station their troops are likely to allow such basing, as it will make them prime target from the largest and most powerful countries in the region if China were to confront India on the Indian Ocean, I personally don't see how Sri Lanka or Maldives could do what Nepal is doing now with China in it's backs considering in a real shooting war unlike Nepal, China couldn't ferry their troops fast enough and in numbers to come save the day . it'll have to bring Troops, materials and supplies all the way from China across the East Sea, then the South China sea all the way to the Malacca strait which will be vulnerable to attacks from other QUAD members, consider the fact that Taiwan still stands till this very moment it's crystal clear that the PLA doesn't have the capability of an long range expeditionary force capable of supporting far away territories,because if they do, they're in Taipei right now which is not the case.