TR Naval Programs

[Oublious]

Don't miss Kozan Selcuk...

 

[dBSPL]

From what I can find, an average French and British carrier group looks something like this.

France has one carrier, four destroyers, a stealth frigate, a supply ship, and a nuclear-powered submarine.

The British carrier group has one carrier, two destroyers, two frigates, one submarine solid store ship, a fleet tanker

I believe it wouldn't be too difficult for Turkey to build a carrier group equal to France and Britain. Turkey could also increase its carrier group capabilities by using USVs as an alternative to adding additional ships.

Costs are a very important factor here. The peacetime task group structure and wartime (or near territorial waters in tense areas at risk of hot conflict) are quite different. An example of this can be that how the US navy used a strike group in the Iraq war.

In terms of environmental risk factors and threat sources, the naval structures of these countries you mentioned have the reserves to keep the wartime task group constantly active. Or these issues are considered within a joint NATO task group. Salvos of 2-3 AshM in simulations may be 15-20 in a full scale war. Aircraft carriers are floating air bases and actually for dominate the area where they are located. For this reason, air bases are priority targets for the enemy. Moreover, unlike land air bases, this air base requires three-dimensional defense, the most important threat being submarines.

The Turkish state faces three different threat perceptions in three different seas. While the Turkish navy tends to force projection and increase its regional deterrence from the Indian Ocean to the Atlantic, it also faces a much more complex equation in the defense of the blue homeland.

In order for the Turkish navy to float an active carrier strike group in war and in all war risk scenarios, it needs to grow by an average of 20% compared to the current fleet on the basis of main combat platforms. There is of course an alternative way. Shifting littoral sea defense to lower tonnage ships with relatively lower production and operating costs. Corvettes. MPAC and HISAR, equipping for ASuW/AAW types of warfare. ADA Mid-life modernization. Thus, more AAW destroyers and all heavy frigates would become a permanent element of the blue navy.

 

[Sanchez]

In order for the Turkish navy to float an active carrier strike group in war and in all war risk scenarios, it needs to grow by an average of 20% compared to the current fleet on the basis of main combat platforms. There is of course an alternative way. Shifting littoral sea defense to lower tonnage ships with relatively lower production and operating costs. Corvettes. MPAC and HISAR equipped for ASuW/AAW types of warfare.Thus, more AAW destroyers and all heavy frigates would become a permanent element of the blue navy.

Hard agree. Though one is gotta add, We really do not have a ship capable of fleet air defence, that's TF2000 territory. If Turkey is interested in a blue water CSG which is basically a carrier, one oiler, one logistics ship, 2-3 GP frigates, 1-2 AA destroyers(or frigates, same thing in this sense) and 1-2 subs; we need:

The continuation of the current 16 frigate layout + 4-6 more,
3-4 destroyers,
One more oiler and logistics ship,
and at least 2 more subs.

Currently, we are set to loose the 4 Yavuz Class ships in the near(15+-) future, as well as all the 8 Burak Class avisos and some number of earlier FACs, Doğan Class with 4 ships are goners, one was already decommissioned recently. 4 Rüzgars will see a similar fate in the not so distant future.

To make up for all the losses, we currently projected to have, 4 İ Class frigates to replace Yavuz Class, 8 Hisars to replace Buraks; currently TBD number of MPACs to replace Doğan and Rüzgars. We can lift some of the weight off of the surface ships with drones in the next decades, yes, but they will never be enough to fully replace actual ships in littoral seas. Number of TF2000s is not yet certain and also not certain if one or two Gabyas will be replaced, they are getting older as well. With Milden, By the time Reis Class is fully operational on all fours, earlier Atılays, at least 2 boats are also goners.

Our projects are not adding numbers, they are replacing our old stuff. I'm not seeing a new outlook to make the navy bigger, it just doesn't exist yet. And if it does, budget for it is currently not there, that's for certain.

 

[Zafer]

They don't have to be twin ships

As they are not meant to be built at the same time they will reflect the capabilities of their time. I would say they would be on average 5 years apart over 20 years. They should cover operations in the Mediterranean, the Middle East, around Africa and reaching Indonesia.

 

[Gary]

With all due respect, A fleet of capable SSN is more crucial to develop true blue water capability than aircraft carriers, specially for medium powers like Turkey.

With all due respect...nope.

Submarines aren't as good as aircraft carriers for sea control mission, a blue water navy has only one goal. Sea control.

 

[Afif]

With all due respect...nope.

Submarines aren't as good as aircraft carriers for sea control mission, a blue water navy has only one goal. Sea control.

No and no.

Post in thread 'Naval Programs'
https://defencehub.live/threads/naval-programs.335/post-259419

 

[Gary]

Name all large naval campaign from WW2, Falklands and Indo-Pak war of 1971, the carriers...not submarines are the dominant tools for sea control. Classic case is the Ghazi v Vikrant of 1971. Not only that the Ghazi failed to wrestle sea control, it failed its task to even come close to the Vikrant. While the Vikrant and its carrier battle group proved its utility, dominating the bay of Bengal and deny their use for Pakistan.

A popular perception is that submarines can provide sea control given their relative stealth and invulnerability. However, it must be considered that submarines are essentially a warfighting-only platform, while ships like aircraft carriers are valuable platforms for roles across the spectrum of conflict. A Carrier Battle Group (CBG) is a valuable adjunct as a submarine-support vessel. CBGs can not only provide C4ISR services but also disrupt enemy air and surface anti-submarine warfare (ASW) efforts, and even conduct ASW operations themselves. Rear Admiral Sudhir Pillai (Retd)​

If Turkiye wants to play great power and it wants its power projected the farthest away from shore as possible in the fastest amount of time and in the most flexible manner, aircraft carriers...not submarines are the way to go.

Its just the law of physics that dictate aircraft could cover an area larger and at a much faster pace than slow submarines which its biggest dilemma is creating noise while going faster or stay silent while going slow...

Aircraft carrier operation are assigned for ocean size sector of operation while submarines, due to their limitation are usually assigned in a much smaller sector of operation.

Nobody really cares if countries come out with latest nuclear submarines, but once they start building carriers (especially supercarriers) all eyes are in constant monitor of progress from keel laying to commissioning, that shows just how much value a carrier offered to any blue water navy. Case study: the Type 003 the most studied PLAN ship and its 004 successor.

Please remember this, naval groupings are usually centered around surface ships, not submarines...that's why blue water navy has the Carrier Strike Group (CSG) or Surface Action Group (SAG) but there's yet to be a Submarine strike group.

In a CSG, the submarines are subservient to the carriers not the other way around.

 

[Afif]

Name all large naval campaign from WW2, Falklands and Indo-Pak war of 1971, the carriers...not submarines are the dominant tools for sea control. Classic case is the Ghazi v Vikrant of 1971. Not only that the Ghazi failed to wrestle sea control, it failed its task to even come close to the Vikrant. While the Vikrant and its carrier battle group proved its utility, dominating the bay of Bengal and deny their use for Pakistan.

That would be a wrong comparison.

In both scenarios the subs were old diesel electric vessel.
They simply does not have ability keep the pace up with a carrier strike group that is roaming freely in the ocean.
And here, I am talking about SSN exclusively.
Ironically, in that same war where Argentinian Subs failed, royal navy's SSN prevailed and successfully sunk the Argentina's major surface combatant.

If Turkiye wants to play great power and it wants its power projected the farthest away from shore as possible in the fastest amount of time and in the most flexible manner, aircraft carriers...not submarines are the way to go.

Sure, the CSG is the best for dominating the sea.

But I am not even arguing about that.

If aircraft carriers are the best for sea control, guess what? a fleet of SSN are the best suited for sea denial and deterrence. (to this day the biggest threat against CSG comes from SSNs)

All I am saying is, considering all aspect it would be more logical for Turkey to develop ultimate sea denial and deterrence capability first, then go for carriers if needed.

Now this is only opinion, and we can dive deep into that topic if you want but I don't have time for now.

Quote-
A popular perception is that submarines can provide sea control given their relative stealth and invulnerability. However, it must be considered that submarines are essentially a warfighting-only platform, while ships like aircraft carriers are valuable platforms for roles across the spectrum of conflict. A Carrier Battle Group (CBG) is a valuable adjunct as a submarine-support vessel. CBGs can not only provide C4ISR services but also disrupt enemy air and surface anti-submarine warfare (ASW) efforts, and even conduct ASW operations themselves. Rear Admiral Sudhir Pillai (Retd)
Unqoute-

I agree.

But here's a quote from Admiral Hyman G. Rickover. ( who also happens to be 'The Father of nuclear navy' ) when he was asked in a congressional hearing about how long USN carriers will survive in a full blown war against soviet union, his response was, '48 HOURS!'

