Is Taiwan Next?

[xizhimen]

The Ukraine air force surprisingly stays intact as well as its air defense after the Russian missile onslaught. They myth that China could disable Taiwan air force and air defense are already broken in Ukraine.

Expecting Taiwan air force to give a bloody fight in the airspace of the Taiwan strait.

We have to let you down, the fight will never come. Do you know why ROC ended up in Taiwan anyway?

 

[McCool]

We have to let you down, the fight will never come. Do you know why ROC ended up in Taiwan anyway?

true there will be no fight. Taiwan stays independent.

 

[xizhimen]

true there will be no fight. Taiwan stays independent.

As long as it's still Republic of China which was founded in 1911, it's fine.

 

[xizhimen]

And overriding majority of the Taiwan people don't want to declare independence, they prefer status quo, not independence, not part of PRC. People from both sides of the Taiwan strait love peace.

Taiwan poll finds 85% support status quo | Taiwan News | Nov. 19, 2021 19:36

www.taiwannews.com.tw

 

[xizhimen]

Taiwan street interview: What do you think Taiwan's condemnation of Russia?

Respondents: what a joke! Who cares about what Taiwan says in this world.
Taiwan can not even guarantee our eggs supply and still has the time to condemn Russia? What a joke..

蔡英文下令谴责俄罗斯 台湾民众狂酸：鸡蛋都搞不定还想谴责俄罗斯

www.youtube.com

 

[simsurf]

These Taiwan islands are just within a grenade throw from the mainland, during the low tide you can almost walk up to them, why PRC hasn't taken them after 70 years? Just like China didn't take over Hong kong and Macao after 1949, it's not because China can't, it's not the right time .

well, PRC did actually try to take the islands in the 50s presumably as a prelude to invading Taiwan itself, US threatened to nuke China if it persisted in the attacks, while UK also considered threatening to nuke China if it tried to reclaim Hong Kong in the 50s

"In order to support the continued existence of the Republic of China government, the United States issued several nuclear threats against the People's Republic of China in the 1950s to force the evacuation of outlying islands and the cessation of attacks against Quemoy and Matsu.

Declassified documents from the National Archives (UK) indicate that the United Kingdom considered threatening China with nuclear retaliation in 1961 in the event of a military reclamation of Hong Kong by China."

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_blackmail

But that was 70 years ago

 

[xizhimen]

well, PRC did actually try to take the islands in the 50s presumably as a prelude to invading Taiwan itself, US threatened to nuke China if it persisted in the attacks, while UK also considered threatening to nuke China if it tried to reclaim Hong Kong in the 50s

"In order to support the continued existence of the Republic of China government, the United States issued several nuclear threats against the People's Republic of China in the 1950s to force the evacuation of outlying islands and the cessation of attacks against Quemoy and Matsu.

Declassified documents from the National Archives (UK) indicate that the United Kingdom considered threatening China with nuclear retaliation in 1961 in the event of a military reclamation of Hong Kong by China."

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_blackmail

But that was 70 years ago

It was a half hearted attempt called off soon after it started, US also threatened China with nuclear bomb in Korean war, USSR also threatened to nuke China, but Mao didn't believe it and couldn't care less.

 

[simsurf]

Don't conveniently forget a hard fact, it was US who deserted Taiwan first, cut off diplomatic relations with Taiwan and welcomed PRC to join UN, as long as it serves US interests, anyone can be trash to throw away at any moment.

Agreed, US will always act in its own best interest and rightly so as every nation does.

Realistically, the US is probably more inclined to help Taiwan until it can relocate or reproduce TSMC's chip production capability in the US, which it's in the process of doing.

 

[Nilgiri]

At the brute level, it is difficult to avoid the possibility that all this has developed over the last 6 months as a collaborative effort by the Russians and the Chinese. This has been, sadly, out of sight of the world, particularly opaque to American intelligence, that has shown itself to be consistently and almost systematically wrong over nearly the last century.

If the Russian calculations are correct, and if their aggression in the Ukraine is successful, then there is little incentive for China to hold back.

It is also relevant to note that without careful preparation, this mischief might not have been possible. Without Chinese commitment to buy Russian gas, this would not have happened.

I'll tell you right now that CCP (whatever sordid stuff they have inherited and do get up to in various cycles) psyche....are not quite the same as Russian tsarist psyche.

Consider what the respective inflictions have been (and their transmittance) from the Mongols.

