TR Air Defence Programs

[Corvus]

For the first time, Ukraine discloses real missile interception rates, moving beyond 'all intercepted' claims—average success stands at 43%

Commander-in-Chief Syrskyi, reported that from February 24, 2022, Russian missiles and drones struck 11,879 targets in Ukraine.

Civilian targets made up 53% of successful Russian strikes, hitting 6,203 targets, while military targets numbered 5,676


Missiles and Drones:

Total Missiles Launched: 9,590

Total Drones Launched: 13,997

Missiles Intercepted: 2,429 (25%)

Drones Intercepted: 5,972 (43%)


Cruise Missiles (Kalibr, Kh-555/101, R-500, Iskander):

Interception Rate: 67%

These cruise missiles are more effectively intercepted, with a significant proportion launched at strategic targets


Guided Missiles (Kh-59, Kh-35, Kh-31):

Interception Rate: 22%

Lower interception rate due to these missiles being launched at frontline or border targets with less layered air defense.


Drones (Shahed-136, Lancet):

Launched: 13,315

Intercepted: 8,836 (63%)

These drones were heavily targeted by air defense, resulting in a moderate interception success rate.


Ballistic Missiles (Iskander, Tochka-U, KN-23):

Launched: 1,388

Interception Rate: 4.5%

Extremely low interception rate, making these missiles a significant threat, particularly to civilian infrastructure.


Anti-Aircraft Missiles Modified to Hit Ground (S-300, S-400):

Launched: 3,008

Interception Rate: 0.63%

These missiles targeted 4,293 objects, primarily civilian (3,196) but also military (1,097).


Kh-22 and Kh-32 Missiles:

Launched: 362

Intercepted: 2 (0.55%)

These missiles, launched from Tu-22M3 bombers, require modern interception systems due to their speed and trajectory.


"Onyx" Missile:

Launched: 211

Intercepted: 12 (5.7%)

High-speed missile with a low interception rate, posing a significant risk to both civilian and military targets.


Hypersonic Weapons (Kh-47M2 "Kinzhal"):

Launched: 111

Intercepted: 28 (25%)

These hypersonic missiles mainly targeted civilian infrastructure, with a notable portion being intercepted.


"Zircon" Missile:

Launched: 6

Intercepted: 2

Struck civilian targets four times, demonstrating the challenges of intercepting truly hypersonic weapons.


Source:

Сирський розкрив, скільки об’єктів в Україні потрапили під удар РФ

Головнокомандувач ЗСУ Олександр Сирський повідомив, що за період з 24 лютого 2022 року в Україні російські ракети та дрони уразили 11 879 об’єктів, з яких більшість цивільні - 6 203, решта військові - 5 676.

www.pravda.com.ua

 

[Radonsider]

For the first time, Ukraine discloses real missile interception rates, moving beyond 'all intercepted' claims—average success stands at 43%

Commander-in-Chief Syrskyi, reported that from February 24, 2022, Russian missiles and drones struck 11,879 targets in Ukraine.

Civilian targets made up 53% of successful Russian strikes, hitting 6,203 targets, while military targets numbered 5,676


Missiles and Drones:

Total Missiles Launched: 9,590

Total Drones Launched: 13,997

Missiles Intercepted: 2,429 (25%)

Drones Intercepted: 5,972 (43%)


Cruise Missiles (Kalibr, Kh-555/101, R-500, Iskander):

Interception Rate: 67%

These cruise missiles are more effectively intercepted, with a significant proportion launched at strategic targets


Guided Missiles (Kh-59, Kh-35, Kh-31):

Interception Rate: 22%

Lower interception rate due to these missiles being launched at frontline or border targets with less layered air defense.


Drones (Shahed-136, