India Historical Indian War History Thread

[GoatsMilk]

Must not have been completely incompetent given that he won some accolades fighting the Imperial Japanese at the Burma front.

Either way he talks like a moron and morons ultimately cost states.

 

[Nilgiri]

Throwback time @Jackdaws et al

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1701152054742597904

 

[Nilgiri]

A look into the deliberate intelligence lapse, scapegoating and bad generals immediately after the conflict, article from 2000.

@Jackdaws @Marlii @Gessler et al.

Kargil: Did The Army Take The Wrong Man To Task For The Lapse?

Rahul Bedi documents the story of Brigadier Surinder Singh, the army’s fall guy for Kargil.

www.mansworldindia.com

 

[Joe Shearer]

Must not have been completely incompetent given that he won some accolades fighting the Imperial Japanese at the Burma front.

Sorry for the late, late level, but the only three who got recognised as effective battle commanders were Thimayya, Thorat and Bogey Sen. Also Cariappa, although he didn't really get to command a formation in combat.

All others served in field ranks and below, as Majors, Captains and Lieutenants. One, Ayub Khan, was singled out for lack of aggression in the face of the enemy.

Niazi, for instance, was a Lieutenant throughout, not much of a qualification for command; he was impressive in battle, and thought of for a DSO, but that was a higher command decoration, and got a Military Cross (the same as Sam, a very important decoration).

Point is service in the ranks, as a company rank officer, does not show your command capabilities, even field rank, Major, Lt. Col. and Colonel, are at best half-way houses.

He did well as a Brigadier during the 1965 operations, and was decorated, as well as being part of the formations that stopped our troops cold in the badly-managed battle of Chawinda.

Niazi was given the equivalent of a Corps Command. He was simply not fit for it. His comfort level might have been - this is pure speculation - as division commander, max. As the commander in East Pakistan/ Bangladesh, he was thoroughly out of his depth.

Again, the point would be that Niazi was not alone; except for Iftekhan Janjua and Tajammul Husain Malik, no other Pakistani general performed well. Our Pakistani friends will tell us that no Indian general performed well other than Sagat Singh, so that can of worms is better left unopened.

 

[Smoke]

During times of conflict or war, India, like many other nations, often uses various forms of storytelling, including fiction, to shape narratives and influence public perception. It's a common strategy used by governments to foster unity, boost morale, and convey specific messages aligned with their objectives.

In India's context, literature, films, and other media have been employed to evoke patriotism, showcase heroism, and mold public sentiment during wartime. These narratives serve as a tool to foster a sense of national identity and garner support for particular actions or policies.

However, it's crucial to distinguish between fictional storytelling for entertainment purposes and the deliberate use of narratives with a political or nationalistic agenda. In the context of conflict, these narratives often aim to sway public opinion and rally support rather than purely entertain.

So, in my view, while India, like other nations, utilizes fiction during wartime, it's part of a broader strategy to shape perceptions and garner backing for certain ideologies or actions rather than solely for entertainment purposes.

Propaganda still plays a significant role in steering debates and discussions. We see it a lot, especially when topics get heated or controversial. Nowadays, with technology and social media, it's easier to spread misinformation or biased viewpoints to control the narrative.

 

[Jackdaws]

Sorry for the late, late level, but the only three who got recognised as effective battle commanders were Thimayya, Thorat and Bogey Sen. Also Cariappa, although he didn't really get to command a formation in combat.

All others served in field ranks and below, as Majors, Captains and Lieutenants. One, Ayub Khan, was singled out for lack of aggression in the face of the enemy.

Niazi, for instance, was a Lieutenant throughout, not much of a qualification for command; he was impressive in battle, and thought of for a DSO, but that was a higher command decoration, and got a Military Cross (the same as Sam, a very important decoration).

Point is service in the ranks, as a company rank officer, does not show your command capabilities, even field rank, Major, Lt. Col. and Colonel, are at best half-way houses.

He did well as a Brigadier during the 1965 operations, and was decorated, as well as being part of the formations that stopped our troops cold in the badly-managed battle of Chawinda.