China has lot of edifice dating back to Wu Di (and successors diligent build on it)....Russia does not (that far back).

China has the raw population bulk that guides this.....Russia does not (in the same scale).

China has developed some large scale philosophies....Russia nowhere near (though I love a lot Russian cultural products).

There is tons of things that are "China" outside of the CCP top-down foray of ~100 years (arising because of all kind of manner of things).

Whereas the Tsarist hold has been much more intense and polarising in many ways (relative to Russia's size).

Its question in the end of how many man-hours of existence you have accounted for in the better mindframe endeavours.

In the end it causes quite some difference in how power courses and guides (and occupies mentally when it does crystallise in whichever node) in these two countries.

Power is not such a stark monolith in the end....very much depends on the environment carved out for it....by especially the more moral and mundane parts of society.

Quite right.

Not worth fighting.

The best course of action is probably for Taiwan to declare its readiness to a negotiated future, and to invite the PRC representatives to a meeting to discuss the detailed plan of work.

Actually this was what was proceeding along quite nicely with the earlier KMT dispensation that would come to power and keep DPP in tighter political contest (post the 80s democratisation by CKS son).

Then CCP broke clear promises and conventions agreed to in HK....and even started targeting some Taiwanese to be deported to PRC for legal procedure there and elsewhere (just like they have done so with a number of hong kongers too).

Taiwanese are responding to that (break of status quo)....they certainly did nothing to initiate it....and it needs lot more airing out (by asking/viewing enough Taiwanese themselves) than relying on selective drip feed propaganda agenda merchants of whatever type.

Consider just the scale DPP (under the lady now) has surmounted the regular anti-incumbency post HK crackdown. KMT is becoming more and more a spent force.....and it will have to shift its own ideology soon to stay competitive.

This is all very much CCP-driven.... so there will be no negotiation on political future for the forseeable future from Taiwanese side (till CCP demonstrably changes and rectifies its basic approach on literal fellow Han chinese it asserts w.r.t HK)....everyone can observe it for themselves in the end I suppose.

It is heartening (for me) to see Taiwanese govt quickly condemn the Russian invasion of Ukraine and put sanctions (that it can) on Russia in response...ready to amply illustrate its own foreign policy (to stand in contrast as far as possible with the muddy one of PRC) though it has limited to no recognition as a state from most of the world.

 

[Blackbeardsgoldfish]

The Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Ralph Johnson in the South China Sea on Feb. 14, 2022. Photo Credit: US Navy​

US Sails Through Taiwan Strait, China Conducts Drills On Hainan​

March 1, 2022 RFA 0 Comments
By RFA


China has launched military training on Hainan island, its most southerly province, a day after the U.S. 7th Fleet announced that one of its destroyers transited the Taiwan Strait.

The Hainan Maritime Safety Administration issued a navigation warning saying military training would take place from Sunday to Tuesday close to the sea and that entering the area within a six-mile radius was prohibited.

A navigation warning is a public advisory notice to mariners about changes to navigational aids and current marine activities or hazards including fishing zones and military exercises.

The warning did not specify what kind of military training but the provided coordinates indicated the location is near China’s Wenchang Rocket Launch Site.
On Saturday, the U.S. Navy 7th Fleet said in a statement that its Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Ralph Johnson was “conducting a routine Taiwan Strait transit.”

The statement said the transit was conducted “through international waters in accordance with international law” and “through a corridor in the Strait that is beyond the territorial sea of any coastal State.”

Before this and most recently, the USS Dewey made a similar transit on Jan. 22, 2022, and the USS Chaffe on Dec. 15, 2021. But those two ships did not turn on their automatic identification system (AIS), whereas the USS Ralph Johnson did, effectively advertizing its mission.
The 7th Fleet said the USS Ralph Johnson’s transit “demonstrates the United States’ commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific.”

Taiwan’s security​

The move was heavily criticized by China. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Eastern Theater Command spokesman, Sr. Col. Shi Yi, was quoted by Chinese state media as saying that “such an action is provocative and aims to embolden Taiwan separatist forces.”

Shi also called the U.S. action “hypocritical and futile” and said the PLA tracked and monitored the destroyer’s movements.

China regards Taiwan as a renegade province and vows to take it back, by force if necessary.

While it’s not unusual for the U.S. navy to sail through the Taiwan Strait, Saturday’s mission took place against a tense international backdrop, as fighting intensifies in Ukraine after an invasion by Russian forces.

