This is nothing but "if I had wheels I'd be a wagon" situation. And how on earth do you even get "ramp-assisted" take off for Hürjet, just because you changed the engine? Navalising it isn't just slapping a more powerful engine and a coat of paint, there are 2.5 tons of empty weight difference between F-35 and F-35C, how on earth are you turning Hürjet without increasing its weight???
In late 2030s and 2040s, when everyone and their mums are moving to 5th gen fighters and drones (at least), better a2a missiles, radars and anti-air systems, you believe a trainer turned light attack plane can be a lethal dogfighter?
If they can be commanded by anyone instead of just controlled all the way through, Hürjet is irrelevant, their orders can be given through SATCOM, instead of from a pilot that is looking at a small screen while also flying. Also, what happens if Hürjet is taken out?
That's great, having a jet that is already not stealthy scream "I'm here" in every spectrum imaginable would most certainly help. It might stay out of the presumed "AD Bubble" but there is no guarantee it can stay outside of enemy a2a missiles, whether from planes or drones, then you are back to controlling the drones from SATCOM and leaving AWACS work to AWACS, because there is no way it can use anything demanding too much power for its radars (because just MURAD wouldn't be enough you would need something like FULMAR so that it could actually scan the surface of the water properly as well).
trying to justify the use of a trainer on an aircraft carrier that is not necessary by making it magically more useful is truly hilarious.
That's great, a light helicopter trying to take place of proper naval helis and a 4th gen trainer pretending to be a naval fighter to support the navy and make sure a vanity project succeeds. Proper Turkish thinking that.
Well... Before responding to the points raised, I want to refine two things from my earlier post, not because they were wrong in substance, but because they were imprecise in a way that invites misreading.
On the TWR and payload figures: The "1.10+ weight-to-thrust ratio" and "full-load 3.4t payload STOBAR" figures should not be read as a single simultaneous configuration, and I should have been clearer about that. These describe two distinct operational profiles:
- Interception / CAP configuration (clean or light load, ~60% internal fuel): this is where the EJ200-powered Hürjet-D achieves a TWR in the 1.05–1.15 range, giving it the rapid climb rate and energy management advantage described. At approximately 8,200–8,600 kg gross weight, the math is straightforward.
- Strike / STOBAR full-load configuration (~3,000–3,400 kg external payload, full internal fuel): here the gross weight rises significantly and TWR drops to the 0.72–0.78 range, which is still within STOBAR ramp departure parameters, but the performance envelope is obviously different. The Tejas Naval, for reference, operates STOBAR in a similar TWR band under full load.
Conflating these into a single sentence was imprecise. The aircraft's value proposition isn't that it simultaneously carries maximum payload and pulls maximum G. It's that it can do both, in the appropriate mission profile, from a ski-jump deck.
On the EJ200 specifically: The EJ200 was used as a reference point because its thrust and form-factor are well-documented and the comparison is clean. The realistic engine candidate for this program wouldn't necessarily be the EJ200. It could equally be the GE F414 (used on the F/A-18E/F and Tejas Mk2, with established export precedent), or a future development derivative of the TEI TF6000 program if the timeline permits. The propulsion argument doesn't depend on which specific engine is selected. It depends on the availability of a 90–100 kN class turbofan that fits the Hürjet's airframe envelope, and that field has multiple viable candidates.
On the navalisation weight penalty, and a comparison that needs correcting: The F-35A vs F-35C figure has appeared more than once here as though it were a general law of navalisation. It isn't, and repetition doesn't make it more applicable. The ~2,500 kg empty weight premium of the F-35C over the F-35A is almost entirely a product of CATOBAR-specific structural engineering: catapult attachment hardpoints, a heavily reinforced forward fuselage to absorb 4–5g horizontal launch loads over a 2–3 second stroke, and a substantially enlarged wing planform to achieve safe approach speeds for arrested recovery at carrier weights. None of this applies to a STOBAR platform.
- The structurally correct reference is the MiG-29 to MiG-29K transition, a STOBAR navalisation of a comparable fourth-generation airframe, and the most directly relevant historical data point for this discussion. The empty weight delta is approximately 100–300 kg. Now, one could argue the MiG-29K also received folding wings, new avionics, and a revised radar suite etc. true, and worth acknowledging. But even accounting for those additions, the
structurally driven STOBAR navalisation penalty remains a fraction of the CATOBAR figure being cited. The STOBAR delta is composed of reinforced main gear for arrested landing loads, nose gear strengthening for ski-jump rotation dynamics, corrosion protection packages, and an arresting hook assembly. On a platform in Hürjet's weight class, a realistic navalisation penalty sits in the 400–750 kg range. Combined with the additional thrust margin of a 90–100 kN engine over the current F404, the performance envelope described holds. Applying the F-35A/C figure to a STOBAR discussion isn't a counter-argument. It's a CATOBAR number being used in the wrong structural context.
- Before continuing, a necessary clarification on what is actually being discussed:
MUGEM is not a forum thought experiment. The program has received its initial funding allocation at SSB level, is formally underway, and the first block is expected to be laid down within the next 12–18 months. TCG Anadolu is already operational and is already at sea without a fixed-wing manned aircraft, that gap exists today, not in some hypothetical future. The F-35B path closed when it closed. A KAAN-derived naval variant, on even an optimistic development timeline, is realistically 12–15 years from carrier qualification. Türkiye is building its second, larger flat-deck platform and still doesn't have a fixed-wing manned jet. Nor does it have anywhere to import one.