 

[Afif]

How Should the National Submarine (MILDEN) Be? Conventional or Nuclear?​

22 Eylül 2021

M. Haluk BAYBAŞ / [email protected]
Silent in depths
Submariner Motto

The Turkish Naval Forces and the defence industry are now taking steps for constructing the National Submarine (MILDEN) based on knowledge and know-how gained by their competent engineers and workers in the prideful materialisation of the National Ship (MILGEM) class corvettes and frigates. First of all, it is imperative to decide on the main propulsion system of the submarine to be constructed, as it will completely affect the design variables. At this point the important decision factor will be between the conventional diesel-electric propulsion system and nuclear power.
Before making this decision, let us examine the submarines and the submarine operation in general, which are quite different from the surface ships.
Submarine warfare encompasses the attack of conventional or nuclear-powered submarines with torpedoes, guided missiles, and nuclear weapons against hostile submarines, surface ships, and land targets by using advanced command-control and detection systems. In addition, other uses of submarines include covert reconnaissance, clandestine operations such as insertion of special force units to the target area, laying of mines covertly, and screening of the surface task force.[1]
Submarines traditionally fulfil their tasks individually, both to maintain their stealthiness and to increase operational effectiveness. Nonetheless, the desire to use this effective platform along with other units of the navy has always existed. However, this thought had been abandoned until recently due to communication constraints in the past. The classical usage has shown that sea denial and attacking the sea line of communication (SLOC) have been the main tasks of submarines. Today, especially nuclear submarines can be deployed effectively in a wider range of tasks such as escorting the aircraft carrier task group, reconnaissance, surveillance and intelligence gathering, support for special force operations, and attack with cruise missiles to land targets.
The most important feature of submarines is that they operate underwater and therefore they are difficult to detect. In other words, “stealthiness” is a crucial feature of submarines. Stealthiness allows them to both ensure self-defence and also develop surprise attacks against the enemy without being detected. It is vital to maintain stealth, especially for conventional submarines. Conventional diesel-electric submarines derive their underwater propulsion from electric motors powered by batteries. There is a need to operate at low speeds for the economic usage of batteries. In addition, it is rather inevitable that they can be located and attacked if they give a slightest indication of their position to hostile units. There are many examples of this situation in history. For this reason, it is essential that they do not give any indication about their presence and maintain their stealth until they conduct their attacks. Another weakness of conventional submarines is that they need to take fresh air from the surface by extending the snorkel at certain periods to recharge their batteries.[2] A snorkel on surface can harm their stealth. In particular, maritime patrol aircrafts (MPA) and naval helicopters can detect periscopes and snorkels by using their radar and infrared systems.

French Rubis-class submarines are one of the smallest-sized nuclear submarines.
Conventional submarines operates at low speeds in their patrol areas for the reasons stated above. Hence, a large number of conventional submarines are needed to be effective in large operational areas. Even so, conventional submarines are very effective and deterrent within the scope of the sea denial, especially in littoral waters[3]. In the maritime literature, conventional submarines are seen as important platforms for increasing the efficiency of smaller navies, especially those adopting sea denial. Since submarines can operate without prior sea and air control, they allow a weaker actor means to attack a stronger one.[4]
Nuclear-Powered Submarines
Nuclear-powered submarines are basically divided into two groups. The first group is nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSN), which use nuclear energy only for main propulsion, and as weapons they use torpedoes and guided missiles against ships, and cruise missiles against land targets. The second type of nuclear submarine is Nuclear Ballistic Missile Submarines (SSBN), which use both nuclear energy in the propulsion system and in intercontinental ballistic nuclear missiles as weapons. SSNs are used for conventional submarine warfare and sea control, whereas SSBNs serve within the scope of nuclear deterrence as a pillar of the nuclear triad. In this article, we are interested in nuclear-powered attack submarines, SSNs in the first group. Nuclear attack submarines can also be categorised under two groups. The first group includes SSNs that use mainly torpedoes as weapons; the second group includes SSGN[5]s that use both torpedoes and large amounts of cruise missiles. Nuclear attack submarines will be referred to as nuclear submarines from this point on.
Nuclear submarines are not subject to disadvantages such as low speed and power limitation. Flexibility, high speed, stealth, endurance, reach, autonomy, and punch (strike), which are expressed as ‘7 deadly virtues’ of nuclear submarines, carry them to a unique place.[6] They are directly used to establish sea control instead of sea denial. In fact, Russia calls these ships “nuclear underwater cruisers”.

Astute-class submarines serve in the United Kingdom’s SSN fleet.
Because they don’t need fresh air from the surface, they do not need to snorkel and can be constantly submerged and maintain their stealth, as well as conduct high-speed operations at deeper depths for extended periods of time (theoretically unlimited). As such, nuclear submarines enjoy both stealth and speed benefits. These features provide them with significant advantages during operations. For example, even if the periscope of a nuclear submarine is detected, it can easily break its track away after its own attack by making high-speed evasive manoeuvres for a long period of time. A nuclear submarine that manoeuvres at 30 knots in the deep can be anywhere within a 30-mile diameter in half an hour. This circle expands in favour of the submarine with each passing minute and as a result it becomes increasingly difficult to find it. In addition, the submarine can detect any hostile torpedoes instantly and avoid them with high speed.
Nuclear submarines can operate in vast areas and cover long sea passages in a short time, thanks to their capability to cruise at higher speeds for unlimited period of time. They can be deployed to different missions in a row, just like surface ships, and their tasking areas can be changed in a short time thanks to easier communication with the command headquarters due to their confidence in not to hesitate to disclose their positions. Nuclear submarines can accompany aircraft carrier or surface task groups as they have the advantage of stealth and speed, and can provide support in front or around the group. All these features provide flexibility for both the submarine commander and decision-making mechanisms at shore headquarters.

Severodvinsk, one of Russia’s Project 885 Yasen class submarines.
Nuclear submarines can be constructed on a larger scale since they do not have energy, power, and high speed restrictions. Thus, they can carry more torpedoes and guided missiles, providing power projection with significant firepower. With their high firepower, they can attack land targets from long distances without being detected. Likewise, they can carry out more extensive special force operations thanks to the capacity of large living spaces. Nuclear-powered submarines can be deployed to cover large operational areas of almost hundreds of miles.
Large navies turned to nuclear-powered submarines a long time ago because of some of the weaknesses of conventional submarines. While the USA, UK, and France only have nuclear in their inventory; Russia, China, and India have both nuclear and conventional submarines.
One of the highlights of the Falklands War between the UK and Argentina in 1982 was the sinking of the Argentine cruiser General Belgrano with 2 torpedoes by the British nuclear attack submarine Conqueror. As we see in this incident, a nuclear submarine, following the outbreak of the crisis, arrived in the southern hemisphere in a short time, found the most important unit of the enemy, after exchanging the necessary reports and orders with the command headquarters, attacked and sank it, and then ensured its own absolute survival. Only a nuclear submarine could accomplish this task. On the other hand, the conventional submarines in Argentina navy, one of which was made in the USA (Santa Fe (S-21)) and the other was of German origin Type-209 San Luis (S‑32), failed to show any success during the war and could not sink any ships.
Santa Fe, after it was detected via radar by a British anti-submarine warfare (ASW) helicopter, was attacked with depth charges as well as unusual weapons for use against a submarine such as machine gun and air to surface missile. San Luis carried out torpedo attacks on the British frigates it detected on 1 and 10 May, but failed as a result of the flaws of the torpedoes and the implementation of torpedo countermeasures by the targets.
From a tactical point of view, it is not possible to provide full submarine coverage around the Falkland Islands with only 2 conventional submarines. As we mentioned before, conventional submarines operate in allocated areas. If enemy ships enter their area, they can develop an attack, otherwise they can pass the war without engaging any target. The fact that San Luis has encountered enemy ships only twice during its time on the battlefield was an example for this situation. In fact, Argentine submarines were unable to establish any contact with British aircraft carriers, which had to be their primary targets. If Argentina had owned only one nuclear submarine, it could have changed the fate of the war with the 7 deadly virtues.

Virginia-class SSN of the US Navy.
Nuclear submarines are unique battle platforms with their features we have mentioned. From essentially a “lone wolf” a decade ago, the submarine is now nearly universally accepted as a key node within network-centric warfare, the purveyor of “undersea dominance,” and an essential element of Sea Power.[7]
Situation in the World
Currently, six countries have nuclear submarines. These are the United States, Russia, France, United Kingdom, China, and India. 68 nuclear-powered submarines in the USA, 36 in Russia, 19 in China, 11 in the United Kingdom, 10 in France, and 3 in India are operating and new ones are being built. There are also some other countries that work on nuclear submarines, such as Brazil and the Republic of Korea. Brazil takes the French design as ship type and builds it with its own reactor. The ship Alvaro Alberto was laid down in 2018 and is expected to enter service in the 2030s. The ship will be 100 metres long with a displacement of 6,000 tons and will be equipped with a 48 MW nuclear-electric propulsion system.[8] The Republic of Korea announced its intention in 2019 to build a nuclear-powered submarine. Australia is seen as another potential country.[9] [10]
Nuclear powered attack submarines vary in size. The smallest, the French Rubis class submarines, has a displacement of 2,600 tons and a length of 73.6 meters. As of 2018, there are 35 Los Angeles class submarines in the US navy inventory with a displacement of 6,900 tons and a length of 110 metres; Russia’s Yasen class submarines with a displacement of 13,800 tons and a length of 130 metres; the United Kingdom’s Trafalgar class submarines with a displacement of 5,200 tons and a length of 85.4 metres; India’s Arihat class submarines with a displacement of 7,000 tons and a length of 111 metres. The required reactor power can be up to approximately 500 MW depending on the size of the ship. The reactor of the French Rubis, one of the smallest nuclear submarine types, has a power of 48 MW. Considering that the Akkuyu nuclear power plant is 4,800 MW, it can be concluded that the reactor in the submarine is quite small, at the rate of one percent. In other words, we can say that construction, operation and maintenance of the reactor will be easier and less costly.