There has been speculation that China could exploit a situation in which Washington was preoccupied by Ukraine by taking action against Taiwan or in the South China Sea.

Beijing has rejected that suggestion, but the Ukraine conflict has at the very least highlighted the diplomatic gulf between Washington and Beijing, as China avoids direct criticism of Russia’s conduct.

The hawkish Chinese tabloid Global Times said “while the ongoing Ukraine-Russia tussle is intensifying, the U.S. military is attempting to demonstrate its capabilities to stir up trouble” in both Europe and Asia.

The same newspaper in an editorial last week warned Taiwan that the Ukrainian crisis proved that “Washington is not reliable” and there is only one option for the island’s future – “to achieve reunification with the mainland.”

The Taiwanese Ministry of National Defense on Monday said “in response to the development of the Ukrainian-Russian military conflict,” Taiwan’s army continues to “maintain a high degree of vigilance and closely monitors the military dynamics around the Taiwan Strait to ensure national security.”

One lesson that China can learn from the Russian invasion of Ukraine, according to Alexander Vuving, a professor with the Hawaii-based Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, is that a unilateral decision to take over a smaller country won’t be acceptable in modern times.

“I think China is not yet ready to launch an invasion of Taiwan,” Vuving said, adding: “But China will intensify its ‘testing’ action to test the capabilities and resolve of its opponents across the Taiwan Strait and in the South China Sea.”


https://www.eurasiareview.com/01032...aiwan-strait-china-conducts-drills-on-hainan/

 

[NEKO]

@T-123456 the fun part is what if China attacks and failed to capture .

= meme content.

Maybe Russian invasion of Ukraine is just a soft launching for WW3, the main event is in Pacific.

 

[Blackbeardsgoldfish]

The Ukraine Invasion: What Lessons Is China Learning?​

Xi Jinping is watching Ukraine with one eye on Taiwan. The West must give him reason to think any invasion would be disastrously costly.
By Jianli Yang and Yan Yu
March 01, 2022

Chinese President Xi Jinping, right, and Russian President Vladimir Putin talk to each other during their meeting in Beijing, China on Feb. 4, 2022.

Credit: Alexei Druzhinin, Sputnik, Kremlin Pool Photo via AP, File
In the morning of February 24, Russian military forces launched a comprehensive invasion of Ukraine, and Western governments immediately announced a new round of sanctions against Russia. Beijing’s public statements have been as ambiguous as ever, expressing respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries, yet at the same time expressing understanding of Russia’s security concerns, and refraining from calling the military action an “invasion.”

Driven by the need to jointly confront the United States, China has chosen to form a strategic alliance with Russia. Just before the opening of the Beijing Winter Olympics, Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin met, and the two sides signed 15 significant cooperation agreements covering a wide range of geopolitical and trade areas. On the very day of Russia’s invasion, China announced that it would allow wheat imports from Russia. This kind of cooperation at such a time is undoubtedly an expression of commitment to and support of Putin, which increases his confidence in his aggression against Ukraine and Russia’s ability to resist Western economic sanctions.

While Putin is the main culprit of the unfolding Ukraine crisis, Xi’s role of “holding a candle to the devil” cannot be ignored. As the military conflict intensifies and economic sanctions against Russia take hold, while Xi will not directly support Russia’s invasion, it is still his premeditated plan to maintain China’s partnership with Russia and secretly provide economic assistance to it. China has been Russia’s largest trading partner for 12 consecutive years and Russia is China’s largest energy exporter. When Western countries announced sanctions against Russia, Beijing said that such measures “are never a fundamental and effective way to solve the problem.” This would undoubtedly bring great hope to a Russia embattled by economic woes.

The Russian invasion has put Putin in the harsh spotlight of international public opinion, relieving the Xi regime of the diplomatic problem of being regarded as the greatest threat to the democratic world in recent years. At the moment, Xi may be enjoying the euphoria of being arguably the biggest winner of the Ukraine crisis. He must also be closely scrutinizing the reaction of all parties, which will serve as reference material for calculating his Taiwan plans.

