Is Taiwan Next?

Blackbeardsgoldfish

Committed member
Moderator
Germany Moderator
Messages
282
Reactions
1 458
Nation of residence
Austria
Nation of origin
Austria
I understand that he is a confirmed office-holder, without limit on his terms.
He'll probably confirmed as that in autumn.

You are probably right on the button on these forecasts.

Nothing will slow down the Chinese other than their population shrinkage, and that will take years to reach proportions where they are diverted from their long-term goals and objectives.
China currently has some 44 million men aged 15-19, in other words potentially 40 million soldiers of the best generation capable of being mobilized in a war against Taiwan(presently 23.5 million inhabitants, projected to peak at 23.7 in 2024 and decrease thereafter). This amount of manpower can only be matched by India, and China could quite literally overrun Taiwan.

China population: https://www.populationpyramid.net/china/2022/
Taiwan population:https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographics_of_Taiwan
 

Joe Shearer

Contributor
Moderator
Professional
Advisor
Messages
1,111
Reactions
21 1,942
Nation of residence
India
Nation of origin
India
He'll probably confirmed as that in autumn.


China currently has some 44 million men aged 15-19, in other words potentially 40 million soldiers of the best generation capable of being mobilized in a war against Taiwan(presently 23.5 million inhabitants, projected to peak at 23.7 in 2024 and decrease thereafter). This amount of manpower can only be matched by India, and China could quite literally overrun Taiwan.

China population: https://www.populationpyramid.net/china/2022/
Taiwan population:https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographics_of_Taiwan
Yes, I thought, obviously wrongly, that I was saying that. The Chinese today can swamp Taiwan. The Chinese are also projected to peak, and to decrease thereafter; one study says that it has already peaked and is already in decline. So it seems that this is a window that the PRC has, that will continuously shrink hereafter.

(The article cited below is behind a pay-wall that stops me from making a copy):

 

Anastasius

Contributor
Moderator
Azerbaijan Moderator
Messages
1,423
Reactions
6 3,176
Nation of residence
United States of America
Nation of origin
Azerbaijan
The Chinese won't invade Taiwan. They prefer economic dominance to anything else and they are well aware they aren't powerful enough yet to take what they want with impunity without serious consequences. They also aren't in as deep shit as Russia to start resorting to desperate measures.
 

Joe Shearer

Contributor
Moderator
Professional
Advisor
Messages
1,111
Reactions
21 1,942
Nation of residence
India
Nation of origin
India
The Chinese won't invade Taiwan. They prefer economic dominance to anything else and they are well aware they aren't powerful enough yet to take what they want with impunity without serious consequences. They also aren't in as deep shit as Russia to start resorting to desperate measures.
I sincerely hope you are right.
 

Blackbeardsgoldfish

Committed member
Moderator
Germany Moderator
Messages
282
Reactions
1 458
Nation of residence
Austria
Nation of origin
Austria
The Chinese won't invade Taiwan. They prefer economic dominance to anything else and they are well aware they aren't powerful enough yet to take what they want with impunity without serious consequences. They also aren't in as deep shit as Russia to start resorting to desperate measures.
Everyone in this thread hopes that there won't be a war, but we're speculating if, and what, could potentially happen.
 

Nilgiri

Experienced member
Moderator
Aviation Specialist
Messages
9,815
Reactions
120 19,919
Nation of residence
Canada
Nation of origin
India
For one is Xi doing his best to keep the relationships between Russia/China and West/China in tact, for the other is he probably doing everything necessary to ensure he gets his third term as premier. Two things that require more of his attention than a war with Taiwan, one that can wait for a few more years if anything.

The lessons that the PLA is drawing from this(at least I suspect that) is that they need to have enough SRBMs in stock to sustain a continuous bombardment of the island for weeks, especially military infrastructure, power plants and administrative centers. This means that they'll build up their arsenal of DF-11, DF-12, DF-15, HN 1 and YJ-18 missiles for as long and as much as they can. Other missile variants too of course, but for this operation they seem like the most important ones.

For logistics... once the missiles have pummeled the runways, hangars and everything in between, and air superiority has been established, crossing the strait seems like a more or less "easy" thing, no? Depending on how much of the Taiwanese navy survives the initial bombing, and how willing the americans are to go into the strait after it started. But since I'm no more than an interested layman in the matter, please correct me on anything you have issues with!

In any case, time favours the mainland in case of future war. How willing the CCP and everyday chinese are to go to war is another question, and in this case, what @beijingwalker is saying doesn't seem without merit. I just really doubt that Taiwan will survive past this decade, but only the future will tell.

This starts to take the contours of a pyrrhic victory that the CCP really does not want (to show to its people).

Why pyrrhic?

Taiwan has layered (with help from US, Japan and Israel) its defense network concerning its military among its densely populated island.

There is no delineation of easy targets for PLA to do without major collateral damage (and it is why I enter the convo talking about dieppe and D-day stuff to begin with).

I know this because the 70s - 80s was that time it was most involved in the layout for this stuff....as was Singapore (there was significant overlap in the countries helping them on this)...given the cold war alliances at the time and the same heavy-urban predicament Singapore had to take into account in its case.


====================

But regarding this pyrrhic nature....

With the mainland people ....there have been deep promises made to them (expressed to me by some of their best in various ways).....extracted often at great cost....because of what preceded it and done during the civil war(s) by Han on Han....and then that one great adversary from those islands to the East...

It is not forgotten....

You see they (CCP) venerate sun yat sen's mausoleum and memorials still....emblazoned ROC insignia inside it and everything unmolested....surviving some of the worst political ravages that went on during Mao's time.

There is much blood Chinese shed under the ROC flag....in so many known and unknown last stands....and the innocents...always the innocents....