Los Angeles-class SSN of the US Navy.
Technological Infrastructure in Turkey
In Turkey, at Gölcük Shipyard, 3 AY-class, 4 PREVEZE-class and 4 GÜR-class conventional submarines have been built under German license since the 1980s. Finally, 6 REIS-class submarines, called Type-214TN in the international literature, are being built at Gölcük Shipyard.[11] During this whole process, sufficient experience and knowledge has been gained on a difficult and special method of shipbuilding. Besides, various projects such as GENESİS (Gemi ENtegrE Savaş İdare Sistemi) CMS, MÜREN (Millî Üretim Entegre Sualtı Savaş Yönetim Sistemi) submarine CMS, and all other critical mission software have become developable in Turkey. In addition, torpedoes and guided missiles have also been developed nationally. The only remaining critical need is the construction or supply of the nuclear power reactor.
The Turkish Atomic Energy Authority is the institution responsible for determining all kinds of policies related to nuclear energy in Turkey. Among the duties of the institution established in 1956;

• To prepare national policy and strategy proposals to be followed in the use of nuclear energy technologies for the benefit of the country,
• To carry out or have carried out all kinds of research, development, innovation, design, technology acquisition, production, testing, domestication works that will make it possible to benefit from nuclear energy, radiation, and accelerator technologies in the scientific, technical, and economic development of the country,
• Cooperating with public institutions and organisations, universities and private sector organisations and carrying out joint projects in this context.[12]

There are departments and institutes of higher education in nuclear energy, the oldest being the Nuclear Energy Engineering Department of Hacettepe University in Turkey. In addition, nuclear reactors have been operated for training and research purposes. Of these, there are 2 reactors at Çekmece Nuclear Research and Training Centre, and a research reactor (Triga Mark II) at the ITU Energy Institute. Meanwhile, the first unit of the Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant, which is under construction, is expected to enter into service in 2023. In conclusion we can say that Turkey has sufficient staff, infrastructure, knowledge and experience in the operation and management of nuclear energy.

Nuclear submarines can also play a role in bringing special force units to the target area. The US Navy’s Virginia-class SSN, USS North Carolina (SSN 777), is pictured during a drill off the coast of Hawaii.
National Submarine
Turkey aims to develop its own unique submarine within the scope of the National Submarine (MILDEN) project based on the capabilities gained in the field of defence industry. Great effort, time and resources will be spent for the works to be done within the scope of the project. The propulsion system shall constitute one of the basic factors in the design of the ship. Once the diesel-electric propulsion system is initially decided, it will not be possible to switch to the nuclear propulsion system later on. Therefore, it should be considered very carefully when deciding on the propulsion system. It is most desirable that the capability to be acquired with MILDEN will pay off the intensive effort that will be spent during the realization of the project. For this reason, the advantages of constructing a couple of nuclear submarines rather than a large number of conventional submarine, and the additional operational capabilities to be gained with the “strategic and psychological deterrence” to be obtained should be taken into account.
It can be argued that nuclear power submarines have high costs. Considering the cost issue from open sources, there are different figures such as $377 million for the French Rubis class nuclear submarine, $1.59 billion for the US Los Angeles class submarine, $2.5 billion for the UK Astute class submarine, and $800 million for Russia’s Yasen class submarine. Factors such as the size, technology, and the country in which the ship was built are effective in this regard. Especially the high labour costs in the western countries are noteworthy in price differences. In open sources, the cost of a conventional diesel-electric submarine with air independent propulsion (AIP) system is around 500 million dollars.
When we compare the operational efficiency, it is obvious that a nuclear submarine can be effective over a much larger area than conventional submarines, can change patrol areas very quickly and reach distant places faster.
Considering the MILGEM project, we can estimate that a period of at least 8-10 years may be required for ship design; and the construction of a submarine can be completed in 5 years. In other words, if launched today, the first ship will be ready 15 years later. The personnel such as officers, engineers, operators, technicians in the navy can be trained in nuclear energy, and the necessary infrastructures and facilities can be prepared during this time. The nuclear reactor needed for the ship could be developed domestically with some technology transfer, or procured from abroad just like nuclear power plants.
Conclusion
As a result, we can assert that it will be more effective with one or two nuclear submarines in large areas such as the Mediterranean; otherwise a large number of conventional submarines may be needed for a mission of similar efficiency. Considering the total cost and long construction durations of several conventional submarines, a medium-size nuclear submarine with a maximum of 1-1.5 billion dollars is thought to be both much more cost-effective and “deterrent at a game-changing level“. In addition, the submarine support of Offshore Task Force/Group’s will be more effective with nuclear submarine within the framework of the sea control and power projection strategy.
The Turkish Submarine Fleet is one of the most powerful conventional submarine fleets in the Mediterranean as can be understood from open sources.[13] In particular, it is very effective in the surrounding seas and provides high deterrence. On the other hand, nuclear submarines have a “game changer” feature in naval operations and in diplomacy. Therefore, it would be more beneficial to direct efforts towards a platform that will provide additional capabilities and also “strategic and psychological deterrence” rather than an existing submarine type. With the addition of several nuclear submarines to the existing conventional submarine fleet, the advantages of both types can be combined and superior underwater dominance can be achieved in any geography, including overseas operations. The construction of existing German designs that have proven themselves can continue if the need for conventional submarines prevails in the future. We consider that there is no marginal benefit of spending so much time and effort building a similar type of conventional submarine.
Since the design process of a submarine, whether nuclear or conventional, takes a very long time, it can be considered to obtain a ready-made design and build it in Turkey just like the case in Anatolian amphibious assault ship. In this way, approximately 10 years of time required for the design will be saved.
Consequently, it should be aimed to build nuclear-powered attack submarines that can operate in vast operational areas without any shortage of range, survival and fuel and that can attack surface and land targets with torpedoes and missiles; therefore, the nuclear powered submarine (SSN/SSGN) alternative should seriously be taken into consideration in MILDEN design.

The Turkish Submarine Fleet is one of the most powerful conventional submarine fleets in the Mediterranean.

Even though this is old but nevertheless I think relevant to our current convo. The author articulated it excellently, more or less I can say this is my argument too.@Gary @Nilgiri

References

• Patton, James H. Jr. (2005) “The Submarine as a Case Study in Transformation: Implications for Future Investment,” Naval War College Review: Vol. 58 : No. 3 , Article 9, https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol58/iss3/9
• Andersson, Jan Joel (2015) “The Race to the Bottom,” Naval War College Review: Vol. 68: No. 1, Article 3,https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss1/3
• Worcester, Maxim “The Role of the Submarine in the Fight for Naval Supremacy in the Pacific” www.ispsw.de , https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/126364/Jan11_Role_of_Submarine.pdf
• Hans J. Ohff, (11 Jul 2017) “Nuclear versus diesel-electric: the case for conventional submarines for the RAN”, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/nuclear-versus-diesel-electric-case-conventional-submarines-ran/

---

[1] Submarine Warfare, https://fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ship/submarine.htm
[2] Submarine snorkel, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Submarine_snorkel#Operational_limitations
[3] Submarine Warfare, https://fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ship/submarine.htm
[4] Andersson, Jan Joel (2015) “The Race to the Bottom,” s.1
[5] Guided Missile Submarine, Nuclear Powered
[6] Geoffrey Till, Sea Power, A Guide for the Twenty-First Century, s.124
[7] Patton, James H. Jr. (2005) “The Submarine as a Case Study in Transformation: Implications for Future Investment,” Naval War College Review: Vol. 58: No. 3, Article 9. s.6
[8] https://www.navyrecognition.com/ind...lvaro-alberto-to-be-commissioned-in-2034.html
[9] Nuclear-Powered Ships, https://www.world-nuclear.org/infor...ications/transport/nuclear-powered-ships.aspx
[10] Nuclear Submarine Game Changer: New Countries To Go Atomic, https://www.forbes.com/sites/hisutt...nger-new-countries-to-go-atomic/#c06b6371d74b
[11] List of submarines of the Turkish Navy, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_submarines_of_the_Turkish_Navy
[12] Türkiye Atom Enerjisi Kurumu, Tarihçe https://www.taek.gov.tr/tr/kurumsal/services.html
[13] Submarine Fleet Strength by Country (2020), https://www.globalfirepower.com/navy-submarines.asp