Niazi was given the equivalent of a Corps Command. He was simply not fit for it. His comfort level might have been - this is pure speculation - as division commander, max. As the commander in East Pakistan/ Bangladesh, he was thoroughly out of his depth.

Again, the point would be that Niazi was not alone; except for Iftekhan Janjua and Tajammul Husain Malik, no other Pakistani general performed well. Our Pakistani friends will tell us that no Indian general performed well other than Sagat Singh, so that can of worms is better left unopened.

So decent tactician. Pathetic strategist.

 

[Afif]

During times of conflict or war, India, like many other nations, often uses various forms of storytelling, including fiction, to shape narratives and influence public perception. It's a common strategy used by governments to foster unity, boost morale, and convey specific messages aligned with their objectives.

In India's context, literature, films, and other media have been employed to evoke patriotism, showcase heroism, and mold public sentiment during wartime. These narratives serve as a tool to foster a sense of national identity and garner support for particular actions or policies.

However, it's crucial to distinguish between fictional storytelling for entertainment purposes and the deliberate use of narratives with a political or nationalistic agenda. In the context of conflict, these narratives often aim to sway public opinion and rally support rather than purely entertain.

So, in my view, while India, like other nations, utilizes fiction during wartime, it's part of a broader strategy to shape perceptions and garner backing for certain ideologies or actions rather than solely for entertainment purposes.

Propaganda still plays a significant role in steering debates and discussions. We see it a lot, especially when topics get heated or controversial. Nowadays, with technology and social media, it's easier to spread misinformation or biased viewpoints to control the narrative.

I mean, sure. More or less every Nation engage in PR and storytelling. But still, in the end independent third party observers can determine who won and who lost.

There is no doubt that Pakostan lost to allied force in 1971 and to India in 1999.

 

[Jackdaws]

During times of conflict or war, India, like many other nations, often uses various forms of storytelling, including fiction, to shape narratives and influence public perception. It's a common strategy used by governments to foster unity, boost morale, and convey specific messages aligned with their objectives.

In India's context, literature, films, and other media have been employed to evoke patriotism, showcase heroism, and mold public sentiment during wartime. These narratives serve as a tool to foster a sense of national identity and garner support for particular actions or policies.

However, it's crucial to distinguish between fictional storytelling for entertainment purposes and the deliberate use of narratives with a political or nationalistic agenda. In the context of conflict, these narratives often aim to sway public opinion and rally support rather than purely entertain.

So, in my view, while India, like other nations, utilizes fiction during wartime, it's part of a broader strategy to shape perceptions and garner backing for certain ideologies or actions rather than solely for entertainment purposes.

Propaganda still plays a significant role in steering debates and discussions. We see it a lot, especially when topics get heated or controversial. Nowadays, with technology and social media, it's easier to spread misinformation or biased viewpoints to control the narrative.

You are right. If one sees American movies you would think USA single handedly won WW2. In reality, Britain was the only one holding out alone with its colonies and later on the USSR.

But it doesn't distort the overall picture of what happened.

 

[Smoke]

I mean, sure. More or less every Nation engage in PR and storytelling. But still, in the end independent third party observers can determine who won and who lost.

There is no doubt that Pakostan lost to allied force in 1971 and to India in 1999.

Well ofcourse, 1971 is a no brainer since Pakistan lost East Pakistan. Kargil is more of a blurry line though, same as 1966.

 

[Smoke]

You are right. If one sees American movies you would think USA single handedly won WW2. In reality, Britain was the only one holding out alone with its colonies and later on the USSR.

But it doesn't distort the overall picture of what happened.

True.

It sure does boil down to the end objectives, the rest does not matter as much if the objective hasn't been met. That is always where information is either misleading, vague or just not available.

 

[Afif]

Kargil is more of a blurry line though, same as 1966.

How so?

 

[Smoke]

How so?

The genesis of the Kargil conflict dates back to India's strategic move in 1984 to control the Siachen Glacier, preventing a similar Pakistani takeover in Kargil by deploying a dedicated division. Pakistan's plan involved covertly creating gaps in Kargil's defense, training local forces, and replacing regular troops to seize areas beyond India's control. Over the years, they maintained secrecy in their buildup.