It is a particular unique situation.....it is hard to put into words or equivalents for other countries....the languages are entirely different to begin with in deep ways...

There are certain things the CCP are hemmed in....even with one such as Xi leading it....and even with the broadening disparity PRC develops with ROC each year.

This is a very touchy issue in the end..... many things have been driven away and abandoned by the CCP psyche....but not everything.
Xi faces quite a struggle within his party even that few understand.

On this one thing....I do agree with Beijingwalker....a very rare thing to happen....and for some different and similiar reasons I don't really care to explore.

It is why I abide by the plain fact that PRC will need to develop its non-pyrrhic capability in the hard realm (wind blowing)....and go through a later political cycle to expand on its soft-realm (sunshine warmth)....in the removal of taiwan's armour to it.
 

Blackbeardsgoldfish

Committed member
Moderator
Germany Moderator
Messages
282
Reactions
1 458
Nation of residence
Austria
Nation of origin
Austria

Taiwan and China keep eyes on Ukraine​

They both want to see whether the United States will step up and lead.​

March 3, 2022
Michael Mazza

Does what is happening in Ukraine matter much for Taiwan? It depends on whom you ask. I raised the question with several policy experts and government officials in Taiwan, and the results of those conversations are revealing.

“There’s no question that China is watching the crisis in Ukraine really closely,” says NBC News reporter Dan De Luce. “And if Russia succeeds in seizing Ukraine, Chinese leaders could see that as a green light to go after Taiwan.” Alternatively, Kharis Templeman, an expert on Taiwan at the Hoover Institution, argues that linking the fates of Ukraine and Taiwan is “lazy analysis.” The truth is likely somewhere in the middle. This should come as little surprise given that Taiwan’s government has set up a task force on the crisis in Eastern Europe. As Hsiao Bi-khim, Taiwan’s representative to the United States, told NBC News, “Like everyone else in the world, we are watching the situation with much concern and anxiety. . . . I think it’s pretty clear to all of us around the world that those undermining stability are China and Russia.”

But why is Taiwan watching so closely? It is not because Beijing will interpret a weak response to Russia as a green light for China to invade Taiwan. Nor is it simply a matter of assessing American credibility. But observers in Taiwan do seem to believe that the events in Europe, and the role America plays, will tell them, as well as observers in Beijing, something important about U.S. power, U.S. interests, global power distribution, and trends in the international system—all of which have implications for Taiwan.

The Sino-Russian axis—dangers and opportunities.​

In December 2021, Xi Jinping told Vladimir Putin, as conveyed by the Russian president’s foreign policy adviser, “even though the bilateral relationship is not an alliance, in its closeness and effectiveness this relationship even exceeds that of an alliance.” Then, in a remarkable joint statement released on February 4, Putin and Xi put that sentiment to paper:
They reaffirm that the new inter-State relations between Russia and China are superior to political and military alliances of the Cold War era. Friendship between the two States has no limits, there are no “forbidden” areas of cooperation, strengthening of bilateral strategic cooperation is neither aimed against third countries nor affected by the changing international environment and circumstantial changes in third countries.
The statement indicates a newly intimate mutual embrace, so it raised alarm bells in Taipei. Although Russia’s acceptance of China’s One China principle is nothing new, Moscow’s public assertion in such a high-profile document that “Taiwan is an inalienable part of China” and that Russia “opposes any forms of independence of Taiwan”—likely made in exchange for Beijing’s public opposition to NATO enlargement—raised eyebrows. Concerns that Russia could provide assistance to China during a Taiwan Strait war seemed far more realistic than they had in the recent past. The non-alliance could greatly complicate not just American efforts to intervene in such a conflict, but also those of Japan and other potentially interested parties.

But some in Taiwan also see an opportunity in this trans-Eurasian snuggle. Xi Jinping has personally invested in his relationship with Putin, having met with him on 38 occasions. If the bromance turns sour or if the consequences of Russian actions redound to China, that could damage Xi at home. There is thus an opportunity, as one scholar put it to me, to weaken Xi by weakening Putin.

A robust and effective U.S.-led response to the invasion of Ukraine could instill greater caution in Xi, who must already be wondering if the democratic world would punish China for using force against Taiwan in the way it has thus far punished Russia. Moreover, if Xi’s embrace of Putin comes to be seen internally as a misstep, the Chinese leader might opt for a more restrained approach to international affairs as he heads into this fall’s 20th Party Congress, in which he aims to secure a third term as Communist Party general-secretary.

Does democracy matter?​

The Russia-China joint statement devotes six full paragraphs to the topic of democracy. The two authoritarian states claim that they are, in fact, democracies and argue that “the advocacy of democracy and human rights must not be used to put pressure on other countries.” Clearly, Moscow and Beijing believe there is an ideological component to their competition with U.S.-led coalitions. It remains an open question just how important that ideological component is to American leaders.

Even as many Americans in the policymaking world agree that Taiwan matters to U.S. interests, they may not agree on why it matters. In general, however, analysts and policymakers subscribe to one or more of three basic rationales for Taiwan’s importance: a strategic import imbued by its geography; its economic relationship with the United States and the central node it occupies in global technology supply chains; and its democracy.

President Joe Biden has described competition between democracy and authoritarianism as a defining feature of our time. In a speech on February 16, he made clear that he sees what is happening in and around Ukraine as proof positive of that outlook. “If we do not stand for freedom where it is at risk today,” he asserted, “we’ll surely pay a steeper price tomorrow.” It’s a message that must appeal to President Tsai Ing-wen, who has described Taiwan as “sitting on the frontlines of the global contest between the liberal democratic order and the authoritarian alternative.” But will what transpires in Eastern Europe reveal that supposed Biden worldview as little more than rhetoric?