 

[Nilgiri]

How Should the National Submarine (MILDEN) Be? Conventional or Nuclear?​

22 Eylül 2021

M. Haluk BAYBAŞ / [email protected]
Silent in depths
Submariner Motto

The Turkish Naval Forces and the defence industry are now taking steps for constructing the National Submarine (MILDEN) based on knowledge and know-how gained by their competent engineers and workers in the prideful materialisation of the National Ship (MILGEM) class corvettes and frigates. First of all, it is imperative to decide on the main propulsion system of the submarine to be constructed, as it will completely affect the design variables. At this point the important decision factor will be between the conventional diesel-electric propulsion system and nuclear power.
Before making this decision, let us examine the submarines and the submarine operation in general, which are quite different from the surface ships.
Submarine warfare encompasses the attack of conventional or nuclear-powered submarines with torpedoes, guided missiles, and nuclear weapons against hostile submarines, surface ships, and land targets by using advanced command-control and detection systems. In addition, other uses of submarines include covert reconnaissance, clandestine operations such as insertion of special force units to the target area, laying of mines covertly, and screening of the surface task force.[1]
Submarines traditionally fulfil their tasks individually, both to maintain their stealthiness and to increase operational effectiveness. Nonetheless, the desire to use this effective platform along with other units of the navy has always existed. However, this thought had been abandoned until recently due to communication constraints in the past. The classical usage has shown that sea denial and attacking the sea line of communication (SLOC) have been the main tasks of submarines. Today, especially nuclear submarines can be deployed effectively in a wider range of tasks such as escorting the aircraft carrier task group, reconnaissance, surveillance and intelligence gathering, support for special force operations, and attack with cruise missiles to land targets.
The most important feature of submarines is that they operate underwater and therefore they are difficult to detect. In other words, “stealthiness” is a crucial feature of submarines. Stealthiness allows them to both ensure self-defence and also develop surprise attacks against the enemy without being detected. It is vital to maintain stealth, especially for conventional submarines. Conventional diesel-electric submarines derive their underwater propulsion from electric motors powered by batteries. There is a need to operate at low speeds for the economic usage of batteries. In addition, it is rather inevitable that they can be located and attacked if they give a slightest indication of their position to hostile units. There are many examples of this situation in history. For this reason, it is essential that they do not give any indication about their presence and maintain their stealth until they conduct their attacks. Another weakness of conventional submarines is that they need to take fresh air from the surface by extending the snorkel at certain periods to recharge their batteries.[2] A snorkel on surface can harm their stealth. In particular, maritime patrol aircrafts (MPA) and naval helicopters can detect periscopes and snorkels by using their radar and infrared systems.

French Rubis-class submarines are one of the smallest-sized nuclear submarines.
Conventional submarines operates at low speeds in their patrol areas for the reasons stated above. Hence, a large number of conventional submarines are needed to be effective in large operational areas. Even so, conventional submarines are very effective and deterrent within the scope of the sea denial, especially in littoral waters[3]. In the maritime literature, conventional submarines are seen as important platforms for increasing the efficiency of smaller navies, especially those adopting sea denial. Since submarines can operate without prior sea and air control, they allow a weaker actor means to attack a stronger one.[4]
Nuclear-Powered Submarines
Nuclear-powered submarines are basically divided into two groups. The first group is nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSN), which use nuclear energy only for main propulsion, and as weapons they use torpedoes and guided missiles against ships, and cruise missiles against land targets. The second type of nuclear submarine is Nuclear Ballistic Missile Submarines (SSBN), which use both nuclear energy in the propulsion system and in intercontinental ballistic nuclear missiles as weapons. SSNs are used for conventional submarine warfare and sea control, whereas SSBNs serve within the scope of nuclear deterrence as a pillar of the nuclear triad. In this article, we are interested in nuclear-powered attack submarines, SSNs in the first group. Nuclear attack submarines can also be categorised under two groups. The first group includes SSNs that use mainly torpedoes as weapons; the second group includes SSGN[5]s that use both torpedoes and large amounts of cruise missiles. Nuclear attack submarines will be referred to as nuclear submarines from this point on.
Nuclear submarines are not subject to disadvantages such as low speed and power limitation. Flexibility, high speed, stealth, endurance, reach, autonomy, and punch (strike), which are expressed as ‘7 deadly virtues’ of nuclear submarines, carry them to a unique place.[6] They are directly used to establish sea control instead of sea denial. In fact, Russia calls these ships “nuclear underwater cruisers”.

Astute-class submarines serve in the United Kingdom’s SSN fleet.
Because they don’t need fresh air from the surface, they do not need to snorkel and can be constantly submerged and maintain their stealth, as well as conduct high-speed operations at deeper depths for extended periods of time (theoretically unlimited). As such, nuclear submarines enjoy both stealth and speed benefits. These features provide them with significant advantages during operations. For example, even if the periscope of a nuclear submarine is detected, it can easily break its track away after its own attack by making high-speed evasive manoeuvres for a long period of time. A nuclear submarine that manoeuvres at 30 knots in the deep can be anywhere within a 30-mile diameter in half an hour. This circle expands in favour of the submarine with each passing minute and as a result it becomes increasingly difficult to find it. In addition, the submarine can detect any hostile torpedoes instantly and avoid them with high speed.
Nuclear submarines can operate in vast areas and cover long sea passages in a short time, thanks to their capability to cruise at higher speeds for unlimited period of time. They can be deployed to different missions in a row, just like surface ships, and their tasking areas can be changed in a short time thanks to easier communication with the command headquarters due to their confidence in not to hesitate to disclose their positions. Nuclear submarines can accompany aircraft carrier or surface task groups as they have the advantage of stealth and speed, and can provide support in front or around the group. All these features provide flexibility for both the submarine commander and decision-making mechanisms at shore headquarters.

Severodvinsk, one of Russia’s Project 885 Yasen class submarines.
Nuclear submarines can be constructed on a larger scale since they do not have energy, power, and high speed restrictions. Thus, they can carry more torpedoes and guided missiles, providing power projection with significant firepower. With their high firepower, they can attack land targets from long distances without being detected. Likewise, they can carry out more extensive special force operations thanks to the capacity of large living spaces. Nuclear-powered submarines can be deployed to cover large operational areas of almost hundreds of miles.
Large navies turned to nuclear-powered submarines a long time ago because of some of the weaknesses of conventional submarines. While the USA, UK, and France only have nuclear in their inventory; Russia, China, and India have both nuclear and conventional submarines.
One of the highlights of the Falklands War between the UK and Argentina in 1982 was the sinking of the Argentine cruiser General Belgrano with 2 torpedoes by the British nuclear attack submarine Conqueror. As we see in this incident, a nuclear submarine, following the outbreak of the crisis, arrived in the southern hemisphere in a short time, found the most important unit of the enemy, after exchanging the necessary reports and orders with the command headquarters, attacked and sank it, and then ensured its own absolute survival. Only a nuclear submarine could accomplish this task. On the other hand, the conventional submarines in Argentina navy, one of which was made in the USA (Santa Fe (S-21)) and the other was of German origin Type-209 San Luis (S‑32), failed to show any success during the war and could not sink any ships.
Santa Fe, after it was detected via radar by a British anti-submarine warfare (ASW) helicopter, was attacked with depth charges as well as unusual weapons for use against a submarine such as machine gun and air to surface missile. San Luis carried out torpedo attacks on the British frigates it detected on 1 and 10 May, but failed as a result of the flaws of the torpedoes and the implementation of torpedo countermeasures by the targets.
From a tactical point of view, it is not possible to provide full submarine coverage around the Falkland Islands with only 2 conventional submarines. As we mentioned before, conventional submarines operate in allocated areas. If enemy ships enter their area, they can develop an attack, otherwise they can pass the war without engaging any target. The fact that San Luis has encountered enemy ships only twice during its time on the battlefield was an example for this situation. In fact, Argentine submarines were unable to establish any contact with British aircraft carriers, which had to be their primary targets. If Argentina had owned only one nuclear submarine, it could have changed the fate of the war with the 7 deadly virtues.