DIPLOMAT BRIEF​

WEEKLY NEWSLETTER​

The United States and NATO have so far shown no desire to engage in direct military intervention, which could be a positive sign for Xi. Although in the 1994 Budapest Memorandum the United States and Britain made certain security guarantees for Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity in exchange for Ukraine’s abandonment of nuclear weapons, now Biden has said the U.S. military will not go to war with Russia over Ukraine. If there is a military conflict in the Taiwan Strait, will the United States adopt the same strategy? Although Taiwan and Ukraine differ in terms of geopolitical strategy, geographic environment, and their role in international supply chains, U.S. military restraint in this Russia-Ukraine incident has undoubtedly become an important consideration for Xi, perhaps leading him to underestimate the resolve of the United States and the West to defend Taiwan militarily.


But Xi will surely also pay close attention to the fact that although the United States and NATO are not directly carrying out military strikes against Russia, the economic sanctions are biting and widespread. Perhaps Xi is not very concerned about that. First, as mentioned above, at the Winter Olympics Russia and China already discussed how to limit the effect of Western economic sanctions. China will provide an economic transfusion to Russia’s economy, so that the effect of sanctions against Russia will not be immediate. Second, if Beijing militarily attacks Taiwan, while it must consider the economic sanctions that major Western countries will inevitably take, China, with a stronger and broader industrial base than Russia, may be more able to rely on its domestic market to prevent its economy from collapsing. In this regard, the Xi regime has done certain preparations in recent years.

What must be more alarming to Xi is the economic sanctions imposed by Western countries on Putin and his close associates, including freezing the overseas assets of he and his family. Due to the intricate connection between China and the international financial and trade system and the fact that countless officials and their families have transferred assets to the United States and other countries over the years, there is no doubt that similar sanctions would be hugely damaging to the Xi regime. This will affect China’s major political families. Since reform and opening up, these political elites have been able to accumulate huge fortunes, big portions of which are constantly being transferred overseas. Moreover, the second and third generations of communist China’s founders are more internationally oriented, and this overseas wealth functions as the foundation of their international ties.

If faced with severe economic and personal sanctions, can a consensus be formed within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) regime to engage in behavior similar to Putin’s? The CCP’s power structure differs from the narrow one of the Putin oligarchy. Even if he is indisputably the “core” leader, Xi may have to consider the demands of other political figures, and other top CCP leaders may in fact have the ability to restrain Xi’s risk-taking impulse.

It is also important for Xi to pay heed to the reaction of the Russian people to the invasion. Anti-war demonstrations have broken out in numerous Russian cities. Hundreds of Russian scientists and journalists who cover international politics have signed an open letter condemning Russia’s military action. If Xi takes military action against Taiwan, will the attitude of Chinese people from all walks of life toward the war be what he desires? Or will the people, who will have to endure greater economic hardship in case of war, be willing to take risks and threaten the stability of the regime?

In this regard, Xi may be more confident even than Putin was, because the CCP regime has a huge advantage over Russia in terms of monopoly of information, suppression of speech, and deceiving the public. Moreover, Xi has mobilized his people’ s nationalism by advocating the “great rejuvenation of the nation.” During the China-U.S. trade war, and management of the COVID-19 epidemic, Xi cultivated nationalist enthusiasm to shift the focus away from the CCP’s mistakes. Now many netizens of China have expressed support for Russia’s invasion, believing that the intervention of the United States was an important factor leading to the conflict. If Xi launches military conflict in the Taiwan Straits, this well-controlled public opinion could be a blessing to the legitimacy of such action. This is certainly what Xi wants.

However, if the anti-war attitude of the Russian people could catch fire and endure, and thus threaten Putin’s rule, it would definitely undermine Xi’s confidence. There is no guarantee that Chinese who demand freedom, who oppose any war launched by Xi, or who are suffering from economic sanctions, along with members of the ruling clique who will be hit personally by individual sanctions imposed by the West, will not form forces beyond Xi’s control.

Given this, in the face of Putin and Xi’s joint efforts to date, and Xi’s possible calculations on Taiwan in reference of the Ukraine crisis, we suggest responses for the United State and its allies to take.

China has become Russia’s economic lifeline. Given China’s extensive trade relations with the United States and Europe, for now Western sanctions against Russia will mean that China will parasitically benefit from the hardship of the Russian people, thereby simultaneously alleviating Putin’s pain and lessening the impact of these sanctions. Therefore, the United States must also closely monitor trade between Russia and China, preformulate collective economic sanction plans on China, and impose them when necessary. China’s economy is still largely dependent on international trade. Given the potential inadequacy of purely domestic economic activity to promote continued growth in time, if international financial ties are suddenly lost, China’s economy may falter or even fall. Xi is in urgent need of maintaining both political and economic stability together to build up his mandate to stay in power for an unprecedented third term at the 20th Party Congress this fall. He could not afford to ignore major economic sanctions imposed by the West.