There are concerns in Taiwan that if the United States fails to ensure Ukraine’s survival as an independent, democratic state, the third rationale for defending Taiwan will be proven unpersuasive for the current crop of decision-makers in Washington. To be clear, no one I spoke to in recent weeks has suggested that the United States should go to war with Russia to reassure Taiwan. But Americans should be aware that, in political warfare efforts aimed at Taiwan, China will make hay of America’s inability to save a fellow democracy, and that certain elements of the pan-Blue camp in Taiwan will adopt a similar narrative in their domestic politicking. There are potentially significant implications for U.S.-Taiwan relations.

Collective security—what is it good for?​

In a recent interview with the Huffington Post Italy (in English here), J. Michael Cole, a research fellow at the Prospect Foundation in Taipei and a longtime Taiwan resident, noted the differing security architectures in Europe and Asia. Unlike Asia, Europe has a large collective security arrangement in the form of NATO. “Initiating a concerted response to Chinese aggression against Taiwan,” he argues, “would be more difficult than among EU and NATO members, even if there, too, unity is often elusive.” Put another way, if NATO cannot mount an effective response to the crisis centered on Ukraine—which is, after all, right next door—what hope is there for the United States to mobilize its far more disparate group of allies in Asia to respond to a crisis in the Taiwan Strait?

What has become apparent is that at least some in Taiwan see in Europe right now an opportunity for the United States to prove what collective defense can accomplish. And while the security of NATO members is not, in a narrow sense, directly threatened, Europe’s peaceful order—in which European countries have thrived and which NATO has played a central role in maintaining—may be crumbling. It is little wonder that some in Taiwan see parallels to Taiwan’s circumstances; Taiwan, after all, has no formal allies of its own.

But beyond those parallels, if the United States is to be successful in establishing an “anti-hegemonic coalition”—to use Elbridge Colby’s preferred terminology—in Asia, it behooves the United States to prove it can successfully lead an extant one in Europe against a foe less powerful than China. Right now, with the advent of major war on its doorstep, that coalition in Europe appears to be failing.

Colby, moreover, recognizes that an anti-hegemonic coalition centered on America’s hub-and-spokes alliance model in Asia may not be sufficient. He argues for pursuing collective defense arrangements, contending in The Strategy of Denial that “the more cohesive the United States can make its alliances in resisting China’s bid for regional hegemony, the better.” But if NATO, the sine qua non of collective security, cannot defend the peace in Europe and prevent growing threats from emerging on its doorstep, what hope is there for Asian states to get past their allergy to collective security?

European security dynamics: Will free Europe continue its embrace of free Taiwan?​

Taiwan has been enjoying a European moment. It has exchanged representative offices with Lithuania. Slovenia and Taiwan are likewise opening trade offices in each other’s capitals, and the Czech Republic and Taiwan have drawn closer in recent years despite Chinese opprobrium. These developments have potentially beneficial long-term consequences for stability in the Taiwan Strait. A diversity of economic partners weakens China’s economic leverage vis-à-vis Taiwan, while a diversity of diplomatic partners complicates China’s decision-making regarding aggressive action against Taiwan.

Even when European states are not explicitly focused on Taiwan, they have increasingly cast their eyes toward China with newfound skepticism. In its Brussels Summit Communiqué last June, NATO raised concerns about the People’s Republic:
China’s stated ambitions and assertive behavior present systemic challenges to the rules-based international order and to areas relevant to Alliance security.
The United Kingdom embraced an “Indo-Pacific tilt” in the course of its 2021 “integrated review of security, defense, development, and foreign policy.” Last October, the European Parliament adopted a resolution urging the EU to “intensify EU-Taiwan political relations” and to “consider Taiwan a key partner and democratic ally in the Indo-Pacific . . . that could contribute to maintaining a rules-based order in the middle of an intensifying great power rivalry.” France’s new Indo-Pacific strategy points to China’s growing power, noting that “its territorial claims are expressed with greater and greater strength” and that tensions are rising “at the Chinese-Indian border, in the Taiwan Strait and on the Korean peninsula.”

Now, observers in Taiwan wonder whether this recent attention can be sustained. The invasion in Ukraine could mark a fundamental shift in security dynamics on the European continent. To an extent not seen in decades, European countries will be consumed with far narrower security concerns. All eyes will be on Russia, with much less attention to spare for the far end of the Eurasian landmass. That may be good for NATO security, especially if this is the crisis that finally spurs members to substantially increase their defense spending, as Chancellor Olaf Scholz just announced Germany would do. But a Europe that turns inward is a troubling development for those observers in Taiwan that see diversified foreign interest in cross-Strait affairs as a stabilizing factor in regional security.

An inward turn in Europe could, in theory, free Washington to focus on the Indo-Pacific. If Europeans are better able to ensure security in Europe, the United States might be able to rebalance its military forces and strategic attention to the China challenge. But that is likely wishful thinking: Even if Asia was the decisive theater for defending American security interests before Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine, it no longer is—at least not in the short term. Putin’s Russia has embraced bald-faced aggression in a way Xi Jinping’s China has not (yet). Putin’s Russia has openly brandished nuclear weapons to achieve its objectives—a step which Xi’s China has thus far eschewed. Washington will find it needs to keep one eye firmly fixed on Europe even as European allies bear more of the burden for their own defense.
Perhaps most surprising, my interlocutors in Taiwan do not seem to be fretting about this outcome. There is at least some recognition of Europe’s importance not only to American security interests, but to Asian security as well. Deterrence in Asia, it seems, is not simply a matter of the military balance. When it comes to Beijing’s decision-making about Taiwan, there are various factors at play.