Virginia-class SSN of the US Navy.
Nuclear submarines are unique battle platforms with their features we have mentioned. From essentially a “lone wolf” a decade ago, the submarine is now nearly universally accepted as a key node within network-centric warfare, the purveyor of “undersea dominance,” and an essential element of Sea Power.[7]
Situation in the World
Currently, six countries have nuclear submarines. These are the United States, Russia, France, United Kingdom, China, and India. 68 nuclear-powered submarines in the USA, 36 in Russia, 19 in China, 11 in the United Kingdom, 10 in France, and 3 in India are operating and new ones are being built. There are also some other countries that work on nuclear submarines, such as Brazil and the Republic of Korea. Brazil takes the French design as ship type and builds it with its own reactor. The ship Alvaro Alberto was laid down in 2018 and is expected to enter service in the 2030s. The ship will be 100 metres long with a displacement of 6,000 tons and will be equipped with a 48 MW nuclear-electric propulsion system.[8] The Republic of Korea announced its intention in 2019 to build a nuclear-powered submarine. Australia is seen as another potential country.[9] [10]
Nuclear powered attack submarines vary in size. The smallest, the French Rubis class submarines, has a displacement of 2,600 tons and a length of 73.6 meters. As of 2018, there are 35 Los Angeles class submarines in the US navy inventory with a displacement of 6,900 tons and a length of 110 metres; Russia’s Yasen class submarines with a displacement of 13,800 tons and a length of 130 metres; the United Kingdom’s Trafalgar class submarines with a displacement of 5,200 tons and a length of 85.4 metres; India’s Arihat class submarines with a displacement of 7,000 tons and a length of 111 metres. The required reactor power can be up to approximately 500 MW depending on the size of the ship. The reactor of the French Rubis, one of the smallest nuclear submarine types, has a power of 48 MW. Considering that the Akkuyu nuclear power plant is 4,800 MW, it can be concluded that the reactor in the submarine is quite small, at the rate of one percent. In other words, we can say that construction, operation and maintenance of the reactor will be easier and less costly.

Los Angeles-class SSN of the US Navy.
Technological Infrastructure in Turkey
In Turkey, at Gölcük Shipyard, 3 AY-class, 4 PREVEZE-class and 4 GÜR-class conventional submarines have been built under German license since the 1980s. Finally, 6 REIS-class submarines, called Type-214TN in the international literature, are being built at Gölcük Shipyard.[11] During this whole process, sufficient experience and knowledge has been gained on a difficult and special method of shipbuilding. Besides, various projects such as GENESİS (Gemi ENtegrE Savaş İdare Sistemi) CMS, MÜREN (Millî Üretim Entegre Sualtı Savaş Yönetim Sistemi) submarine CMS, and all other critical mission software have become developable in Turkey. In addition, torpedoes and guided missiles have also been developed nationally. The only remaining critical need is the construction or supply of the nuclear power reactor.
The Turkish Atomic Energy Authority is the institution responsible for determining all kinds of policies related to nuclear energy in Turkey. Among the duties of the institution established in 1956;

• To prepare national policy and strategy proposals to be followed in the use of nuclear energy technologies for the benefit of the country,
• To carry out or have carried out all kinds of research, development, innovation, design, technology acquisition, production, testing, domestication works that will make it possible to benefit from nuclear energy, radiation, and accelerator technologies in the scientific, technical, and economic development of the country,
• Cooperating with public institutions and organisations, universities and private sector organisations and carrying out joint projects in this context.[12]

There are departments and institutes of higher education in nuclear energy, the oldest being the Nuclear Energy Engineering Department of Hacettepe University in Turkey. In addition, nuclear reactors have been operated for training and research purposes. Of these, there are 2 reactors at Çekmece Nuclear Research and Training Centre, and a research reactor (Triga Mark II) at the ITU Energy Institute. Meanwhile, the first unit of the Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant, which is under construction, is expected to enter into service in 2023. In conclusion we can say that Turkey has sufficient staff, infrastructure, knowledge and experience in the operation and management of nuclear energy.

Nuclear submarines can also play a role in bringing special force units to the target area. The US Navy’s Virginia-class SSN, USS North Carolina (SSN 777), is pictured during a drill off the coast of Hawaii.
National Submarine
Turkey aims to develop its own unique submarine within the scope of the National Submarine (MILDEN) project based on the capabilities gained in the field of defence industry. Great effort, time and resources will be spent for the works to be done within the scope of the project. The propulsion system shall constitute one of the basic factors in the design of the ship. Once the diesel-electric propulsion system is initially decided, it will not be possible to switch to the nuclear propulsion system later on. Therefore, it should be considered very carefully when deciding on the propulsion system. It is most desirable that the capability to be acquired with MILDEN will pay off the intensive effort that will be spent during the realization of the project. For this reason, the advantages of constructing a couple of nuclear submarines rather than a large number of conventional submarine, and the additional operational capabilities to be gained with the “strategic and psychological deterrence” to be obtained should be taken into account.
It can be argued that nuclear power submarines have high costs. Considering the cost issue from open sources, there are different figures such as $377 million for the French Rubis class nuclear submarine, $1.59 billion for the US Los Angeles class submarine, $2.5 billion for the UK Astute class submarine, and $800 million for Russia’s Yasen class submarine. Factors such as the size, technology, and the country in which the ship was built are effective in this regard. Especially the high labour costs in the western countries are noteworthy in price differences. In open sources, the cost of a conventional diesel-electric submarine with air independent propulsion (AIP) system is around 500 million dollars.
When we compare the operational efficiency, it is obvious that a nuclear submarine can be effective over a much larger area than conventional submarines, can change patrol areas very quickly and reach distant places faster.
Considering the MILGEM project, we can estimate that a period of at least 8-10 years may be required for ship design; and the construction of a submarine can be completed in 5 years. In other words, if launched today, the first ship will be ready 15 years later. The personnel such as officers, engineers, operators, technicians in the navy can be trained in nuclear energy, and the necessary infrastructures and facilities can be prepared during this time. The nuclear reactor needed for the ship could be developed domestically with some technology transfer, or procured from abroad just like nuclear power plants.
Conclusion
As a result, we can assert that it will be more effective with one or two nuclear submarines in large areas such as the Mediterranean; otherwise a large number of conventional submarines may be needed for a mission of similar efficiency. Considering the total cost and long construction durations of several conventional submarines, a medium-size nuclear submarine with a maximum of 1-1.5 billion dollars is thought to be both much more cost-effective and “deterrent at a game-changing level“. In addition, the submarine support of Offshore Task Force/Group’s will be more effective with nuclear submarine within the framework of the sea control and power projection strategy.
The Turkish Submarine Fleet is one of the most powerful conventional submarine fleets in the Mediterranean as can be understood from open sources.[13] In particular, it is very effective in the surrounding seas and provides high deterrence. On the other hand, nuclear submarines have a “game changer” feature in naval operations and in diplomacy. Therefore, it would be more beneficial to direct efforts towards a platform that will provide additional capabilities and also “strategic and psychological deterrence” rather than an existing submarine type. With the addition of several nuclear submarines to the existing conventional submarine fleet, the advantages of both types can be combined and superior underwater dominance can be achieved in any geography, including overseas operations. The construction of existing German designs that have proven themselves can continue if the need for conventional submarines prevails in the future. We consider that there is no marginal benefit of spending so much time and effort building a similar type of conventional submarine.
Since the design process of a submarine, whether nuclear or conventional, takes a very long time, it can be considered to obtain a ready-made design and build it in Turkey just like the case in Anatolian amphibious assault ship. In this way, approximately 10 years of time required for the design will be saved.
Consequently, it should be aimed to build nuclear-powered attack submarines that can operate in vast operational areas without any shortage of range, survival and fuel and that can attack surface and land targets with torpedoes and missiles; therefore, the nuclear powered submarine (SSN/SSGN) alternative should seriously be taken into consideration in MILDEN design.

The Turkish Submarine Fleet is one of the most powerful conventional submarine fleets in the Mediterranean.

Even though this is old but nevertheless I think relevant to our current convo. The author articulated it excellently, more or less I can say this is my argument too.@Gary @Nilgiri

References

• Patton, James H. Jr. (2005) “The Submarine as a Case Study in Transformation: Implications for Future Investment,” Naval War College Review: Vol. 58 : No. 3 , Article 9, https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol58/iss3/9
• Andersson, Jan Joel (2015) “The Race to the Bottom,” Naval War College Review: Vol. 68: No. 1, Article 3,https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss1/3
• Worcester, Maxim “The Role of the Submarine in the Fight for Naval Supremacy in the Pacific” www.ispsw.de , https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/126364/Jan11_Role_of_Submarine.pdf
• Hans J. Ohff, (11 Jul 2017) “Nuclear versus diesel-electric: the case for conventional submarines for the RAN”, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/nuclear-versus-diesel-electric-case-conventional-submarines-ran/

---

[1] Submarine Warfare, https://fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ship/submarine.htm
[2] Submarine snorkel, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Submarine_snorkel#Operational_limitations
[3] Submarine Warfare, https://fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ship/submarine.htm
[4] Andersson, Jan Joel (2015) “The Race to the Bottom,” s.1
[5] Guided Missile Submarine, Nuclear Powered
[6] Geoffrey Till, Sea Power, A Guide for the Twenty-First Century, s.124
[7] Patton, James H. Jr. (2005) “The Submarine as a Case Study in Transformation: Implications for Future Investment,” Naval War College Review: Vol. 58: No. 3, Article 9. s.6
[8] https://www.navyrecognition.com/ind...lvaro-alberto-to-be-commissioned-in-2034.html
[9] Nuclear-Powered Ships, https://www.world-nuclear.org/infor...ications/transport/nuclear-powered-ships.aspx
[10] Nuclear Submarine Game Changer: New Countries To Go Atomic, https://www.forbes.com/sites/hisutt...nger-new-countries-to-go-atomic/#c06b6371d74b
[11] List of submarines of the Turkish Navy, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_submarines_of_the_Turkish_Navy
[12] Türkiye Atom Enerjisi Kurumu, Tarihçe https://www.taek.gov.tr/tr/kurumsal/services.html
[13] Submarine Fleet Strength by Country (2020), https://www.globalfirepower.com/navy-submarines.asp

The author is pretty short on details concerning what developing a naval nuclear powerplant (especially a miniaturised one) entails (w.r.t even an established nuclear energy + research sector which Turkiye is some way away from having on its shores).