In the early 1990s, Indian intelligence noted Pakistan's creation of 10 Northern Light Infantry battalions. Discussions between Military Intelligence and Military Operations vaguely addressed this, overlooking the potential use of these relieved troops.

Pakistan exploited a quiet Kargil sector and infiltrated into the Kashmir Valley, prompting Indian generals to shift forces, leaving vulnerabilities in Kargil's defense. Moreover, strategic heights previously under Indian control were later occupied by Pakistan, with no subsequent inquiry.

Subsequent decisions, including changing key commanders and removing experienced troops, weakened India's defense. Critical equipment, aerial support, and mine-laying operations were hampered. The Kargil Division was redeployed away from its primary task, and critical communication centers were lost due to fire accidents. Tanks were non-functional, and frontline troops were diverted for non-combat tasks, compromising the country's defense.

Despite attempts to raise concerns and requisition necessary resources, critical defense stores and support were denied, worsening the situation during the conflict. The mismanagement, lack of preparedness, and questionable decisions by senior officials led to a strategic debacle in the Kargil War.

Pakistan retreated from Kargil following international pressure and diplomatic efforts that led to the Clinton-Sharif agreement. This agreement aimed to restore the Line of Control (LoC) in adherence to the Simla Agreement.

Under this deal, Pakistan agreed to withdraw its forces from the Kargil region, seeking an honorable exit from the conflict. The retreat was influenced by diplomatic negotiations that stressed de-escalation and adherence to established agreements between India and Pakistan.

In summary, Pakistan successfully internationalized Kashmir. However, events such as Nawaz Sharif's discussions with China's leaders in Beijing and his meeting with President Bill Clinton in Washington DC strongly suggest that China's neutral stance played a crucial role in what is now known as the Clinton-Sharif deal.

This deal, considered a key external factor in expediting the end of the Kargil conflict, aimed to provide an honorable exit for the Pakistani armed forces. It emphasized restoring the Line of Control (LoC) in accordance with the Simla Agreement by Pakistan.

In return, President Clinton pledged his personal involvement in the Kashmir dispute and expressed intentions to visit South Asia before the end of his term next year.

 

[Jackdaws]

The genesis of the Kargil conflict dates back to India's strategic move in 1984 to control the Siachen Glacier, preventing a similar Pakistani takeover in Kargil by deploying a dedicated division. Pakistan's plan involved covertly creating gaps in Kargil's defense, training local forces, and replacing regular troops to seize areas beyond India's control. Over the years, they maintained secrecy in their buildup.

In the early 1990s, Indian intelligence noted Pakistan's creation of 10 Northern Light Infantry battalions. Discussions between Military Intelligence and Military Operations vaguely addressed this, overlooking the potential use of these relieved troops.

Pakistan exploited a quiet Kargil sector and infiltrated terrorists into the Kashmir Valley, prompting Indian generals to shift forces, leaving vulnerabilities in Kargil's defense. Moreover, strategic heights previously under Indian control were later occupied by Pakistan, with no subsequent inquiry.

Subsequent decisions, including changing key commanders and removing experienced troops, weakened India's defense. Critical equipment, aerial support, and mine-laying operations were hampered. The Kargil Division was redeployed away from its primary task, and critical communication centers were lost due to fire accidents. Tanks were non-functional, and frontline troops were diverted for non-combat tasks, compromising the country's defense.

Despite attempts to raise concerns and requisition necessary resources, critical defense stores and support were denied, worsening the situation during the conflict. The mismanagement, lack of preparedness, and questionable decisions by senior officials led to a strategic debacle in the Kargil War.

Pakistan retreated from Kargil following international pressure and diplomatic efforts that led to the Clinton-Sharif agreement. This agreement aimed to restore the Line of Control (LoC) in adherence to the Simla Agreement.

Under this deal, Pakistan agreed to withdraw its forces from the Kargil region, seeking an honorable exit from the conflict. The retreat was influenced by diplomatic negotiations that stressed de-escalation and adherence to established agreements between India and Pakistan.

