Is Taiwan Next?

Paro

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Will the US manage to get that going until then though? All six facilities will be up and running by 2024,
They expect by end of 2024 they can meet the US demand locally with Round Top and the other two in Texas and California ( don't remember their names sorry)

"Smith pointed out that the Round Top project, which should become operational in 2023, is a uniquely enriched polymetallic deposit weighted toward heavy rare earths and contains 16 of the 17 existing rare earth elements, as well as lithium, gallium and other US-listed critical minerals.

At the planned initial production rate, the mine has sufficient identified resources to operate for more than 100 years."




and they will actually compete with TSMC in semiconductor tech?
They don't plan on competing with TSMC but work with them to expand their production in US. And Also Intel is building the biggest ever plant in Ohio.

Also, the new upgrade order for the ASML lithography machine by TSMC points toward the Arizona facility. My take is the TSMC, US will produce more advanced chips than the one in Taiwan in coming years.






In probably a few years the US will be the biggest Semiconductor industry on the planet, and they seem to be preparing the ground to dwarf throw Taiwan at China.

Americans themselves will bomb the shit out of TSMC to keep it away from the Chinese hands. The net loser is always china if it goes against the gods of war and the CCP knows this more than anyone.



@Nilgiri @Gessler @Peace Lover
 
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Blackbeardsgoldfish

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They expect by end of 2024 they can meet the US demand locally with Round Top and the other two in Texas and California ( don't remember their names sorry)

"Smith pointed out that the Round Top project, which should become operational in 2023, is a uniquely enriched polymetallic deposit weighted toward heavy rare earths and contains 16 of the 17 existing rare earth elements, as well as lithium, gallium and other US-listed critical minerals.

At the planned initial production rate, the mine has sufficient identified resources to operate for more than 100 years."





They don't plan on competing with TSMC but work with them to expand their production in US. And Also Intel is building the biggest ever plant in Ohio.

Also, the new upgrade order for the ASML lithography machine by TSMC points toward the Arizona facility. My take is the TSMC, US will produce more advanced chips than the one in Taiwan in coming years.






In probably a few years the US will be the biggest Semiconductor industry on the planet, and they seem to be preparing the ground to dwarf throw Taiwan at China.

Americans themselves will bomb the shit out of TSMC to keep it away from the Chinese hands. The net loser is always china if it goes against the gods of war and the CCP knows this more than anyone.



@Nilgiri @Gessler @Peace Lover
Thanks for the reading material!
Don’t know enough about the topic to really have an opinion, so I’ll stay out of it.
One thing however, do you really believe that the US would bomb TSMC? Because their allies wouldn’t want to become too dependent on US manufacturing during (what I presume will be) another Trump presidency?
Maybe a stuxnet type of attack on the facility, I can see that happen with the plausible deniability, but a bombing attack?
 

Paro

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One thing however, do you really believe that the US would bomb TSMC? Because their allies wouldn’t want to become too dependent on US manufacturing during (what I presume will be) another Trump presidency?
Who would you prefer control the semi conductor industry? A dictator Mr11 or a democratically elected moron who has an expiration date of 4 years.
Maybe a stuxnet type of attack on the facility, I can see that happen with the plausible deniability, but a bombing attack?
They may use hammers to break the lithography printers for all I care.
 

Nilgiri

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Couldn't this also be used as a bargaining chip in China's favour? Either Taiwan rejoins the mainland, or the entire world will experience an increase in price and regression in chip technology? China will suffer under this just the same, sure, but couldn't this be seen as a credible threat to the rest?

Think Paro has addressed this quite well. Little to add on my end.

Single point failure vulnerability is very extreme in Taiwan....PRC knows it....and West knows it (and is taking steps to re-shore things like Paro pointing out, though I feel timeline wise it will take longer given the tier B and Tier C stuff you need to also develop around Tier A core etc to make things truly viable).

They (PRC) dont want Samson situation..... it is all about managing status quo as long as possible IMO....and see that out to the current (known) horizon of utility. Things get murky past that horizon for CCP....given last 40 years they got used to assured light.

Now with the Russia equation factor....that will add to more wait and see without rocking the boat too much.
 

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What Taiwan provides to China (and the world at large more broadly) is also huge....

It is for example the literal single failure point for immense amount of processors/chips etc (especially at the highest tiers).

That adds a huge amount of deterrence to keeping status quo....for all sides that cannot afford such a golden goose to be upset or even destroyed....given the extremely long time to develop anything like that again, anywhere.