To me, it looks very much like Turkiye is looking very closely at how Japan and South Korea have developed their regional navies (with some blue water components that will augment with time) around their LHD/LPH classes.

Turkiye in large part will scale this to its economic wherewithall in the end, balancing its security priority going forward.

But the resource route underwater is SSK oriented for a reason for those two as well. These are countries with far larger nuclear energy sectors than Turkiye.

i.e Picking the SSN route to then base upon that (and costs involved by doing so) needs an extraordinary domain space requirement to allocate resources to.

Otherwise it simply need be contrasted with having a higher SSK number (and choice to simply send these out ahead of time to a domain space nearby etc if they need to be there with a faster surface asset).

That is going to win out cost benefit wise almost all the time for most navies unless there are very long range pressing requirements/roles in a larger baked in strategy w.r.t similarly large peer rivals at some large distance away.

 

[rai456]

How Should the National Submarine (MILDEN) Be? Conventional or Nuclear?​

22 Eylül 2021

M. Haluk BAYBAŞ / [email protected]
Silent in depths
Submariner Motto

The Turkish Naval Forces and the defence industry are now taking steps for constructing the National Submarine (MILDEN) based on knowledge and know-how gained by their competent engineers and workers in the prideful materialisation of the National Ship (MILGEM) class corvettes and frigates. First of all, it is imperative to decide on the main propulsion system of the submarine to be constructed, as it will completely affect the design variables. At this point the important decision factor will be between the conventional diesel-electric propulsion system and nuclear power.
Before making this decision, let us examine the submarines and the submarine operation in general, which are quite different from the surface ships.
Submarine warfare encompasses the attack of conventional or nuclear-powered submarines with torpedoes, guided missiles, and nuclear weapons against hostile submarines, surface ships, and land targets by using advanced command-control and detection systems. In addition, other uses of submarines include covert reconnaissance, clandestine operations such as insertion of special force units to the target area, laying of mines covertly, and screening of the surface task force.[1]
Submarines traditionally fulfil their tasks individually, both to maintain their stealthiness and to increase operational effectiveness. Nonetheless, the desire to use this effective platform along with other units of the navy has always existed. However, this thought had been abandoned until recently due to communication constraints in the past. The classical usage has shown that sea denial and attacking the sea line of communication (SLOC) have been the main tasks of submarines. Today, especially nuclear submarines can be deployed effectively in a wider range of tasks such as escorting the aircraft carrier task group, reconnaissance, surveillance and intelligence gathering, support for special force operations, and attack with cruise missiles to land targets.
The most important feature of submarines is that they operate underwater and therefore they are difficult to detect. In other words, “stealthiness” is a crucial feature of submarines. Stealthiness allows them to both ensure self-defence and also develop surprise attacks against the enemy without being detected. It is vital to maintain stealth, especially for conventional submarines. Conventional diesel-electric submarines derive their underwater propulsion from electric motors powered by batteries. There is a need to operate at low speeds for the economic usage of batteries. In addition, it is rather inevitable that they can be located and attacked if they give a slightest indication of their position to hostile units. There are many examples of this situation in history. For this reason, it is essential that they do not give any indication about their presence and maintain their stealth until they conduct their attacks. Another weakness of conventional submarines is that they need to take fresh air from the surface by extending the snorkel at certain periods to recharge their batteries.[2] A snorkel on surface can harm their stealth. In particular, maritime patrol aircrafts (MPA) and naval helicopters can detect periscopes and snorkels by using their radar and infrared systems.

French Rubis-class submarines are one of the smallest-sized nuclear submarines.
Conventional submarines operates at low speeds in their patrol areas for the reasons stated above. Hence, a large number of conventional submarines are needed to be effective in large operational areas. Even so, conventional submarines are very effective and deterrent within the scope of the sea denial, especially in littoral waters[3]. In the maritime literature, conventional submarines are seen as important platforms for increasing the efficiency of smaller navies, especially those adopting sea denial. Since submarines can operate without prior sea and air control, they allow a weaker actor means to attack a stronger one.[4]
Nuclear-Powered Submarines
Nuclear-powered submarines are basically divided into two groups. The first group is nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSN), which use nuclear energy only for main propulsion, and as weapons they use torpedoes and guided missiles against ships, and cruise missiles against land targets. The second type of nuclear submarine is Nuclear Ballistic Missile Submarines (SSBN), which use both nuclear energy in the propulsion system and in intercontinental ballistic nuclear missiles as weapons. SSNs are used for conventional submarine warfare and sea control, whereas SSBNs serve within the scope of nuclear deterrence as a pillar of the nuclear triad. In this article, we are interested in nuclear-powered attack submarines, SSNs in the first group. Nuclear attack submarines can also be categorised under two groups. The first group includes SSNs that use mainly torpedoes as weapons; the second group includes SSGN[5]s that use both torpedoes and large amounts of cruise missiles. Nuclear attack submarines will be referred to as nuclear submarines from this point on.
Nuclear submarines are not subject to disadvantages such as low speed and power limitation. Flexibility, high speed, stealth, endurance, reach, autonomy, and punch (strike), which are expressed as ‘7 deadly virtues’ of nuclear submarines, carry them to a unique place.[6] They are directly used to establish sea control instead of sea denial. In fact, Russia calls these ships “nuclear underwater cruisers”.

Astute-class submarines serve in the United Kingdom’s SSN fleet.
Because they don’t need fresh air from the surface, they do not need to snorkel and can be constantly submerged and maintain their stealth, as well as conduct high-speed operations at deeper depths for extended periods of time (theoretically unlimited). As such, nuclear submarines enjoy both stealth and speed benefits. These features provide them with significant advantages during operations. For example, even if the periscope of a nuclear submarine is detected, it can easily break its track away after its own attack by making high-speed evasive manoeuvres for a long period of time. A nuclear submarine that manoeuvres at 30 knots in the deep can be anywhere within a 30-mile diameter in half an hour. This circle expands in favour of the submarine with each passing minute and as a result it becomes increasingly difficult to find it. In addition, the submarine can detect any hostile torpedoes instantly and avoid them with high speed.
Nuclear submarines can operate in vast areas and cover long sea passages in a short time, thanks to their capability to cruise at higher speeds for unlimited period of time. They can be deployed to different missions in a row, just like surface ships, and their tasking areas can be changed in a short time thanks to easier communication with the command headquarters due to their confidence in not to hesitate to disclose their positions. Nuclear submarines can accompany aircraft carrier or surface task groups as they have the advantage of stealth and speed, and can provide support in front or around the group. All these features provide flexibility for both the submarine commander and decision-making mechanisms at shore headquarters.

Severodvinsk, one of Russia’s Project 885 Yasen class submarines.
Nuclear submarines can be constructed on a larger scale since they do not have energy, power, and high speed restrictions. Thus, they can carry more torpedoes and guided missiles, providing power projection with significant firepower. With their high firepower, they can attack land targets from long distances without being detected. Likewise, they can carry out more extensive special force operations thanks to the capacity of large living spaces. Nuclear-powered submarines can be deployed to cover large operational areas of almost hundreds of miles.
Large navies turned to nuclear-powered submarines a long time ago because of some of the weaknesses of conventional submarines. While the USA, UK, and France only have nuclear in their inventory; Russia, China, and India have both nuclear and conventional submarines.
One of the highlights of the Falklands War between the UK and Argentina in 1982 was the sinking of the Argentine cruiser General Belgrano with 2 torpedoes by the British nuclear attack submarine Conqueror. As we see in this incident, a nuclear submarine, following the outbreak of the crisis, arrived in the southern hemisphere in a short time, found the most important unit of the enemy, after exchanging the necessary reports and orders with the command headquarters, attacked and sank it, and then ensured its own absolute survival. Only a nuclear submarine could accomplish this task. On the other hand, the conventional submarines in Argentina navy, one of which was made in the USA (Santa Fe (S-21)) and the other was of German origin Type-209 San Luis (S‑32), failed to show any success during the war and could not sink any ships.
Santa Fe, after it was detected via radar by a British anti-submarine warfare (ASW) helicopter, was attacked with depth charges as well as unusual weapons for use against a submarine such as machine gun and air to surface missile. San Luis carried out torpedo attacks on the British frigates it detected on 1 and 10 May, but failed as a result of the flaws of the torpedoes and the implementation of torpedo countermeasures by the targets.
From a tactical point of view, it is not possible to provide full submarine coverage around the Falkland Islands with only 2 conventional submarines. As we mentioned before, conventional submarines operate in allocated areas. If enemy ships enter their area, they can develop an attack, otherwise they can pass the war without engaging any target. The fact that San Luis has encountered enemy ships only twice during its time on the battlefield was an example for this situation. In fact, Argentine submarines were unable to establish any contact with British aircraft carriers, which had to be their primary targets. If Argentina had owned only one nuclear submarine, it could have changed the fate of the war with the 7 deadly virtues.