The balance of military power: Who needs it?​

Writing in the Wall Street Journal last month before the Ukraine invasion, Oriana Skylar Mastro and Elbridge Colby argued against additional deployments of U.S. forces to Europe to shore up NATO. “Sending more resources to Europe is the definition of getting distracted,” they write. “The U.S. should remain committed to NATO’s defense but husband its critical resources for the primary fight in Asia, and Taiwan in particular.” While some Taiwanese that I spoke to agreed with Mastro and Colby’s contention that Taiwan is more important to American interests than Ukraine, I did not find agreement with the insistence that Ukraine is a distraction. And while there are concerns about resource distribution, it is not at all clear that husbanding resources for Asia will provide the deterrent boost that Mastro and Colby claim.

Rather, Xi Jinping might interpret the husbanding of resources as proof positive that American power is in terminal decline. The effect, one argument goes, may be to further convince Xi Jinping that his assessment of a rising East and declining West is correct. If America the Decadent is unable to exercise global leadership in the way it has since World War II; if it is offloading responsibilities to others; if it must conserve resources for a future fight—well, that is an America that China can defeat in battle, Xi might think, even if the arithmetic says the United States is ready for such a fight. And, of course, who is to say that in the event of a conflict over Taiwan, Washington would not again decide to “husband its critical resources” for a time when national interests, even more narrowly defined, are at stake?
To be sure, the military balance in Asia matters greatly. But it is not all that matters. Adversary perceptions of American national power, national will, and national character all factor into decisions about the use of force. Right now and in the weeks and months to come, my conversations suggest, it is America’s approach to Europe, not Asia, that will primarily shape those perceptions in China.

Will America lead?​

There is clearly a diversity of opinion in Taiwan on these questions. Even so, the views and arguments shared here reflect the thinking of influential national security elites and elements of the Tsai administration, who see their country’s fate tied, in important ways, to Ukraine’s, though not for the reasons many American commentators have asserted. There are certainly concerns that a diversion of U.S. attention to Europe in the coming months might provide China with an opportunity to more aggressively squeeze Taiwan via coercive displays of military might, disinformation campaigns, employment of economic leverage, and other so-called “gray zone” tactics. But the greater concerns, at least among those with whom I spoke, are that the United States will fail to lead an effective response to the Russian invasion and that Putin will ultimately succeed in his endeavor. That outcome would mark a world made new—a world far less conducive to Taiwan’s survival as a thriving, independent, democratic state.

https://www.aei.org/op-eds/taiwan-and-china-keep-eyes-on-ukraine/




Some of the more interesting/important parts I highlighted in red.
The lack of any significant military contributions to the fight in Ukraine and the very unmemorable media appearances of Biden in regards to the conflict leave me thinking that the US hasn't seized the opportunity to get the european part of NATO into their Indo-pacific strategy. Trying to make up for the french submarine fiasco, not that it received much coverage in the US news and has also largely been forgotten in Europe, but it would have still been a good time to do something.
Also disappointed in the EU for not engaging India and establishing stronger bilateral ties with this new crisis, especially in opposition to China(and their russian alliance alongside it). Maybe strategic autonomy will become a reality, doesn't seem impossible now.
One thing that would surprise me if Xi really tried to get a diplomatic solution going, but what would all those new toys be good for then? And you've got to appease your rabid nationalists too, that's a fire you can only keep down for so long, especially after fanning it so much.
 

Nilgiri

Experienced member
Moderator
Aviation Specialist
Messages
9,815
Reactions
120 19,919
Nation of residence
Canada
Nation of origin
India

Taiwan and China keep eyes on Ukraine​

They both want to see whether the United States will step up and lead.​

March 3, 2022
Michael Mazza

Does what is happening in Ukraine matter much for Taiwan? It depends on whom you ask. I raised the question with several policy experts and government officials in Taiwan, and the results of those conversations are revealing.

“There’s no question that China is watching the crisis in Ukraine really closely,” says NBC News reporter Dan De Luce. “And if Russia succeeds in seizing Ukraine, Chinese leaders could see that as a green light to go after Taiwan.” Alternatively, Kharis Templeman, an expert on Taiwan at the Hoover Institution, argues that linking the fates of Ukraine and Taiwan is “lazy analysis.” The truth is likely somewhere in the middle. This should come as little surprise given that Taiwan’s government has set up a task force on the crisis in Eastern Europe. As Hsiao Bi-khim, Taiwan’s representative to the United States, told NBC News, “Like everyone else in the world, we are watching the situation with much concern and anxiety. . . . I think it’s pretty clear to all of us around the world that those undermining stability are China and Russia.”

But why is Taiwan watching so closely? It is not because Beijing will interpret a weak response to Russia as a green light for China to invade Taiwan. Nor is it simply a matter of assessing American credibility. But observers in Taiwan do seem to believe that the events in Europe, and the role America plays, will tell them, as well as observers in Beijing, something important about U.S. power, U.S. interests, global power distribution, and trends in the international system—all of which have implications for Taiwan.

The Sino-Russian axis—dangers and opportunities.​

In December 2021, Xi Jinping told Vladimir Putin, as conveyed by the Russian president’s foreign policy adviser, “even though the bilateral relationship is not an alliance, in its closeness and effectiveness this relationship even exceeds that of an alliance.” Then, in a remarkable joint statement released on February 4, Putin and Xi put that sentiment to paper:

The statement indicates a newly intimate mutual embrace, so it raised alarm bells in Taipei. Although Russia’s acceptance of China’s One China principle is nothing new, Moscow’s public assertion in such a high-profile document that “Taiwan is an inalienable part of China” and that Russia “opposes any forms of independence of Taiwan”—likely made in exchange for Beijing’s public opposition to NATO enlargement—raised eyebrows. Concerns that Russia could provide assistance to China during a Taiwan Strait war seemed far more realistic than they had in the recent past. The non-alliance could greatly complicate not just American efforts to intervene in such a conflict, but also those of Japan and other potentially interested parties.