In summary, Pakistan successfully internationalized Kashmir. However, events such as Nawaz Sharif's discussions with China's leaders in Beijing and his meeting with President Bill Clinton in Washington DC strongly suggest that China's neutral stance played a crucial role in what is now known as the Clinton-Sharif deal.

This deal, considered a key external factor in expediting the end of the Kargil conflict, aimed to provide an honorable exit for the Pakistani armed forces. It emphasized restoring the Line of Control (LoC) in accordance with the Simla Agreement by Pakistan.

In return, President Clinton pledged his personal involvement in the Kashmir dispute and expressed intentions to visit South Asia before the end of his term next year.

There was no honorable exit as such. After what was a collosal Indian intelligence failure and Indian losses, the introduction of Bofors and the Indian Air Force changed the equation. Pak Air Force didn't get involved - even Nachiketa was shot down by the Pak Army and not Air Force if I remember right.

Either way, with dwindling resources and constant Indian pounding, Pak Army and Political leadership hand was forced and they wanted an exit.

Sartaz Aziz first came to India and in a meeting lasting only a few minutes, India declined a ceasefire.

 

[Smoke]

There was no honorable exit as such. After what was a collosal Indian intelligence failure and Indian losses, the introduction of Bofors and the Indian Air Force changed the equation. Pak Air Force didn't get involved - even Nachiketa was shot down by the Pak Army and not Air Force if I remember right.

Either way, with dwindling resources and constant Indian pounding, Pak Army and Political leadership hand was forced and they wanted an exit.

Sartaz Aziz first came to India and in a meeting lasting only a few minutes, India declined a ceasefire.

The army was not forced, but rather the political leadership gave in under pressure from Clinton. FYI, Musharraf had moved nukes without notice to the Government.

They managed to down two Migs with Anza II, one pilot died while the other was a POW, the IAF became super cautious because of that. Supplies became an issue since there was no support coming in from Pakistan.

However, the Kashmir issue was internationalized and the gaps in Kargil were fully exploited.

 

[Jackdaws]

The army was not forced, but rather the political leadership gave in under pressure from Clinton. FYI, Musharraf had moved nukes without notice to the Government.

They managed to down two Migs with Anza II, one pilot died while the other was a POW, the IAF became super cautious because of that. Supplies became an issue since there was no support coming in from Pakistan.

However, the Kashmir issue was internationalized and the gaps in Kargil were fully exploited.

So the guy who engineered a coup against Sharif didn't stop him from flying to Clinton?

 

[Smoke]

So the guy who engineered a coup against Sharif didn't stop him from flying to Clinton?

Was busy in the war, wouldn't you say?

 

[Nilgiri]

What was your name on PDF out of interest @Smoke ?

 

[Smoke]

What was your name on PDF out of interest @Smoke ?

My alias was Smoke on PDF as well.

 

[Joe Shearer]

During times of conflict or war, India, like many other nations, often uses various forms of storytelling, including fiction, to shape narratives and influence public perception. It's a common strategy used by governments to foster unity, boost morale, and convey specific messages aligned with their objectives.

In India's context, literature, films, and other media have been employed to evoke patriotism, showcase heroism, and mold public sentiment during wartime. These narratives serve as a tool to foster a sense of national identity and garner support for particular actions or policies.

However, it's crucial to distinguish between fictional storytelling for entertainment purposes and the deliberate use of narratives with a political or nationalistic agenda. In the context of conflict, these narratives often aim to sway public opinion and rally support rather than purely entertain.

So, in my view, while India, like other nations, utilizes fiction during wartime, it's part of a broader strategy to shape perceptions and garner backing for certain ideologies or actions rather than solely for entertainment purposes.

Propaganda still plays a significant role in steering debates and discussions. We see it a lot, especially when topics get heated or controversial. Nowadays, with technology and social media, it's easier to spread misinformation or biased viewpoints to control the narrative.

Valid point in broad brush-strokes, but what are you referring to?

 

[Smoke]

Valid point in broad brush-strokes, but what are you referring to?

The nitty gritties that were emphasized, the small victories that didn't matter in the end as the overall objective was never met.