PRC really cannot risk doing something by absolute force for quite a long time.

PRC wants to finish the Chinese civil war for good.

I seen many Chinese who support the prc actually saying that General kai shek escaping to Taiwan was a mistake.

They believed Taiwan would be a thorn in the long term.
 

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PRC wants to finish the Chinese civil war for good.

I seen many Chinese who support the prc actually saying that General kai shek escaping to Taiwan was a mistake.

They believed Taiwan would be a thorn in the long term.

Its complicated. Definitely a loose end CCP perceives need tieing up.

But no easy or guaranteed way in doing it.

You cannot rely on the online trolls to form sound balanced impression though, that is my advice.

CKS escape to Taiwan is interesting story just on its own.

That civil war's details are completely overlooked by most (younger generation) Chinese I've talked to...past the rote cliffnotes.

Foreigners are inevitably even less educated about it.

Taiwan as a fortress was proven by Japan much earlier btw...so the thorn is not at all unexpected.

The great mistake was by the Qing IMO in letting that happen as it did....still operating on norms that it would be fairly easy problem to address for later like was done with Dutch Formosa.

The whole nature of the world had dramatically changed and the Chinese sorely underestimated that for a very long period of time....in fact China took several fissures and severe extreme pain (and mental anguish) quite deeply as result.

It is still playing out. Taiwan is just a very noticeable part of it....but even within China there is a great many things unresolved compared to how they are portrayed in the interim "rise".
 

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What Could European Militaries Contribute to the Defense of Taiwan?​

It is clear that European militaries can contribute to the defense of Taiwan if required – and they can start taking the necessary steps now.
Franz-Stefan Gady

By Franz-Stefan Gady and Oskar Glaese
April 01, 2022

What Could European Militaries Contribute to the Defense of Taiwan?

Two U.S. Air Force F-35A Lightning IIs and two French Air Force Dassault Rafales break formation during flight May 18, 2021, over France.

Credit: U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Alexander Cook
The focus of European policymakers over the past several weeks has been on dealing with arguably the biggest military crisis on European soil since the end of World War II. Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has triggered what the German government has called a Zeitenwende, a turning point in history, when it comes to Europe’s defense procurement and policies. Country after country in Europe has pledged to increase defense expenditure. Germany alone has announced its intention to spend 100 billion euros in a special fund to address urgent capability shortages of the Bundeswehr, Germany’s armed forces.

In laying out plans for future defense policies on the continent, European policymakers need to consider contingencies beyond Russia’s recent aggression. As the ongoing war in Ukraine has shown, “unthinkable” geopolitical scenarios are tragically thinkable and far less comfort can be taken in the assumption that potential adversaries will make decisions in ways we would understand as rational. Given this, the potential need for European contributions to a U.S. military campaign against China in the Western Pacific needs to be understood.

While European states do not have a formal military commitment to Taiwan akin to the Taiwan Relations Act in the United States, they are nonetheless likely to come under considerable pressure from allies and regional partners, in particular the United States, to contribute to the collective defense of Taiwan in the event of a military confrontation with the People’s Republic of China.

The principal burden of any such contribution is likely to fall upon a relatively small number of European militaries. Seven countries (the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and Poland) account for the bulk of the continent’s expeditionary military capability. The scale of any military commitment made at present is also likely to be limited by at least two significant competing demand signals in Europe’s near abroad: a significantly increased deterrence requirement against Russia in Eastern Europe following Vladimir Putin’s war of aggression against Ukraine, and ongoing insurgent and jihadist violence in the Sahel and the Middle East.

From a military-operational perspective, the capabilities and forces most useful in a Taiwan conflict scenario are, by and large, the same capabilities that would be of key importance in a high-intensity conflict with Russia in Eastern Europe. This includes, among other things, Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems, cyber reconnaissance capabilities, precision-guided munitions, long-range air and maritime strike capabilities, medium- and long-range air defense systems, and electronic warfare systems, as well as suppression of enemy air defense and destruction of enemy air defense (SEAD/DEAD) aircraft and weapons. As a result, any European move to significantly support the United States and Taiwan militarily in a conflict with China would to some extent weaken their capacity to deal with a Russian contingency at the same time, unless there is a fundamental shift toward détente relations between Russia and the West, which appears highly unlikely in the near term.