But some in Taiwan also see an opportunity in this trans-Eurasian snuggle. Xi Jinping has personally invested in his relationship with Putin, having met with him on 38 occasions. If the bromance turns sour or if the consequences of Russian actions redound to China, that could damage Xi at home. There is thus an opportunity, as one scholar put it to me, to weaken Xi by weakening Putin.

A robust and effective U.S.-led response to the invasion of Ukraine could instill greater caution in Xi, who must already be wondering if the democratic world would punish China for using force against Taiwan in the way it has thus far punished Russia. Moreover, if Xi’s embrace of Putin comes to be seen internally as a misstep, the Chinese leader might opt for a more restrained approach to international affairs as he heads into this fall’s 20th Party Congress, in which he aims to secure a third term as Communist Party general-secretary.

Does democracy matter?​

The Russia-China joint statement devotes six full paragraphs to the topic of democracy. The two authoritarian states claim that they are, in fact, democracies and argue that “the advocacy of democracy and human rights must not be used to put pressure on other countries.” Clearly, Moscow and Beijing believe there is an ideological component to their competition with U.S.-led coalitions. It remains an open question just how important that ideological component is to American leaders.

Even as many Americans in the policymaking world agree that Taiwan matters to U.S. interests, they may not agree on why it matters. In general, however, analysts and policymakers subscribe to one or more of three basic rationales for Taiwan’s importance: a strategic import imbued by its geography; its economic relationship with the United States and the central node it occupies in global technology supply chains; and its democracy.

President Joe Biden has described competition between democracy and authoritarianism as a defining feature of our time. In a speech on February 16, he made clear that he sees what is happening in and around Ukraine as proof positive of that outlook. “If we do not stand for freedom where it is at risk today,” he asserted, “we’ll surely pay a steeper price tomorrow.” It’s a message that must appeal to President Tsai Ing-wen, who has described Taiwan as “sitting on the frontlines of the global contest between the liberal democratic order and the authoritarian alternative.” But will what transpires in Eastern Europe reveal that supposed Biden worldview as little more than rhetoric?

There are concerns in Taiwan that if the United States fails to ensure Ukraine’s survival as an independent, democratic state, the third rationale for defending Taiwan will be proven unpersuasive for the current crop of decision-makers in Washington. To be clear, no one I spoke to in recent weeks has suggested that the United States should go to war with Russia to reassure Taiwan. But Americans should be aware that, in political warfare efforts aimed at Taiwan, China will make hay of America’s inability to save a fellow democracy, and that certain elements of the pan-Blue camp in Taiwan will adopt a similar narrative in their domestic politicking. There are potentially significant implications for U.S.-Taiwan relations.

Collective security—what is it good for?​

In a recent interview with the Huffington Post Italy (in English here), J. Michael Cole, a research fellow at the Prospect Foundation in Taipei and a longtime Taiwan resident, noted the differing security architectures in Europe and Asia. Unlike Asia, Europe has a large collective security arrangement in the form of NATO. “Initiating a concerted response to Chinese aggression against Taiwan,” he argues, “would be more difficult than among EU and NATO members, even if there, too, unity is often elusive.” Put another way, if NATO cannot mount an effective response to the crisis centered on Ukraine—which is, after all, right next door—what hope is there for the United States to mobilize its far more disparate group of allies in Asia to respond to a crisis in the Taiwan Strait?

What has become apparent is that at least some in Taiwan see in Europe right now an opportunity for the United States to prove what collective defense can accomplish. And while the security of NATO members is not, in a narrow sense, directly threatened, Europe’s peaceful order—in which European countries have thrived and which NATO has played a central role in maintaining—may be crumbling. It is little wonder that some in Taiwan see parallels to Taiwan’s circumstances; Taiwan, after all, has no formal allies of its own.

But beyond those parallels, if the United States is to be successful in establishing an “anti-hegemonic coalition”—to use Elbridge Colby’s preferred terminology—in Asia, it behooves the United States to prove it can successfully lead an extant one in Europe against a foe less powerful than China. Right now, with the advent of major war on its doorstep, that coalition in Europe appears to be failing.

Colby, moreover, recognizes that an anti-hegemonic coalition centered on America’s hub-and-spokes alliance model in Asia may not be sufficient. He argues for pursuing collective defense arrangements, contending in The Strategy of Denial that “the more cohesive the United States can make its alliances in resisting China’s bid for regional hegemony, the better.” But if NATO, the sine qua non of collective security, cannot defend the peace in Europe and prevent growing threats from emerging on its doorstep, what hope is there for Asian states to get past their allergy to collective security?

European security dynamics: Will free Europe continue its embrace of free Taiwan?​

Taiwan has been enjoying a European moment. It has exchanged representative offices with Lithuania. Slovenia and Taiwan are likewise opening trade offices in each other’s capitals, and the Czech Republic and Taiwan have drawn closer in recent years despite Chinese opprobrium. These developments have potentially beneficial long-term consequences for stability in the Taiwan Strait. A diversity of economic partners weakens China’s economic leverage vis-à-vis Taiwan, while a diversity of diplomatic partners complicates China’s decision-making regarding aggressive action against Taiwan.

Even when European states are not explicitly focused on Taiwan, they have increasingly cast their eyes toward China with newfound skepticism. In its Brussels Summit Communiqué last June, NATO raised concerns about the People’s Republic:

The United Kingdom embraced an “Indo-Pacific tilt” in the course of its 2021 “integrated review of security, defense, development, and foreign policy.” Last October, the European Parliament adopted a resolution urging the EU to “intensify EU-Taiwan political relations” and to “consider Taiwan a key partner and democratic ally in the Indo-Pacific . . . that could contribute to maintaining a rules-based order in the middle of an intensifying great power rivalry.” France’s new Indo-Pacific strategy points to China’s growing power, noting that “its territorial claims are expressed with greater and greater strength” and that tensions are rising “at the Chinese-Indian border, in the Taiwan Strait and on the Korean peninsula.”

