Hey thx, wanted to post this I remembered:@Rooxbar forgot to tag you.
@Nilgiri thoughts? PRC will play it nice from now on?
They probably realized two fronts confrontation is not strategically wise for their cause.
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Adelson referred to another Iranian dissident at the conference, Amir Abbas Fakhravar, whom he said he would like to support, saying, “I like Fakhravar because he says that, if we attack, the Iranian people will be ecstatic.” Dayanim said that when he disputed that assumption Adelson responded, “I really don’t care what happens to Iran. I am for Israel.”
Very interesting; I reply here not to derail the thread on Syria.I'm reading into structural realism right now, although in terms of directly reading from books I've decided start more historically with Machiavelli.
I am beginning this journey with a measure of skepticism of the black-box approach to formulating a general theory of state behavior because I find it counter-intuitive to formulate arguments at a macro-level without "micro-foundations", however even in these early stages I can recognize there are obvious and good reasons why this is not done, chiefly I think this is somewhere between very difficult to impossible. I refer to the categories of structural-realist (Waltz, Mearsheimer) arguments about why this "blind-ness" is necessary like so:
1) The argument of inevitability (which you're making): that the pressures/forces of the anarchic international system force states to behave according to their "structural imperative" or optimally for their survival
2) The argument of simplicity/generalizability: that it is not sensible to attempt to account for every factor, and that one can restrict variables in order to feasibly formulate a general theory which is a sufficient approximation of state behavior to be useful as an explanatory vehicle.
What I take away from this is that the pressures of international anarchy function as constraints, but not the entirety of the variables influencing state behavior, and that in the eyes of structural realists, analyzing state behavior according to these constraints as a best approximation has explanatory power.
Looking at the world around me, I just don't see a world insulated from beliefs, and identity complexes in the political realm. Whether it is in the solidarity that countries exhibit with one another, who they choose to form deeper partnerships with, how they structure and select the multi-lateral institutions they participate in.
Would Turkey and Malaysia be signing technological co-operation agreements if not for their shared religion? Would there be an organization of turkic states, without a shared identity complex, cultural practices, and beliefs? Would the EU be possible without the same, or the general solidarity between all the Western countries be possible without the same? On the tin, I think phenomenon like these point to the influence of socio-cultural factors, however constrained by the realities of state-interests within international anarchy.
To be clear, I'm seeking a counter-argument from you oh wise Rooxbar.
Salam Rooxbar,Very interesting; I reply here not to derail the thread on Syria.
I agree with some assumptions and arguments of structural-realism but only as a prescriptive model not a descriptive one. Theirs is a model selection dilemma, of Occam's razor considerations on variable, i.e. parsimony. The trade-off is between both interpretability/complexity and generalisability/over-fitting. I think structural assumptions for inter-state relations as a descriptive tool fail more than not, but I see the failures as deviations from rationality. The deviations need accounting for but that's not the job of a prescriptive model. I however agree that wherever structural forces fail to give an account of state action, the action is more often than not, a rough edge than a crucial component of IR (i.e. the neorealist can claim he has foregone granularity for the sake of at least having a picture; others they will claim in their attempts at capturing details miss the forest for the trees). After all the state of anarchy comes with multiple equilibria and the freedom accorded through the various evolutionary paths towards the same power maximization outcome can look like ideological choices. This may seem like a version of defensive realism, but I find the assumptions there more problematic than the work of Mearsheimer et al.
I haven't really made up my mind about how much of this path dependency is contingent, or what degree of ideological freedom can be tolerated by the structural forces. In the field of comparative politics trying to account for state action based on internal forces, every theory put forward (domestic politics forces, pressure groups, class analysis, rational choice, organizational/institutional process, bureaucratic inertia, etc.) has some merit which means it will again all boil down to trade-offs and model selection as an amalgamation of all will just be a complicated qualitative description with little explicit predictive power. A theory of IR based on a foundation of Innenpolitiks has always seemed to me to be lacking. But me personally, I believe in anarchy within the state as well and this lack of rigidity within states (even one-party police state ones) is itself a factor in state action in international stage letting itself be moulded by international structural forces. My assumptions (which I reiterated in that post in lay terms) is derived from my understanding of history more than anything else (IR theory included) and is more due to Thucydides, Aristotle, Polybius and Machiavelli rather than Waltz, Morgenthau, Wendt or any others. It's more informed by a reading of Russo-Chinese relations during cold war or Israeli-Iranian cold conflict of aughts and 10s or books on Gladio operations and the like by Turkish authors such as Mumcu and Hablemitoğlu (there's also one by Paul Williams, not as robust). I'm sure if I go into the history of India-Pakistan (book recs appreciated), the same lessons await me there as well. What I mean to say is my conceptions came first, then came a reading of IR which on many occasions reinforced my conceptions.
But I have to add these assumption of structural forces in neorealism is itself axiomatic and static as it involves no dynamic evolution clause in its various formulations; this is a serious flaw as politics is surface and economic and energy constraints, themselves dynamic, by underlying it, make politics even more unstable. I have been meaning to read Gourevitch and other second-image reversed approaches for sometime now, hoping there might be some answers there; haven't gotten to it yet. At least 100 more books on the reading list before we get there lol.