Despite this, it is clear that European militaries can contribute to the defense of Taiwan if required, even if only to a limited degree. Many European states still possess capable expeditionary forces, along with enabling capabilities that would facilitate their deployment to the Indo-Pacific theater, although the lack of established forward operating locations poses significant challenges to European power projection capabilities to the region.

Perhaps the most challenging issue for European military planners in the event of a Taiwan conflict would not, however, be generating their own forces for deployment, but the likely reduction in available U.S. reinforcements for a simultaneous contingency in Europe or its near abroad.

The precise nature of any “ask” upon European militaries in a hypothetical Taiwan contingency is dependent on the operational approach, or approaches, adopted by China. The U.S. Department of Defense identifies four principal options open to Beijing: a coercive cyber and information operations campaign, a dedicated air and maritime blockade of Taiwan, a stand-off campaign of air and missile strikes, and an invasion of Taiwan’s outlying islands and/or the main island itself.

Each of these options would potentially require a different mixture of capabilities to be deployed in response.

Scenario 1: Grey-zone Activities

In this scenario, China will likely use sub-threshold coercion in the grey-zone – clearly hostile activities below the threshold of armed attack – directed at non-military targets but also across warfighting domains including air, sea, cyber, and space.

Any European support to help combat Chinese grey zone activities would need to begin in advance of a military crisis. First, European partners along with Taiwan could actively cooperate in helping establish norms of behavior that could help stigmatize Chinese grey zone coercion. European countries, given their norm-setting powers and institutional influence in international organizations, would be ideally suited for this task.

Second, select European powers and Taiwan could informally conduct bilateral exchanges and partnerships between their respective coast guards with a special emphasis on countering coercion in the grey zone. This could include joint exercises of European and Taiwanese special operations forces on how to counter grey zone coercion in the maritime domain in and around Taiwan as part of regular military exchanges.

Third, Europe could support Taiwan and help fend off Chinese attacks in the cyber domain. Despite lagging behind the United States, select European countries – most notably the United Kingdom, France, and the Netherlands – retain strong military cyber capabilities. They would also bring operational experience in cyberwarfare. Both France and the U.K. have conducted successful military cyber campaigns against terrorist groups in the Sahel and the Sahara as well as against the terrorist organization Islamic State in Iraq and Syria respectively. A recent net assessment by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) has put the U.K. and France on par with China and Russia in terms of its overall cyber capabilities.

Select European powers would not need to necessarily go on the offensive against the People’s Liberation Army in the cyber domain. They could confine their role to helping defend Taiwanese networks. For example, Germany is known to operate effective computer emergency response teams (CERTs); specifically, their military CERTBw (Computer Emergency Response Team Bundeswehr) could help protect Taiwanese networks and support Taiwanese network defense operations. This would require deeper peacetime cooperation between Taiwan and Germany and would need to include a willingness to share critical intelligence in a timely manner, which could prove tricky given high profile intelligence leaks within Taiwan’s armed forces.

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Scenario 2: Air and Maritime Blockade

For stronger coercive effect, China could choose to implement an air and maritime blockade, potentially paired with information warfare operations to force political concessions on the part of Taipei.

In this scenario, European countries would seek to avoid the situation escalating to direct militarily confrontation if possible. Instead, they could choose to organize or participate in an international airlift to break the blockade by requisitioning civilian cargo planes.

In order to emphasize its non-military nature, this could be coordinated by the European Union’s Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC) or through ad-hoc arrangement between participating European nations. This would require an agreement between commercial operators and respective European governments. This could be part of EUERCC contingency planning. Agreements between the U.S. Department of Defense and commercial operators around the U.S. Civil Reserve Air Fleet could serve as useful blueprints in this regard.

As long as this activity is not overly military in nature, China, having chosen to pursue a sub-threshold approach, may be unwilling to escalate to direct military action by attacking civilian cargo planes en route to Taiwan. Such a logistical operation could be accompanied by coercive diplomacy and the threat of imposition of economic sanctions and a boycott of a select number of Chinese goods.

Scenario 3: Air and Missile Strikes

Under the Joint Fire Strike Campaign concept, the PLA could choose to conduct missile attacks and air strikes against select targets in combination with offensive cyber operations to degrade Taiwan’s defenses and force the island into submission.

While European militaries could choose to join Taiwanese (and potentially U.S.) forces in attacking Chinese targets such a move would be highly escalatory and is therefore only likely to be considered if PLA invasion preparations are already underway.