Now, observers in Taiwan wonder whether this recent attention can be sustained. The invasion in Ukraine could mark a fundamental shift in security dynamics on the European continent. To an extent not seen in decades, European countries will be consumed with far narrower security concerns. All eyes will be on Russia, with much less attention to spare for the far end of the Eurasian landmass. That may be good for NATO security, especially if this is the crisis that finally spurs members to substantially increase their defense spending, as Chancellor Olaf Scholz just announced Germany would do. But a Europe that turns inward is a troubling development for those observers in Taiwan that see diversified foreign interest in cross-Strait affairs as a stabilizing factor in regional security.

An inward turn in Europe could, in theory, free Washington to focus on the Indo-Pacific. If Europeans are better able to ensure security in Europe, the United States might be able to rebalance its military forces and strategic attention to the China challenge. But that is likely wishful thinking: Even if Asia was the decisive theater for defending American security interests before Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine, it no longer is—at least not in the short term. Putin’s Russia has embraced bald-faced aggression in a way Xi Jinping’s China has not (yet). Putin’s Russia has openly brandished nuclear weapons to achieve its objectives—a step which Xi’s China has thus far eschewed. Washington will find it needs to keep one eye firmly fixed on Europe even as European allies bear more of the burden for their own defense.
Perhaps most surprising, my interlocutors in Taiwan do not seem to be fretting about this outcome. There is at least some recognition of Europe’s importance not only to American security interests, but to Asian security as well. Deterrence in Asia, it seems, is not simply a matter of the military balance. When it comes to Beijing’s decision-making about Taiwan, there are various factors at play.

The balance of military power: Who needs it?​

Writing in the Wall Street Journal last month before the Ukraine invasion, Oriana Skylar Mastro and Elbridge Colby argued against additional deployments of U.S. forces to Europe to shore up NATO. “Sending more resources to Europe is the definition of getting distracted,” they write. “The U.S. should remain committed to NATO’s defense but husband its critical resources for the primary fight in Asia, and Taiwan in particular.” While some Taiwanese that I spoke to agreed with Mastro and Colby’s contention that Taiwan is more important to American interests than Ukraine, I did not find agreement with the insistence that Ukraine is a distraction. And while there are concerns about resource distribution, it is not at all clear that husbanding resources for Asia will provide the deterrent boost that Mastro and Colby claim.

Rather, Xi Jinping might interpret the husbanding of resources as proof positive that American power is in terminal decline. The effect, one argument goes, may be to further convince Xi Jinping that his assessment of a rising East and declining West is correct. If America the Decadent is unable to exercise global leadership in the way it has since World War II; if it is offloading responsibilities to others; if it must conserve resources for a future fight—well, that is an America that China can defeat in battle, Xi might think, even if the arithmetic says the United States is ready for such a fight. And, of course, who is to say that in the event of a conflict over Taiwan, Washington would not again decide to “husband its critical resources” for a time when national interests, even more narrowly defined, are at stake?
To be sure, the military balance in Asia matters greatly. But it is not all that matters. Adversary perceptions of American national power, national will, and national character all factor into decisions about the use of force. Right now and in the weeks and months to come, my conversations suggest, it is America’s approach to Europe, not Asia, that will primarily shape those perceptions in China.

Will America lead?​

There is clearly a diversity of opinion in Taiwan on these questions. Even so, the views and arguments shared here reflect the thinking of influential national security elites and elements of the Tsai administration, who see their country’s fate tied, in important ways, to Ukraine’s, though not for the reasons many American commentators have asserted. There are certainly concerns that a diversion of U.S. attention to Europe in the coming months might provide China with an opportunity to more aggressively squeeze Taiwan via coercive displays of military might, disinformation campaigns, employment of economic leverage, and other so-called “gray zone” tactics. But the greater concerns, at least among those with whom I spoke, are that the United States will fail to lead an effective response to the Russian invasion and that Putin will ultimately succeed in his endeavor. That outcome would mark a world made new—a world far less conducive to Taiwan’s survival as a thriving, independent, democratic state.

https://www.aei.org/op-eds/taiwan-and-china-keep-eyes-on-ukraine/




Some of the more interesting/important parts I highlighted in red.
The lack of any significant military contributions to the fight in Ukraine and the very unmemorable media appearances of Biden in regards to the conflict leave me thinking that the US hasn't seized the opportunity to get the european part of NATO into their Indo-pacific strategy. Trying to make up for the french submarine fiasco, not that it received much coverage in the US news and has also largely been forgotten in Europe, but it would have still been a good time to do something.
Also disappointed in the EU for not engaging India and establishing stronger bilateral ties with this new crisis, especially in opposition to China(and their russian alliance alongside it). Maybe strategic autonomy will become a reality, doesn't seem impossible now.
One thing that would surprise me if Xi really tried to get a diplomatic solution going, but what would all those new toys be good for then? And you've got to appease your rabid nationalists too, that's a fire you can only keep down for so long, especially after fanning it so much.

I'll try get to some of this later in more depth I think is warranted.

In mean time, what does @T-123456 think about moving this thread to the taiwan section to give that section a post boost etc...
 