Political power is as personal as it is institutional within the CCP in general and its ruling class in particular. Therefore, it is critical to leverage on what matters to individual leaders and the institutions that support them. The most obvious target is the vast wealth of China’s ruling elite. Much of it is entwined with China’s most significant multinational companies or hidden in foreign banks, making this elite more vulnerable to financial sanctions. The intelligence agencies of Western countries know a great deal about the hidden assets of members of the Chinese ruling class, and publishing such information would itself be a serious blow to the CCP regime. The United States has never taken these systematic actions, but now is the time to openly prepare for such actions, which by itself will be an effective deterrent to Xi’s ambitions for Taiwan.

Another element of deterrence is also necessary: strategic clarity. Although the United States and NATO have yet to take direct military action against Russia, and may not in the future, the United States must explain to its people and the world that the Taiwan issue is different, and that the United States has not only a moral but legal responsibility to defend Taiwan. The past policy of strategic ambiguity may have played its due role, but as China’s ambition and capacity to unify Taiwan by force is becoming more and more obvious, and especially given that Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has become a reality, the United States must abandon the existing strategy. Vagueness will no longer be enough to stop Xi.

Finally, Russia is currently standing at the forefront of those confronting the democratic world. In addition to sanctions, the international community should fully support the anti-war and pro-democracy forces of the Russian people and strive to achieve political reform there so as to remove the root causes of dictatorship and military violence. This would not only be a more fundamental way to end the Ukrainian crisis and erase Putin’s fascist rule. It would also present the most profound warning to Xi, because what he fears most is the possibility that the liberal-minded and peace-loving people might combine with breakaway members of his ruling clique to form an effective force against Xi and CCP totalitarianism. Russia’s growing isolation, especially Putin’s political downfall, over its aggression against Ukraine would tell Xi that the same fate might await him if he dared invade Taiwan.

https://thediplomat.com/2022/03/the-ukraine-invasion-what-lessons-is-china-learning/

 

[Ryder]

China invading Taiwan is not going to be easy I cannot imagine how much casualties they will suffer just to create a beachead.

 

[Joe Shearer]

China invading Taiwan is not going to be easy I cannot imagine how much casualties they will suffer just to create a beachead.

Completely different from Ukraine, but even there, an indifferent public quickly rallied once they were invaded.

 

[crixus]

China invading Taiwan is not going to be easy I cannot imagine how much casualties they will suffer just to create a beachead.

If China been through that attack , then they will become military super power , if they failed then their dream of super power militarily will become a nightmare and economic sanction will have sever economic impact.

 

[Nilgiri]

The Ukraine Invasion: What Lessons Is China Learning?​

Xi Jinping is watching Ukraine with one eye on Taiwan. The West must give him reason to think any invasion would be disastrously costly.
By Jianli Yang and Yan Yu
March 01, 2022

Chinese President Xi Jinping, right, and Russian President Vladimir Putin talk to each other during their meeting in Beijing, China on Feb. 4, 2022.

Credit: Alexei Druzhinin, Sputnik, Kremlin Pool Photo via AP, File
In the morning of February 24, Russian military forces launched a comprehensive invasion of Ukraine, and Western governments immediately announced a new round of sanctions against Russia. Beijing’s public statements have been as ambiguous as ever, expressing respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries, yet at the same time expressing understanding of Russia’s security concerns, and refraining from calling the military action an “invasion.”

Driven by the need to jointly confront the United States, China has chosen to form a strategic alliance with Russia. Just before the opening of the Beijing Winter Olympics, Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin met, and the two sides signed 15 significant cooperation agreements covering a wide range of geopolitical and trade areas. On the very day of Russia’s invasion, China announced that it would allow wheat imports from Russia. This kind of cooperation at such a time is undoubtedly an expression of commitment to and support of Putin, which increases his confidence in his aggression against Ukraine and Russia’s ability to resist Western economic sanctions.