A potentially less escalatory way to offer military assistance in such a scenario would be by airlifting air and missile defense systems and ground-based electronic warfare systems (EW) into Taiwan in the run-up to a military conflict. While European countries only possess a limited number of long-range surface-to-air missile (SAM) batteries, they have, in the past, been able to deploy some of these abroad for operations, most notably in NATO’s Active Fence mission in Turkey from 2013.

High demand for these assets in a potential Russia contingency would result in only a small number being made available for deployment, perhaps four to five Patriot batteries from Germany, the Netherlands, and Spain collectively. Additionally, given that a portion of France’s SAM forces will be allocated to protecting elements of Paris’ nuclear deterrent, France and Italy could likely add two to three SAMP/T batteries to this total, although this might pose interoperability challenges with existing U.S.-origin Taiwanese systems.

Even moving a relatively small force such as this, however, would consume large portions of Europe strategic airlift capabilities. Such a deployment would also likely be even more constrained by inadequate warning time, perhaps more so than transport capacity.

If a deployment to Taiwan itself is deemed to be impractical for operational or political reasons, European militaries could instead offer to reinforce U.S. military bases in the region, as well as those of regional allies, although this would require bilateral agreements between the respective European countries and the host governments.

Should air-based and maritime EW capabilities be required, this would also require access agreements to facilitate the use of air and naval bases in the region. The relative lack of current European forward operating locations will put a significant constraint on European power projection capabilities in the event of a crisis.

Scenario 4: Invasion

PLA planning for an amphibious invasion of Taiwan and its outlying islands primarily falls under its Joint Island Landing concept. This would require air and naval superiority for the duration of PLA operations against Taiwan and involve military operations across all warfighting domains.

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Whilst a successful fait accompli conducted against an outlying island might not prompt any direct military response against China, either by Taipei or by its external allies, a full-scale invasion almost certainly would. Although warning times for a full-scale invasion would likely be longer than under the previous two scenarios, this would be counterbalanced by the increased range of capabilities that would need to be deployed in response.

Amphibious forces would be at their most vulnerable in the initial phases of an operation; either in transit, or before an initial beachhead is secured. The success of such an operation would largely be predicated on the PLA achieving air and sea control around Taiwan for the duration. Key capability “asks” of European militaries under this scenario are therefore likely to center on providing part of the air and maritime combat power necessary to challenge this control as well as the requisite enablers and support capabilities required to sustain these forces.

European air forces lack dedicated long-range bomber aircraft. Instead, Europe’s combat air power consists of short-range tactical aircraft such as the Eurofighter Typhoon, Rafale, or F-16 Fighting Falcon armed with air-launched cruise missiles and other precision-guided munitions. The majority of these squadrons would likely not be available for a Taiwan contingency, being earmarked instead for retention in the European theater, or, in France’s case, for the nuclear deterrent role. Even the largest recent deployment of European combat air power, the 2011 Libyan air campaign, only saw the equivalent of 10 squadrons deployed by European militaries at its peak, including naval aviation. Nonetheless, it is possible that select European countries could collectively supply a smaller, but still substantial air power to the Indo-Pacific, perhaps six squadrons, as long as adequate basing capacity and enabling support is available in the region.

The availability of these bases and enablers is far from clear, however. Relying on short-range combat aircraft would require the use of substantial air-to-air refueling capabilities, which European air forces have only to a limited degree, both to transfer these aircraft from Europe to the Western Pacific and to support their operations once deployed.

In addition to combat air power, European countries could also deploy surface naval forces in the vicinity of Taiwan for surface warfare operations against the PLA Navy, land-attack missions, or ballistic missile defense. Attack submarines could be used against PLA naval assets and to conduct sea-launched land-attack strikes. The combined navies of Germany, France, the U.K., Italy, Spain, and the Netherlands feature a considerable number of large surface combatants, yet their suitability for high-intensity warfare missions remains in doubt. Furthermore , only a fraction of these hulls could likely deploy for short-notice operations in the Western Pacific, given commitments under NATO and existing maintenance and repair cycles.

A joint European aircraft carrier group, and possibly an accompanying amphibious group, with accompanying submarine escort, could likely be assembled for a major Taiwan contingency, comprising perhaps a dozen hulls in total. However, the quantity and quality of Chinese anti-ship capabilities would mean that this would be an extremely risky prospect early on in a conflict. In the maritime strike role, a stand-off posture employing land attack cruise missiles is therefore likely to be prioritized. Only a very small number of European hulls are currently armed with such systems, however.