Blackbeardsgoldfish

Committed member
Moderator
Germany Moderator
Messages
282
Reactions
1 458
Nation of residence
Austria
Nation of origin
Austria

Why Beijing thinks Taiwan is different from Ukraine​

  • Key difference is the Eastern European country’s status as a recognised sovereign state and so far Beijing’s ‘red line’ has not been crossed
  • But Washington’s support for the self-ruled island is increasingly infuriating Beijing, which is taking careful note of the war’s progress

Minnie Chan

Minnie Chan

+ FOLLOW
Published: 11:00pm, 10 Mar, 2022

Illustraion: Henry Wong

Illustraion: Henry Wong
Russia’s full-scale attack on Ukraine – justified by Moscow as a response to its neighbour’s tilt to the West and Nato – has many pondering whether Beijing would follow suit in Taiwan.

Beijing has long felt that Washington is using the self-ruled island as part of a strategy to undermine and contain its rival – accusing the US of disrespecting its sovereignty by backing the Taiwanese pro-independence camp.

Beijing regards the island as part of its territory, which it intends to recover by force if necessary, and “Today Ukraine, Tomorrow Taiwan” quickly emerged as a Taiwanese catchphrase after the Russian invasion began late last month.

But analysts said there were clear differences between the two – with sovereignty as the key reason why Beijing’s intentions in Taiwan were largely different from Russia’s invasion of its East European neighbour.

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi used his annual press conference on Monday to underline that the situations in Taiwan and Ukraine were not comparable – the former was an entirely internal matter, while the latter a conflict between two countries.

Washington was concerned enough about the similarities to send a high-profile delegation of former security officials to Taiwan, immediately after the Russian invasion.

Without referring directly to the whirlwind visit, led by former chairman of the US joint chiefs of staff Michael Mullen, Wang said the US was pushing the self-ruled island into a dangerous situation. He also stressed the need for the two powers to get along well and avoid confrontation.

Wang Yi says Taiwan and Ukraine situations are fundamentally different
9 Mar 2022

Taiwan’s situation is a result of the civil war between the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang, which was finally suspended in 1949 with the establishment of the People’s Republic of China.

It was not until 1979 that Washington cut formal ties with KMT-held Taipei and switched official diplomatic relations to Beijing.

Then-US president Jimmy Carter signed the Taiwan Relations Act, which acknowledged the “one-China principle” without defining whether Beijing or Taipei represents “China”.

At present, just 13 out of 193 UN members recognise Taiwan as a sovereign state. The rest, like the US, give recognition to Beijing. Ukraine, a former Soviet republic, is regarded as an independent sovereign country with membership of the United Nations.

Russia cited Ukraine’s ambition to join Nato and the EU as an infringement of a red line, but while Beijing has been increasingly furious at Washington’s challenges to the status quo on Taiwan, no lines have so far been crossed.

Why has the relationship between the Chinese mainland and Taiwan taken a turn for the worse?​

According to Taiwan affairs specialist Wang Jianmin, at Minnan Normal University in Fujian province, there is still room for Beijing and the US to handle Taiwan “more wisely”.

In the Asia-Pacific region, there had been no crossing of Beijing’s “red line” – defined as a formal declaration of Taiwan’s independence or diplomatic relations established between Taipei and Washington, he said.

“The Americans have kept encouraging Taiwanese to challenge Beijing’s bottom line, but Taipei so far dares not to amend its constitution, while Washington still reiterates its long-standing one-China policy.”

Analysts said the US was using multifaceted tactics on Taiwan, maintaining its long-standing strategic ambiguity while supporting the island’s defence and encouraging closer trade ties.

Biden administration approves its first arms sale to Taiwan
5 Aug 2021

The Taiwan Relations Act allows weapons sales but does not specify whether the US would come to Taipei’s direct aid if it was attacked. Arms deals with Taiwan soared under former president Donald Trump – reaching a record high of nearly US$20 billion.

In total, the White House has approved 13 weapons sales to Taipei since the start of the Trump administration, two of them in the past six months under President Joe Biden, to counter the growing threat posed by Beijing.

The military hardware includes dozens of F-16 fighter jets, anti-ship missiles, long-range land attack missiles, and aircraft-mounted reconnaissance sensors.
The US has also been putting pressure on Beijing’s red line with visits to Taiwan by a succession of current and former officials – including Trump’s health secretary Alex Azar, who in 2020 became the highest-ranked serving official to visit Taipei since 1979.


For Beijing, these efforts by the US to foster ties with Taiwan are regarded as a deviation from the status quo, aimed at undermining its strategic position by encouraging the self-ruled island towards an independence path.

“But how Beijing reacts will be different from Russia,” Wang said.

According to Zhou Chenming, a researcher from the Yuan Wang military science and technology think tank in Beijing, the Chinese leadership is more capable and confident than its Moscow counterpart when dealing with core national interests.

“Beijing understands the ‘strategic ambiguity’ applied by Washington over Taiwan benefits both the US and [mainland] China,” he said. “But China is much more powerful than Russia, in terms of economic power and military strength.”

https://www.scmp.com/news/china/dip...es-set-change?module=hard_link&pgtype=article

As a rising power, Beijing believes “time and momentum” are on its side to catch up with the US in national strength, through a massive effort in economic and defence development, Zhou said.

China’s military has been undergoing a massive modernisation which has included two aircraft carriers – one of them developed domestically – and a third expected to be launched this year. It is also developing its 6th generation fighter jet.

Military spending is continuing to rise – with a 7.1 per cent budget increase announced at the weekend – up from last year’s 6.8 per cent, although years of double-digit growth ended in 2017.

Beijing is also using legal tools against Taiwanese independence. A senior official has proposed a new law to punish anyone violating their responsibility to promote reunification – on top of the Anti-Secession Law that provides a legal framework for taking back the island by force.
c41a78c5-0c13-46bf-a53b-fbb5006d423b_ce381c36.jpg


A blacklist of “diehard Taiwanese separatists” and their financial supporters has also been drawn up, with Beijing vowing to prosecute them, as well as banning them from entering the mainland, Hong Kong and Macau.