While Putin is the main culprit of the unfolding Ukraine crisis, Xi’s role of “holding a candle to the devil” cannot be ignored. As the military conflict intensifies and economic sanctions against Russia take hold, while Xi will not directly support Russia’s invasion, it is still his premeditated plan to maintain China’s partnership with Russia and secretly provide economic assistance to it. China has been Russia’s largest trading partner for 12 consecutive years and Russia is China’s largest energy exporter. When Western countries announced sanctions against Russia, Beijing said that such measures “are never a fundamental and effective way to solve the problem.” This would undoubtedly bring great hope to a Russia embattled by economic woes.

The Russian invasion has put Putin in the harsh spotlight of international public opinion, relieving the Xi regime of the diplomatic problem of being regarded as the greatest threat to the democratic world in recent years. At the moment, Xi may be enjoying the euphoria of being arguably the biggest winner of the Ukraine crisis. He must also be closely scrutinizing the reaction of all parties, which will serve as reference material for calculating his Taiwan plans.

DIPLOMAT BRIEF​

WEEKLY NEWSLETTER​

The United States and NATO have so far shown no desire to engage in direct military intervention, which could be a positive sign for Xi. Although in the 1994 Budapest Memorandum the United States and Britain made certain security guarantees for Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity in exchange for Ukraine’s abandonment of nuclear weapons, now Biden has said the U.S. military will not go to war with Russia over Ukraine. If there is a military conflict in the Taiwan Strait, will the United States adopt the same strategy? Although Taiwan and Ukraine differ in terms of geopolitical strategy, geographic environment, and their role in international supply chains, U.S. military restraint in this Russia-Ukraine incident has undoubtedly become an important consideration for Xi, perhaps leading him to underestimate the resolve of the United States and the West to defend Taiwan militarily.


But Xi will surely also pay close attention to the fact that although the United States and NATO are not directly carrying out military strikes against Russia, the economic sanctions are biting and widespread. Perhaps Xi is not very concerned about that. First, as mentioned above, at the Winter Olympics Russia and China already discussed how to limit the effect of Western economic sanctions. China will provide an economic transfusion to Russia’s economy, so that the effect of sanctions against Russia will not be immediate. Second, if Beijing militarily attacks Taiwan, while it must consider the economic sanctions that major Western countries will inevitably take, China, with a stronger and broader industrial base than Russia, may be more able to rely on its domestic market to prevent its economy from collapsing. In this regard, the Xi regime has done certain preparations in recent years.

What must be more alarming to Xi is the economic sanctions imposed by Western countries on Putin and his close associates, including freezing the overseas assets of he and his family. Due to the intricate connection between China and the international financial and trade system and the fact that countless officials and their families have transferred assets to the United States and other countries over the years, there is no doubt that similar sanctions would be hugely damaging to the Xi regime. This will affect China’s major political families. Since reform and opening up, these political elites have been able to accumulate huge fortunes, big portions of which are constantly being transferred overseas. Moreover, the second and third generations of communist China’s founders are more internationally oriented, and this overseas wealth functions as the foundation of their international ties.

If faced with severe economic and personal sanctions, can a consensus be formed within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) regime to engage in behavior similar to Putin’s? The CCP’s power structure differs from the narrow one of the Putin oligarchy. Even if he is indisputably the “core” leader, Xi may have to consider the demands of other political figures, and other top CCP leaders may in fact have the ability to restrain Xi’s risk-taking impulse.

It is also important for Xi to pay heed to the reaction of the Russian people to the invasion. Anti-war demonstrations have broken out in numerous Russian cities. Hundreds of Russian scientists and journalists who cover international politics have signed an open letter condemning Russia’s military action. If Xi takes military action against Taiwan, will the attitude of Chinese people from all walks of life toward the war be what he desires? Or will the people, who will have to endure greater economic hardship in case of war, be willing to take risks and threaten the stability of the regime?

In this regard, Xi may be more confident even than Putin was, because the CCP regime has a huge advantage over Russia in terms of monopoly of information, suppression of speech, and deceiving the public. Moreover, Xi has mobilized his people’ s nationalism by advocating the “great rejuvenation of the nation.” During the China-U.S. trade war, and management of the COVID-19 epidemic, Xi cultivated nationalist enthusiasm to shift the focus away from the CCP’s mistakes. Now many netizens of China have expressed support for Russia’s invasion, believing that the intervention of the United States was an important factor leading to the conflict. If Xi launches military conflict in the Taiwan Straits, this well-controlled public opinion could be a blessing to the legitimacy of such action. This is certainly what Xi wants.