If these offensive limitations are deemed to overly limit the utility of a major European maritime task force in the Western Pacific, an alternative might be for European countries to offer to replace U.S. naval assets currently assigned to the 5th Fleet in the Middle East in the event of a conflict, allowing the United States to more rapidly reinforce its own naval forces in the Western Pacific, as well as reducing the potential logistical burden on European navies, given their greater existing support infrastructure in the Middle East and Indian Ocean.

Conclusion

Select European powers could provide limited military support to the United States and Taiwan in the event of a military conflict in the Western Pacific. European contributions, depending on the specific cross-strait conflict scenario, could include providing cyber intelligence and defense capabilities, conducting a civilian strategic airlift, dispatching naval task forces and combat aircraft for SEAD/DEAD missions, as well as air lifting air-defense capabilities into theater.

A key assumption in all of the above scenarios is that Europe would not be acting alone, but as part of a U.S.-led coalition, probably including regional partners. The U.S. would be widely expected to contribute the majority of military capability to any external action in support of Taiwan. Given that, any high-intensity conflict with China in the Western Pacific would significantly reduce U.S. military capacity in Europe and other regions of the world in key areas, which could result in a further headache for European military planners.

Should European countries be required to dispatch their most capable military assets to the Western Pacific to support U.S. military operations, this would further reduce European capacity to respond to a military crisis along NATO’s eastern flank or in the Mediterranean. Overall, unless there is an accelerated push to procure capabilities for high-intensity warfare in large quantities, a conflict in Taiwan would significantly weaken conventional deterrence in Europe vis-à-vis other near-peer adversaries such as Russia. European policymakers and planners will therefore need to urgently grapple not just with generating the forces necessary for a Taiwan contingency but also with increasing their own contributions to the defense of Europe itself.

https://thediplomat.com/2022/04/what-could-european-militaries-contribute-to-the-defense-of-taiwan/
 

McCool

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The defense of Taiwan rests on

  1. Taiwanese willingness to have a separate country
  2. Taiwanese willingness to sustain losses, sacrifice and persevere in face of overwhelming odds
Material support could only do so much for Taiwan. Remember how the Afghan army flush with western money and weapons capitulated while relatively inferior armed Ukraine manage to beat back Russian forces ?
 

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Pelosi to Visit Taiwan in First Such Trip for 25 Years, FNN Says​

  • House speaker reportedly plans to travel to island on Sunday
  • Trip is sign of support for Taipei amid Russian war in Ukraine
Nancy Pelosi

By
Samson Ellis and
Cindy Wang
April 7, 2022, 4:33 AM GMT+2Updated onApril 7, 2022, 11:33 AM GMT+2

U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi is scheduled to visit Taiwan, according to media reports, a landmark display of American support that triggered a diplomatic protest from Beijing.

Pelosi will arrive in Taipei on Sunday following a visit to Japan, according to reports Thursday in both Taiwan and Japan, including by Fuji News Network, which cited people it did not identify. It would be the first visit by a serving U.S. house speaker since Newt Gingrich traveled to Taiwan in 1997.

Pelosi’s office declined to say whether she was traveling to Taipei when contacted by Bloomberg News, citing longstanding security protocols. Taiwanese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Joanne Ou declined to comment when asked about a potential visit at a press briefing, saying the government will release statement “at the right time.”

Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen would welcome the show of diplomatic support at a time when Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has raised concern that China may follow through on its oft-repeated threat to take control of the democratic island by military force. It would represent the latest in a series of visits by senior U.S. officials to Taiwan in recent years and the most high-profile under the presidency of Joe Biden.

Tsai met a bipartisan group led by former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Michael Mullen in Taipei in February. That was followed a day later by the arrival of former Secretary of State Michael Pompeo on a private trip.
In 2020, two senior officials from the administration of former President Donald Trump -- Health and Human Services Secretary Alex Azar and Undersecretary of State Keith Krach -- led delegations to Taiwan. Azar was the highest ranking sitting U.S. administration official to visit Taipei since Washington switched official ties to Beijing in 1979.

Beijing lodged a protest with Washington over reports of Pelosi’s planned visit, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhao Lijian said at a regular briefing Thursday in Beijing.

“If she does visit, China will take strong measures and the consequences will be borne by the U.S.,” Zhao said, without giving details on what those steps would entail.