Zhu Feng, dean of the School of International Studies at Nanjing University, said Beijing was developing a range of scenarios to cope with the different challenges.

“The Chinese are not so stupid to be easily manipulated by the Americans’ geopolitical games. Beijing is very clear that it’s crucial to avoid any military conflicts.”

Shanghai-based military expert Ni Lexiong said Beijing would be making very careful calculations on how to react to the US and Taipei, but the asymmetric combat tactics adopted by Ukraine were also being noted.

Senior Beijing adviser proposes reunification law amid Taiwan tensions
9 Mar 2022

“The battle cost of a Taiwan contingency would be much higher than Russia’s full-scale attack on Ukraine. There are many uncertainties once a war breaks out,” he said.

“For example, Putin found his airborne troops – which took just six hours to occupy Prague when Russia invaded Czechoslovakia in 1968 – are no longer a real elite force, because [they took] more than two days to control an airport in Kyiv.”

While Ukraine’s land border with Russia made an invasion straightforward, an attack on Taiwan would require a complex operation involving air force, navy and marines, because of the natural barrier of Taiwan Strait, Ni said.

Experts said Beijing is not expected to attack Taiwan while the West’s attention is on Ukraine, but the fierce competition between China and the US meant the crisis over the island will continue to elevate.


Military conflicts will happen any time in the Taiwan Strait once the US attempts to resume diplomatic ties, or signs on any military assistance deals with Taiwan,” Wang Jianmin warned.

Lu Li-shih, a former instructor at Taiwan’s Navy Academy in Kaohsiung, said the PLA would be updating its “Taiwan reunification operation plan” based on its observations of the “vivid” tactics adopted by Ukrainian soldiers equipped with US weapons.

“The PLA is the world’s most hardworking troop trying all efforts to learn everything from their American counterparts,” Lu said.

“I once predicted the PLA would not attack Taiwan until it becomes a real blue navy five years later, but now I believe their plan might be deferred up to one decade.”

Additional reporting by Amber Wang

https://www.scmp.com/news/china/dip...3/why-beijing-thinks-taiwan-different-ukraine
 

Nilgiri

Experienced member
Moderator
Aviation Specialist
Messages
9,815
Reactions
120 19,919
Nation of residence
Canada
Nation of origin
India
This thread is pretty much dead, but I'll keep on posting a few things once in a while.

I'll be getting to it soon again.

Another thing you must consider with all Taiwan analysis is the golden goose factor and how that looks for PRC post (hypothetical) war.

Down to detail of how do you manage the defeated Taiwanese population (who's worst fears they put as unlikely are now fully realised).

Its people in the end that matter the most (way past capital assets)....this is no longer the cold war era.
 

simsurf

Member
Messages
5
Reactions
8
Nation of residence
Australia
Nation of origin
Taiwan
He'll probably confirmed as that in autumn.


China currently has some 44 million men aged 15-19, in other words potentially 40 million soldiers of the best generation capable of being mobilized in a war against Taiwan(presently 23.5 million inhabitants, projected to peak at 23.7 in 2024 and decrease thereafter). This amount of manpower can only be matched by India, and China could quite literally overrun Taiwan.

China population: https://www.populationpyramid.net/china/2022/
Taiwan population:https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographics_of_Taiwan
PRC doesn’t have the lift capacity to carry out a successful invasion yet
however, many analysts believe they will by 2026/27
 

Blackbeardsgoldfish

Committed member
Moderator
Germany Moderator
Messages
282
Reactions
1 458
Nation of residence
Austria
Nation of origin
Austria
PRC doesn’t have the lift capacity to carry out a successful invasion yet
however, many analysts believe they will by 2026/27
You're correct and I've said something along those lines in this thread before:
The one thing that I fear is that if the Mainland and Taiwan don't reunite by mid decade, then it'll happen by April 2027, and not peacefully. The Shanghai Massacre occurred on the 12th of April 1927, and this would give it a nice, centennial ring to it, something the CCP likes, as seen with their large parades last year and the various goals they've set for 2049, the centennial founding year of the PRC. At this point in 2027, China would be too strong militarily for the US to interfere without burning itself badly, it's economy would be on par, if not surpassing the american one.
It's worth reading the posts by all the other members too
 

xizhimen

Experienced member
Messages
7,391
Reactions
384
Nation of residence
China
Nation of origin
China
The Chinese won't invade Taiwan. They prefer economic dominance to anything else and they are well aware they aren't powerful enough yet to take what they want with impunity without serious consequences. They also aren't in as deep shit as Russia to start resorting to desperate measures.
It's common sense in both PRC and ROC, even Taiwan public never worry about it, they know it's not coming. As for PRC, keeping pressure and slowly pushing US out of Asia-Pacific region is the goal, going into a real war is not.

China vs US military strength in Asia-Pacific region by 2025
INDOPACOM-2025-1024x750.jpg
 

xizhimen

Experienced member
Messages
7,391
Reactions
384
Nation of residence
China
Nation of origin
China
The Chinese are also projected to peak, and to decrease thereafter; one study says that it has already peaked and is already in decline. So it seems that this is a window that the PRC has, that will continuously shrink hereafter.
One study? Millions of other studies projected that China will overtake US much sooner than expected, which one people should believe?
 

McCool

Contributor
Messages
685
Reactions
1,907
Nation of residence
Indonesia
Nation of origin
Indonesia
Is Taiwan next ?

Yeah maybe , but this time US air force and naval aviation will prevent the invaders achieving air superiority and we're going to see a repeat of the Russian army in Ukraine.

Except this time the invading forces will be drowned underwater.
 

Follow us on social media

Latest posts

Top Bottom