Virginia-class SSN of the US Navy.
Nuclear submarines are unique battle platforms with their features we have mentioned. From essentially a “lone wolf” a decade ago, the submarine is now nearly universally accepted as a key node within network-centric warfare, the purveyor of “undersea dominance,” and an essential element of Sea Power.[7]
Situation in the World
Currently, six countries have nuclear submarines. These are the United States, Russia, France, United Kingdom, China, and India. 68 nuclear-powered submarines in the USA, 36 in Russia, 19 in China, 11 in the United Kingdom, 10 in France, and 3 in India are operating and new ones are being built. There are also some other countries that work on nuclear submarines, such as Brazil and the Republic of Korea. Brazil takes the French design as ship type and builds it with its own reactor. The ship Alvaro Alberto was laid down in 2018 and is expected to enter service in the 2030s. The ship will be 100 metres long with a displacement of 6,000 tons and will be equipped with a 48 MW nuclear-electric propulsion system.[8] The Republic of Korea announced its intention in 2019 to build a nuclear-powered submarine. Australia is seen as another potential country.[9] [10]
Nuclear powered attack submarines vary in size. The smallest, the French Rubis class submarines, has a displacement of 2,600 tons and a length of 73.6 meters. As of 2018, there are 35 Los Angeles class submarines in the US navy inventory with a displacement of 6,900 tons and a length of 110 metres; Russia’s Yasen class submarines with a displacement of 13,800 tons and a length of 130 metres; the United Kingdom’s Trafalgar class submarines with a displacement of 5,200 tons and a length of 85.4 metres; India’s Arihat class submarines with a displacement of 7,000 tons and a length of 111 metres. The required reactor power can be up to approximately 500 MW depending on the size of the ship. The reactor of the French Rubis, one of the smallest nuclear submarine types, has a power of 48 MW. Considering that the Akkuyu nuclear power plant is 4,800 MW, it can be concluded that the reactor in the submarine is quite small, at the rate of one percent. In other words, we can say that construction, operation and maintenance of the reactor will be easier and less costly.

Los Angeles-class SSN of the US Navy.
Technological Infrastructure in Turkey
In Turkey, at Gölcük Shipyard, 3 AY-class, 4 PREVEZE-class and 4 GÜR-class conventional submarines have been built under German license since the 1980s. Finally, 6 REIS-class submarines, called Type-214TN in the international literature, are being built at Gölcük Shipyard.[11] During this whole process, sufficient experience and knowledge has been gained on a difficult and special method of shipbuilding. Besides, various projects such as GENESİS (Gemi ENtegrE Savaş İdare Sistemi) CMS, MÜREN (Millî Üretim Entegre Sualtı Savaş Yönetim Sistemi) submarine CMS, and all other critical mission software have become developable in Turkey. In addition, torpedoes and guided missiles have also been developed nationally. The only remaining critical need is the construction or supply of the nuclear power reactor.
The Turkish Atomic Energy Authority is the institution responsible for determining all kinds of policies related to nuclear energy in Turkey. Among the duties of the institution established in 1956;

• To prepare national policy and strategy proposals to be followed in the use of nuclear energy technologies for the benefit of the country,
• To carry out or have carried out all kinds of research, development, innovation, design, technology acquisition, production, testing, domestication works that will make it possible to benefit from nuclear energy, radiation, and accelerator technologies in the scientific, technical, and economic development of the country,
• Cooperating with public institutions and organisations, universities and private sector organisations and carrying out joint projects in this context.[12]

There are departments and institutes of higher education in nuclear energy, the oldest being the Nuclear Energy Engineering Department of Hacettepe University in Turkey. In addition, nuclear reactors have been operated for training and research purposes. Of these, there are 2 reactors at Çekmece Nuclear Research and Training Centre, and a research reactor (Triga Mark II) at the ITU Energy Institute. Meanwhile, the first unit of the Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant, which is under construction, is expected to enter into service in 2023. In conclusion we can say that Turkey has sufficient staff, infrastructure, knowledge and experience in the operation and management of nuclear energy.

Nuclear submarines can also play a role in bringing special force units to the target area. The US Navy’s Virginia-class SSN, USS North Carolina (SSN 777), is pictured during a drill off the coast of Hawaii.
National Submarine
Turkey aims to develop its own unique submarine within the scope of the National Submarine (MILDEN) project based on the capabilities gained in the field of defence industry. Great effort, time and resources will be spent for the works to be done within the scope of the project. The propulsion system shall constitute one of the basic factors in the design of the ship. Once the diesel-electric propulsion system is initially decided, it will not be possible to switch to the nuclear propulsion system later on. Therefore, it should be considered very carefully when deciding on the propulsion system. It is most desirable that the capability to be acquired with MILDEN will pay off the intensive effort that will be spent during the realization of the project. For this reason, the advantages of constructing a couple of nuclear submarines rather than a large number of conventional submarine, and the additional operational capabilities to be gained with the “strategic and psychological deterrence” to be obtained should be taken into account.
It can be argued that nuclear power submarines have high costs. Considering the cost issue from open sources, there are different figures such as $377 million for the French Rubis class nuclear submarine, $1.59 billion for the US Los Angeles class submarine, $2.5 billion for the UK Astute class submarine, and $800 million for Russia’s Yasen class submarine. Factors such as the size, technology, and the country in which the ship was built are effective in this regard. Especially the high labour costs in the western countries are noteworthy in price differences. In open sources, the cost of a conventional diesel-electric submarine with air independent propulsion (AIP) system is around 500 million dollars.
When we compare the operational efficiency, it is obvious that a nuclear submarine can be effective over a much larger area than conventional submarines, can change patrol areas very quickly and reach distant places faster.
Considering the MILGEM project, we can estimate that a period of at least 8-10 years may be required for ship design; and the construction of a submarine can be completed in 5 years. In other words, if launched today, the first ship will be ready 15 years later. The personnel such as officers, engineers, operators, technicians in the navy can be trained in nuclear energy, and the necessary infrastructures and facilities can be prepared during this time. The nuclear reactor needed for the ship could be developed domestically with some technology transfer, or procured from abroad just like nuclear power plants.
Conclusion
As a result, we can assert that it will be more effective with one or two nuclear submarines in large areas such as the Mediterranean; otherwise a large number of conventional submarines may be needed for a mission of similar efficiency. Considering the total cost and long construction durations of several conventional submarines, a medium-size nuclear submarine with a maximum of 1-1.5 billion dollars is thought to be both much more cost-effective and “deterrent at a game-changing level“. In addition, the submarine support of Offshore Task Force/Group’s will be more effective with nuclear submarine within the framework of the sea control and power projection strategy.
The Turkish Submarine Fleet is one of the most powerful conventional submarine fleets in the Mediterranean as can be understood from open sources.[13] In particular, it is very effective in the surrounding seas and provides high deterrence. On the other hand, nuclear submarines have a “game changer” feature in naval operations and in diplomacy. Therefore, it would be more beneficial to direct efforts towards a platform that will provide additional capabilities and also “strategic and psychological deterrence” rather than an existing submarine type. With the addition of several nuclear submarines to the existing conventional submarine fleet, the advantages of both types can be combined and superior underwater dominance can be achieved in any geography, including overseas operations. The construction of existing German designs that have proven themselves can continue if the need for conventional submarines prevails in the future. We consider that there is no marginal benefit of spending so much time and effort building a similar type of conventional submarine.
Since the design process of a submarine, whether nuclear or conventional, takes a very long time, it can be considered to obtain a ready-made design and build it in Turkey just like the case in Anatolian amphibious assault ship. In this way, approximately 10 years of time required for the design will be saved.
Consequently, it should be aimed to build nuclear-powered attack submarines that can operate in vast operational areas without any shortage of range, survival and fuel and that can attack surface and land targets with torpedoes and missiles; therefore, the nuclear powered submarine (SSN/SSGN) alternative should seriously be taken into consideration in MILDEN design.

The Turkish Submarine Fleet is one of the most powerful conventional submarine fleets in the Mediterranean.