Hu Xijin, former editor-in-chief of the Communist Party’s Global Times newspaper, in a defiant Thursday editorial said such a trip would represent “the most serious provocation by Washington” on Taiwan since the island’s then president, Lee Teng-hui, visited the U.S. in 1996. Hu deemed Gingrich’s visit less serious as he belonged to a different political party than then-President Bill Clinton, even though that affiliation has no standing on the speaker’s seniority in U.S. politics. Pelosi and Biden are both Democrats.

“While the crisis in Ukraine is still ongoing, the U.S. is deliberately taking the offensive toward China,” Hu wrote. “China cannot back down this time.” He called on the People’s Liberation Army to close down Taiwanese airspace on Sunday, by buzzing the island with aircraft including from the “direction of Pelosi’s plane.”

China has steadily increased its military pressure on Taiwan, more than doubling its military forays into Taiwan’s air-defense identification zone to around 950 last year, according to Defense Ministry data compiled by Bloomberg. Chinese military aircraft, including fighter jets and bombers, crossed the median line of the Taiwan Strait two days in a row following Krach’s visit.

Last month, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi reaffirmed China’s commitment to a peaceful resolution over Taiwan, saying that the dispute over the democratically ruled island was “not comparable at all” to Ukraine. Still, he reiterated Beijing’s stance that Taiwan was an “inalienable” part of China and warned that any U.S. efforts to condone “separatists” would lead to “unbearable consequences.”

— With assistance by Jenni Marsh


https://www.bloomberg.com/news/arti...iwan-in-first-such-trip-for-25-years-fnn-says
 

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US senators defy China threats with Taiwan visit​

Issued on: 14/04/2022 - 15:06Modified: 14/04/2022 - 15:04
Visiting US senator Bob Menendez (R) is greeted by Taiwan's foreign minister Joseph Wu in Taipei Handout AFP

Taipei (AFP) – A delegation of United States lawmakers led by vocal China hawk Senator Lindsey Graham arrived in Taiwan on Thursday for a two-day trip as Beijing threatened "strong measures" in response.


The group, which also includes Senate Foreign Relations Committee chairman Bob Menendez, is making the latest in a string of visits by foreign politicians to the island in defiance of pressure from Beijing.

A US government plane touched down in Taipei on Thursday evening for what Washington's de facto embassy said were talks on "US-Taiwan relations, regional security, and other significant issues of mutual interest".

Taiwan's foreign ministry said the group would meet President Tsai Ing-wen, foreign minister Joseph Wu and defence officials.
China's Communist Party has never controlled self-ruled Taiwan but it views the island as part of its territory and has vowed to one day seize it, by force if necessary.

Those threats have become more bellicose under President Xi Jinping, making the security of Taiwan a rare subject of bipartisan support in Washington.

Menendez was among a group of lawmakers who introduced a bill in February to rename Taipei's de facto embassy in Washington the "Taiwan Representative Office".

That would be a diplomatic departure from the tradition of using the word "Taipei".

Beijing baulks at use of the word Taiwan on the international stage and opposes any country having official exchanges with the democratic island.

Lithuania's recent decision to allow Taiwan to use its own name for a representative office triggered Beijing to launch a trade war against Vilnius that has angered the European Union.

China's foreign ministry warned the US senators against "going down on the wrong and dangerous path" ahead of their arrival.
"China will continue to take strong measures to resolutely safeguard its national sovereignty and territorial integrity," spokesman Zhao Lijian told reporters.

A Swedish parliamentary delegation is also currently in Taiwan.

"The purpose of the visit is very clear," Swedish lawmaker Charlie Weimers told reporters on Thursday.

"It is to send a signal of support from Europe to Taiwan. And to make sure that signal is being heard all across the Taiwan Strait."
Former US secretary of state Mike Pompeo infuriated Beijing when he said the United States should diplomatically recognise Taiwan as "a free and sovereign country" during a visit last month.

China's sabre-rattling has spurred greater diplomatic support for Taipei and prompted visits from Western politicians shaken by Beijing's more muscular tone.

Russia's recent invasion of Ukraine has also heightened fears that China might one day follow through on threats to annex its smaller neighbour.

Like most nations, the United States diplomatically recognises Beijing but also maintains de facto diplomatic ties with Taipei and is bound by an Act of Congress to ensure Taiwan can maintain its defence.