The question on the table is therefore not whether Turkiye should build a carrier. That decision has been made, funded, and initiated. The question is what flies off it, and when. If someone's objection is rooted in a fundamental disagreement with the existence of the program, that's a legitimate policy opinion, but it belongs in a different conversation, addressed through the appropriate channels. What we are discussing here is the operational and doctrinal framework for a program that is actively happening, and "just wait for the ideal platform" isn't a doctrine. It's a minumum 15-year capability gap with no answer. Okay, let's all criticize together, but this isn't a response to reality; it's more like a few defense-enthusiasts echoing their own thoughts.
On the dogfighting point, and the "everyone will be 5th gen" assumption: The argument that a light combat aircraft is irrelevant because "everyone will be 5th gen" by the 2040s rests on a production reality that doesn't support it. Rafale Marine deliveries to France continue under Tranche 4 contracts well into this decade. The FA-50 has active export orders from Poland, Malaysia, and the Philippines. None of whom are receiving 5th gen replacements alongside them. The F/A-18E/F Super Hornet remains in production for international customers. India's Tejas Naval program targets IOC in the early 2030s. The J-15 family continues in serial production. The realistic threat environment in which MUGEM's air wing operates during the 2035–2045 window is a heavily mixed one "not a purely 5th-gen world" and it is exactly this kind of environment where a high-sortie-rate light platform with strong MUM-T integration has genuine operational relevance.
More importantly, the Hürjet-D was never framed as an air superiority platform to duel 5th-gen fighters. That characterization is not in the original post. The manned asset's role in this construct is forward combat management, loyal wingman control, and rapid CAP/interception within a layered system. Arguing against a version of the proposal that wasn't made is a pattern that has appeared a few times in this response, and it's worth naming directly.
On MUM-T and the SATCOM argument: GEO satellite round-trip latency; 480–600ms. LEO constellations under ideal conditions (Starlink class); 20–40ms. Line-of-sight tactical datalinks in the Link 16 family: sub-5ms, with substantially higher jam-resistance in contested RF environments. In terminal maneuvering phases where a Kızılelma-II is making real-time course corrections rather than following pre-loaded waypoints that latency differential is not a footnote. It is the difference between a responsive combat wingman and an autonomous agent operating on a pre-mission script.
Beyond latency, SATCOM links are the primary electronic warfare target in any peer or near-peer conflict. A forward-deployed human controller on a low-probability-of-intercept line-of-sight datalink is a genuine doctrinal advantage, not a redundancy. The USAF's Collaborative Combat Aircraft program, the RAF's Mosquito project, and the RAAF's MQ-28 Ghost Bat integration are all architecturally built around exactly this forward controller model not SATCOM-dependent autonomous operation. This is the direction every serious air force with a MUM-T program is moving. The question of what happens if the Hürjet is attrited applies equally to any forward command node, manned or otherwise, and the answer, in every doctrine, is layered redundancy and fallback SATCOM, not the elimination of the forward node.
On the EW emissions point: This is the one objection I'll partially grant. Emissions discipline is a genuine design constraint and not a trivial problem. But the framing assumes the Hürjet-D operates as a solo, unescorted asset deep in contested airspace, which is not the doctrinal construct being proposed. The E-2D Hawkeye is not low-observable. The P-8 Poseidon is not low-observable. Both operate effectively in contested environments because their doctrine accounts for standoff geometry, escort packages, and the layered air defense umbrella of the carrier group. The sensor architecture question, MURAD versus a more capable dedicated surface-search solution is worth a separate and detailed discussion, and it points toward a modular pod architecture consistent with where ASELSAN's sensor programs are developing. It does not constitute an argument against the platform concept itself.
To avoid any misunderstanding, and fearing that a lengthy explanation might bore readers, I want to quickly summarize the topic: Describing a structured doctrinal proposal as "truly hilarious" and ending with "Proper Turkish thinking" isn't a technical counter-argument. It's what tends to appear when the technical objections have run thin. I'll leave that observation here. This discussion generally deserves a higher standard than that, and I'd rather keep it there.
The position stands: MUGEM's first block will be laid. TCG Anadolu is already at sea. A KAAN-derived naval variant is a decade and a half away at minimum. A navalized Hürjet with a 90–100 kN engine, AESA integration, and a MUM-T architecture isn't a fallback, it's a deliberate doctrinal choice about what Turkiye wants to be operationally capable of in the 2030s rather than waiting for the 2040s.
The UK didn't consider the Harrier a vanity solution while waiting for the F-35B. France didn't suspend carrier aviation while Rafale Marine was in development, the Etendard and Super Etendard flew for decades, built institutional knowledge, and handed off to the next generation when it was ready. That approach isn't called a compromise. It's called operational continuity, and it's precisely what a navalized Hürjet offers MUGEM from day one.
In my previous post, Anka-3 (perhaps its actual naval version will be coded as 4, who knows?) was listed alongside Kızılelma-II as part of a loyal wingman package. But honestly, it definitely deserves a much deeper discussion about its potential in the air wing composition breakdown.