However, if the anti-war attitude of the Russian people could catch fire and endure, and thus threaten Putin’s rule, it would definitely undermine Xi’s confidence. There is no guarantee that Chinese who demand freedom, who oppose any war launched by Xi, or who are suffering from economic sanctions, along with members of the ruling clique who will be hit personally by individual sanctions imposed by the West, will not form forces beyond Xi’s control.

Given this, in the face of Putin and Xi’s joint efforts to date, and Xi’s possible calculations on Taiwan in reference of the Ukraine crisis, we suggest responses for the United State and its allies to take.

China has become Russia’s economic lifeline. Given China’s extensive trade relations with the United States and Europe, for now Western sanctions against Russia will mean that China will parasitically benefit from the hardship of the Russian people, thereby simultaneously alleviating Putin’s pain and lessening the impact of these sanctions. Therefore, the United States must also closely monitor trade between Russia and China, preformulate collective economic sanction plans on China, and impose them when necessary. China’s economy is still largely dependent on international trade. Given the potential inadequacy of purely domestic economic activity to promote continued growth in time, if international financial ties are suddenly lost, China’s economy may falter or even fall. Xi is in urgent need of maintaining both political and economic stability together to build up his mandate to stay in power for an unprecedented third term at the 20th Party Congress this fall. He could not afford to ignore major economic sanctions imposed by the West.

Political power is as personal as it is institutional within the CCP in general and its ruling class in particular. Therefore, it is critical to leverage on what matters to individual leaders and the institutions that support them. The most obvious target is the vast wealth of China’s ruling elite. Much of it is entwined with China’s most significant multinational companies or hidden in foreign banks, making this elite more vulnerable to financial sanctions. The intelligence agencies of Western countries know a great deal about the hidden assets of members of the Chinese ruling class, and publishing such information would itself be a serious blow to the CCP regime. The United States has never taken these systematic actions, but now is the time to openly prepare for such actions, which by itself will be an effective deterrent to Xi’s ambitions for Taiwan.

Another element of deterrence is also necessary: strategic clarity. Although the United States and NATO have yet to take direct military action against Russia, and may not in the future, the United States must explain to its people and the world that the Taiwan issue is different, and that the United States has not only a moral but legal responsibility to defend Taiwan. The past policy of strategic ambiguity may have played its due role, but as China’s ambition and capacity to unify Taiwan by force is becoming more and more obvious, and especially given that Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has become a reality, the United States must abandon the existing strategy. Vagueness will no longer be enough to stop Xi.

Finally, Russia is currently standing at the forefront of those confronting the democratic world. In addition to sanctions, the international community should fully support the anti-war and pro-democracy forces of the Russian people and strive to achieve political reform there so as to remove the root causes of dictatorship and military violence. This would not only be a more fundamental way to end the Ukrainian crisis and erase Putin’s fascist rule. It would also present the most profound warning to Xi, because what he fears most is the possibility that the liberal-minded and peace-loving people might combine with breakaway members of his ruling clique to form an effective force against Xi and CCP totalitarianism. Russia’s growing isolation, especially Putin’s political downfall, over its aggression against Ukraine would tell Xi that the same fate might await him if he dared invade Taiwan.

https://thediplomat.com/2022/03/the-ukraine-invasion-what-lessons-is-china-learning/

Xi will wait and watch this year (especially since hands full on how these things now settle with Putin and West to take forward).

Usual flexing on taiwan strait might increase a bit....but I really do not think they want or are even prepared for that war with Taiwan.

It would be another matter if Taiwan was not an island.....well it would have been resolved in the civil war itself....we would not have this situation to begin with.

Island fortress brings unique thing to any theatre analysis....you have to study the conveyance logistics for such a thing closely as possible. Everything hinges on that for the war....that chokepoint if you will.

If its bad enough for the attacker, its a large deterrence no matter its overall bulk ratio it enjoys.

 

[Joe Shearer]

Xi will wait and watch this year (especially since hands full on how these things now settle with Putin and West to take forward).

Usual flexing on taiwan strait might increase a bit....but I really do not think they want or are even prepared for that war with Taiwan.

It would be another matter if Taiwan was not an island.....well it would have been resolved in the civil war itself....we would not have this situation to begin with.

Island fortress brings unique thing to any theatre analysis....you have to study the conveyance logistics for such a thing closely as possible. Everything hinges on that for the war....that chokepoint if you will.