Even though this is old but nevertheless I think relevant to our current convo. The author articulated it excellently, more or less I can say this is my argument too.@Gary @Nilgiri

References

• Patton, James H. Jr. (2005) “The Submarine as a Case Study in Transformation: Implications for Future Investment,” Naval War College Review: Vol. 58 : No. 3 , Article 9, https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol58/iss3/9
• Andersson, Jan Joel (2015) “The Race to the Bottom,” Naval War College Review: Vol. 68: No. 1, Article 3,https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss1/3
• Worcester, Maxim “The Role of the Submarine in the Fight for Naval Supremacy in the Pacific” www.ispsw.de , https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/126364/Jan11_Role_of_Submarine.pdf
• Hans J. Ohff, (11 Jul 2017) “Nuclear versus diesel-electric: the case for conventional submarines for the RAN”, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/nuclear-versus-diesel-electric-case-conventional-submarines-ran/

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[1] Submarine Warfare, https://fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ship/submarine.htm
[2] Submarine snorkel, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Submarine_snorkel#Operational_limitations
[3] Submarine Warfare, https://fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ship/submarine.htm
[4] Andersson, Jan Joel (2015) “The Race to the Bottom,” s.1
[5] Guided Missile Submarine, Nuclear Powered
[6] Geoffrey Till, Sea Power, A Guide for the Twenty-First Century, s.124
[7] Patton, James H. Jr. (2005) “The Submarine as a Case Study in Transformation: Implications for Future Investment,” Naval War College Review: Vol. 58: No. 3, Article 9. s.6
[8] https://www.navyrecognition.com/ind...lvaro-alberto-to-be-commissioned-in-2034.html
[9] Nuclear-Powered Ships, https://www.world-nuclear.org/infor...ications/transport/nuclear-powered-ships.aspx
[10] Nuclear Submarine Game Changer: New Countries To Go Atomic, https://www.forbes.com/sites/hisutt...nger-new-countries-to-go-atomic/#c06b6371d74b
[11] List of submarines of the Turkish Navy, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_submarines_of_the_Turkish_Navy
[12] Türkiye Atom Enerjisi Kurumu, Tarihçe https://www.taek.gov.tr/tr/kurumsal/services.html
[13] Submarine Fleet Strength by Country (2020), https://www.globalfirepower.com/navy-submarines.asp

Nuclear submarines are much more difficult to build and operate than conventional submarines. Even with the support of the US and UK with the AUKUS program Australia will still take decades to be able to build and operate their own submaries.
You would need to get the support of Russia or China and even then they likely won't share as much technology as the US and UK are sharing with Australia.

 

[Anmdt]

The author is pretty short on details concerning what developing a naval nuclear powerplant (especially a miniaturised one) entails (w.r.t even an established nuclear energy + research sector which Turkiye is some way away from having on its shores).

To me, it looks very much like Turkiye is looking very closely at how Japan and South Korea have developed their regional navies (with some blue water components that will augment with time) around their LHD/LPH classes.

Turkiye in large part will scale this to its economic wherewithall in the end, balancing its security priority going forward.

But the resource route underwater is SSK oriented for a reason for those two as well. These are countries with far larger nuclear energy sectors than Turkiye.

i.e Picking the SSN route to then base upon that (and costs involved by doing so) needs an extraordinary domain space requirement to allocate resources to.

Otherwise it simply need be contrasted with having a higher SSK number (and choice to simply send these out ahead of time to a domain space nearby etc if they need to be there with a faster surface asset).

That is going to win out cost benefit wise almost all the time for most navies unless there are very long range pressing requirements/roles in a larger baked in strategy w.r.t similarly large peer rivals at some large distance away.

Neither the author is aware of details in Milden project (displacement and sizes), nor Turkish Navy intends to have a nuclear propulsion in Milden. At its current stage the Milden foresees to be operational in 2030s so a nuclear submarine in best case is business of 2045+. And i doubt if Turkish Navy will ever adopt a doctrine that will require a nuclear submarine.

 

[AWP]

Before jumping to the topic of carrier strike group we need to talk about the FAC & Tf-100 projects , I am not a expert but these two matter more than TCG Anadolu .

 

[Zafer]

A nuclear submarine is only viable when we have a good reactor technology already fully developed for our power generation needs. Once you have the technology it is only natural to use it for marine propulsion, Molten salt reactors is our best bet yet.

 

[PutinBro]

It provides fire control through tracking and updating the randezvous point for the missile through CMS and illumination radar or data-links.

*To how many hisar-d at same time?(speaking about midcourse)

*Why I-class has 2× illuminators while hisar-d is not SARH guided?

 

[dBSPL]

A nuclear submarine is only viable when we have a good reactor technology already fully developed for our power generation needs. Once you have the technology it is only natural to use it for marine propulsion, Molten salt reactors is our best bet yet.

The vast majority of reactors designed for naval purposes are of the PWR type, while the other important detail is that the US, the UK and Russia in particular are producing nuclear marine reactors based on steam turbine propulsion. There is a reason why I draw attention to these three countries. Turkiye is currently interested in SMRs designed or manufactured by companies such as Westinghouse, GE and R&R plc. We can naturally add Russia to this list. There is no official announcement yet, but there was information from US sources that there was a negotiation process involving about 20 reactors. The SMRs of these companies are also of PWR type. I think this issue (SMR) is one of the unofficial extensions of the EF-F16 dilemma. Eventually, there may be a domestic jet and a Russian SMR. Anyway... This is new news, but in general, there is a will to create a nuclear industry in the country and there are processes going on one way or another. Of course, it would be pure speculation to link the SMR industry with this submarine propulsion, and even then there are significant design differences. First and foremost, there is the issue of noiselessness. Submarine nuclear drives, for example, can use natural circulation for most of their full power without coolant pumps.

But the connection I want to make is that some of the companies I wrote, or not mentioned above, are also companies that produce or design nuclear reactors for submarines and aircraft carriers. I think bringing the SMR industry into the Turkish energy infrastructure will help us move forward in many ways. Of course, progress in nuclear technology depends on the existence of a developed industry and a highly qualified workforce. One way to do this, as the South Korean experience shows, is to start by importing nuclear reactors from foreign countries, and then, with a determined and stable political will, to establish a domestic nuclear industry; in this way, it is possible to achieve a leap forward. Over time, South Korea has built up the skilled human resources to design its own nuclear reactors and power plants, a development that should be taken as an example by countries around the world. In the process that started with nuclear power plants built by foreign companies, South Korea has managed to increase this rate to 98 percent today by developing its own reactor technology, while the localization rate it was able to achieve was 2 percent at first.

South Korea is building its own nuclear submarine today. A country that was almost completely devastated just 70 years ago, and which has gone through many economic crises: the industrial progress they have made today should be included in the textbooks of our country.

trivia:
> Works in the nuclear field in Turkiye began in 1955. About 5 years after we sent troops to Korea.
> In 61, the first experimental reactor was commissioned. 1 year before South Korea.
> Since 1976, the Akkuyu NPP project, which had been shelved or canceled in every tender process, was finally finalized in 2010. South Korea was one of the countries bidding for this NPP. They had built their first nuclear power plant in 1986, with Westinghouse designed reactors.

? South Korea is not building nuclear submarines.I appreciate that you are paying attention to our economic development and the growth of our nuclear power industry. But we Koran are focusing on light aircraft carriers, not nuclear submarines.

Sorry then, besides the news I shared the link to, there is also a lot of similiar reports on net. By accepting these as true, I had inferred that the work on this issue had reached a certain point. Thank you for the correction.

South Korea's First Nuclear Submarine Looks Closer - Naval News

Nuclear submarines offer significant advantages over non-nuclear ones. South Korea as been looking to acquire them for many years and now has the industry to do it.

www.navalnews.com

 

[urban mine]

? South Korea is not building nuclear submarines.I appreciate that you are paying attention to our economic development and the growth of our nuclear power industry. But we Korean are focusing on light aircraft carriers, not nuclear submarines.

 

[Zafer]

There is no telling that a similar scenario to what SK went through will work for us. We need to put more effort in to developing our own technology without waiting for someone else to initiate us to it. There are scientific work going on in the world to convert heat directly into electric power without using steam. I believe once more pressing development work is completed we will get to do science in such innovative tech too.

 

[urban mine]

Sorry then, besides the news I shared the link to, there is also a lot of similiar reports on net. By accepting these as true, I had inferred that the work on this issue had reached a certain point. Thank you for the correction.

South Korea's First Nuclear Submarine Looks Closer - Naval News

Nuclear submarines offer significant advantages over non-nuclear ones. South Korea as been looking to acquire them for many years and now has the industry to do it.

www.navalnews.com

Oh, I think it's been around for a while, especially since the North Korean SLBM threat became more certain.
In South Korea, many military enthusiasts have talked about plans for a nuclear-powered submarine, but the government has never officially announced that it is moving forward. I'm sure they've looked at it internally, but I don't know... The biggest obstacle is the US, its nuclear submarine building facilities, and the experts involved.

It isn‘t decided yet what will come after KSS-III. A batch of 3 new 4.000+ t attack submarines with VLS (possible nuclear propulsion).

It is true that there is no plan after KSS-III. But we haven't even built the KSS-III BATCH-II yet, and we have plans for BATCH-III. Is it necessarily a nuclear submarine after that?

 

[Chocopie]

IMO we would need at least 3x 5,000-6,000 t SSN to hunt down DPRK ballistic missile submarines, Chinese and Japanese carrier groups and as a 2nd strike retaliation platform with more powerful, longer range SLBMs … and at best with nuclear warheads on the tips