US arms sales and diplomatic visits to Taiwan have ticked up under both former president Donald Trump and his successor Joe Biden.
© 2022 AFP

https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20220414-us-senators-defy-china-threats-with-taiwan-visit


Six U.S. lawmakers arrive in Taiwan on unannounced trip​


TAIPEI (Reuters) - A group of six U.S. lawmakers, including chairman of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Bob Menendez, landed in Taiwan on Thursday for a previously unannounced visit, in a show of support to the island in the face of Chinese pressure.

The United States has no formal relations with Chinese-claimed Taiwan, but is its most important international backer and arms supplier.

Taiwan has been heartened by the continued U.S. support offered by the Biden administration, which has repeatedly talked of its "rock-solid" commitment to the democratically governed island. That has strained already poor Sino-U.S. relations.

The bipartisan group, which will meet with Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen on Friday morning on their two-day visit, arrived at Taipei's downtown Songshan airport on a U.S. Air Force aircraft and were greeted by Taiwan Foreign Minister Joseph Wu.

The visit not only shows the bipartisan U.S. support for Taiwan, but also the "rock solid" nature of Taiwan-US relations, Presidential Office spokesman Xavier Chang said in a statement.

"The Presidential Office looks forward to continuing to deepen the Taiwan-U.S. partnership through this face-to-face exchange, and continuing to work together to contribute to global and regional peace, stability, prosperity and development," he added.

Menendez, a Democrat, is a staunch supporter of Taiwan. In February he co-proposed a bill that would require the United States to negotiate the renaming of Taiwan's de facto embassy in Washington as the "Taiwan Representative Office".

Senior Republican Senator Lindsey Graham is also on the trip.

(Reporting by Ben Blanchard; Editing by Raissa Kasolowsky)

https://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/six-u-s--lawmakers-arrive-in-taiwan-on-unannounced-trip/47518064
 

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Taiwan military to send non-commissioned officers to U.S.: source​

04/13/2022 07:41 PM

The Ministry of National Defense in Taipei. CNA file photo

The Ministry of National Defense in Taipei. CNA file photo

Taipei, April 13 (CNA) Taiwan's military will send non-commissioned officers (NCOs) to the United States to observe the training of their American counterparts later this year, with the aim of boosting the joint operations capability of the nation's armed forces, a military source told CNA Wednesday.

The source, who preferred to stay anonymous due to the sensitivity of the issue, said an undisclosed number of Taiwanese NCOs will visit the U.S. military's Joint Readiness Training Center and the Asymmetric Warfare Group of the U.S. Army in the coming months, to observe how the U.S. military trains its NCOs.

Previously Taiwan's military only sent more high level military officers on such observation trips to the U.S.

However, the source did not disclose when exactly the NCOs will visit the U.S. or how long each group will stay there, saying only that it marks the beginning of a three-year-program which the military will review after its initial three-year-run.

The source said such trips will be extremely helpful for Taiwanese NCOs to learn how the U.S. trains its NCOs for joint military operations including different branches of the armed forces, which is crucial in modern warfare, especially given the multidimensional threat Taiwan faces from China.

Before the launch of the program, Ministry of National Defense (MND) Chief Sergeant Pan Wen-ching (潘文清) led a small group of NCOs to the U.S. late last year, the source said.

During that trip from Dec. 1-10, the group visited the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, the Special Operations Command Pacific, and the 25th Infantry Division's Lightning Forge's Joint Readiness Training Center, the source added.

NCOs constitute the backbone of basic units in both Taiwan and the U.S. armed forces, and are increasingly depended upon to train troops and boost their combat performance.

Among the roughly 180,000 military personnel that make up Taiwan's military, around 90,000 are NCOs, according to a report the MND sent to the Legislative Yuan earlier this year.

Experts' views​

Meanwhile, three defense experts CNA talked to applauded the decision Wednesday, saying it will make NCOs in Taiwan more professional and boost the combat preparedness of local troops.

Su Tzu-yun (蘇紫雲), an analyst at the government-funded Institute for National Defense and Security Research (INDSR), said previously only senior officers were chosen by the military to engage in exchanges with their U.S. counterparts.

It is a positive sign that the two sides are moving their defense exchanges to a more grassroots level, Su said.

Unlike military officers who face more frequent rotation, NCOs usually stay in one unit for a longer period of time and are therefore more familiar with that unit and its weapon systems, Su said.