If its bad enough for the attacker, its a large deterrence no matter its overall bulk ratio it enjoys.

In the US, at one time, they had thought about nuclear war and its consequences, and called it the thinking of the unthinkable. However, in the US, at that time, and today, in a residual kind of manner, there exists the capability of taking an issue, stripping it down to its bare essentials, to quote Baloo, and working out the structure and possible processes, yielding scenarios. Nothing but scenarios, nothing but thought exercises, nevertheless very clinically bounded exercises of forecasting, of casting mathematics into a cauldron of fearful consequences, of calculating lives lost, immediately, and in lingering pain over years, and the consequences on a civilisation that had to go through this primordial trial.

What was that about?

That was about our own inability, in India, to think about, and to analyse our geo-political position, and our choices, including our most difficult and counter-intuitive choices, in any kind of rational manner. Reading a short passage from Asad Durrani's book, submitted by a friend on a private forum brought home the gap in what we seem to do in public, and what our neighbours seem to do in private.

 

[Blackbeardsgoldfish]

Xi will wait and watch this year (especially since hands full on how these things now settle with Putin and West to take forward).

Usual flexing on taiwan strait might increase a bit....but I really do not think they want or are even prepared for that war with Taiwan.

It would be another matter if Taiwan was not an island.....well it would have been resolved in the civil war itself....we would not have this situation to begin with.

Island fortress brings unique thing to any theatre analysis....you have to study the conveyance logistics for such a thing closely as possible. Everything hinges on that for the war....that chokepoint if you will.

If its bad enough for the attacker, its a large deterrence no matter its overall bulk ratio it enjoys.

For one is Xi doing his best to keep the relationships between Russia/China and West/China in tact, for the other is he probably doing everything necessary to ensure he gets his third term as premier. Two things that require more of his attention than a war with Taiwan, one that can wait for a few more years if anything.

The lessons that the PLA is drawing from this(at least I suspect that) is that they need to have enough SRBMs in stock to sustain a continuous bombardment of the island for weeks, especially military infrastructure, power plants and administrative centers. This means that they'll build up their arsenal of DF-11, DF-12, DF-15, HN 1 and YJ-18 missiles for as long and as much as they can. Other missile variants too of course, but for this operation they seem like the most important ones.

For logistics... once the missiles have pummeled the runways, hangars and everything in between, and air superiority has been established, crossing the strait seems like a more or less "easy" thing, no? Depending on how much of the Taiwanese navy survives the initial bombing, and how willing the americans are to go into the strait after it started. But since I'm no more than an interested layman in the matter, please correct me on anything you have issues with!

In any case, time favours the mainland in case of future war. How willing the CCP and everyday chinese are to go to war is another question, and in this case, what @beijingwalker is saying doesn't seem without merit. I just really doubt that Taiwan will survive past this decade, but only the future will tell.

 

[Joe Shearer]

For one is Xi doing his best to keep the relationships between Russia/China and West/China in tact, for the other is he probably doing everything necessary to ensure he gets his third term as premier. Two things that require more of his attention than a war with Taiwan, one that can wait for a few more years if anything.

I understand that he is a confirmed office-holder, without limit on his terms.

 

[Joe Shearer]

The lessons that the PLA is drawing from this(at least I suspect that) is that they need to have enough SRBMs in stock to sustain a continuous bombardment of the island for weeks, especially military infrastructure, power plants and administrative centers. This means that they'll build up their arsenal of DF-11, DF-12, DF-15, HN 1 and YJ-18 missiles for as long and as much as they can. Other missile variants too of course, but for this operation they seem like the most important ones.

For logistics... once the missiles have pummeled the runways, hangars and everything in between, and air superiority has been established, crossing the strait seems like a more or less "easy" thing, no? Depending on how much of the Taiwanese navy survives the initial bombing, and how willing the americans are to go into the strait after it started. But since I'm no more than an interested layman in the matter, please correct me on anything you have issues with!

In any case, time favours the mainland in case of future war. How willing the CCP and everyday chinese are to go to war is another question, and in this case, what @beijingwalker is saying doesn't seem without merit. I just really doubt that Taiwan will survive past this decade, but only the future will tell.

You are probably right on the button on these forecasts.

Nothing will slow down the Chinese other than their population shrinkage, and that will take years to reach proportions where they are diverted from their long-term goals and objectives.