Chieh Chung (揭仲), an associate research fellow at the National Policy Foundation in Taipei, said NCOs in the U.S. military are considered the core of basic units.

In the U.S. military, senior military personnel are responsible for making decisions while NCOs are in charge of execution and offering professional guidance to soldiers, he said.

Shu Hsiao-huang (舒孝煌), another analyst at the INDSR, said Taiwan's NCOs usually only undergo training locally and do not have the chance to travel overseas to conduct exchanges with foreign counterparts.

Over the past year the U.S. has launched more exchange programs to enhance the combat readiness of the military in allied nations equipped with U.S. weapons systems, Shu added.

(By Matt Yu and Joseph Yeh)

https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/202204130016
 

Blackbeardsgoldfish

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Taiwan is part of China, Beijing tells U.S.​

Reuters

Chinese Defense Minister Wei Fenghe attends the IISS Shangri-la Dialogue in Singapore

Chinese Defense Minister Wei Fenghe attends the IISS Shangri-la Dialogue in Singapore, June 2, 2019. REUTERS/Feline Lim/File Photo

HONG KONG, April 20 (Reuters) - Taiwan is a part of China and no one can change that, Chinese Defense Minister Wei Fenghe said on Wednesday during a rare phone call with U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, according to a statement from Beijing.

"If the Taiwan issue were not handled properly, it would have a damaging impact on Sino-U.S. relations," Wei added, according to statement published by the defence ministry.

https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/taiwan-is-part-china-beijing-tells-us-2022-04-20/
 

Indian gir lion

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Its complicated. Definitely a loose end CCP perceives need tieing up.

But no easy or guaranteed way in doing it.

You cannot rely on the online trolls to form sound balanced impression though, that is my advice.

CKS escape to Taiwan is interesting story just on its own.

That civil war's details are completely overlooked by most (younger generation) Chinese I've talked to...past the rote cliffnotes.

Foreigners are inevitably even less educated about it.

Taiwan as a fortress was proven by Japan much earlier btw...so the thorn is not at all unexpected.

The great mistake was by the Qing IMO in letting that happen as it did....still operating on norms that it would be fairly easy problem to address for later like was done with Dutch Formosa.

The whole nature of the world had dramatically changed and the Chinese sorely underestimated that for a very long period of time....in fact China took several fissures and severe extreme pain (and mental anguish) quite deeply as result.

It is still playing out. Taiwan is just a very noticeable part of it....but even within China there is a great many things unresolved compared to how they are portrayed in the interim "rise".
Are there internal fault lines in China also?
 

Ryder

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Its going to be interesting because Chinese troops will be engaging in combat for the first time since 1979 when China invaded Vietnam.

War ended up in a stalemate but the Chinese suffered some pretty heavy casualties. In a way China suffered a defeat.
 

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Are there internal fault lines in China also?

Of course there, like with any very large country especially.

Currently there is a very large power tussle between Xi faction and other factions in the CCP due to various pressures/faults that have intensified since covid.
 

Nilgiri

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Its going to be interesting because Chinese troops will be engaging in combat for the first time since 1979 when China invaded Vietnam.

War ended up in a stalemate but the Chinese suffered some pretty heavy casualties. In a way China suffered a defeat.

The objective failed (to dislodge Vietnam out of cambodia).....Vietnam stayed put in their intervention in Cambodia (Pol Pot was a CCP ally) for a further 10 years.

It was a massive failure on china's part, especially as Vietnam has never forgotten that and has added to underlying long term animosity.
 

Indian gir lion

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Of course there, like with any very large country especially.

Currently there is a very large power tussle between Xi faction and other factions in the CCP due to various pressures/faults that have intensified since covid.
Sir please elaborate a little , I am curious about regional fault lines .
Like in india , we have some in south. , in punjab. , and north east .
 

Nilgiri

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Sir please elaborate a little , I am curious about regional fault lines .
Like in india , we have some in south. , in punjab. , and north east .

you can search terms like "china" , "PRC", "Qing" and "cantonese" w.r.t my name on this forum and read older posts etc....some of which might provide light on what you seek


 

Blackbeardsgoldfish

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Covers many of the points raised earlier in this thread:

Watched a couple of interviews with Kevin Rudd lately since he's doing promo for a new book of his, and I think he's one of the most concise and intelligent analysts of the situation here. Really recommend putting some of them on as background noise for chores or while commuting.

Some of those that I watched:


 
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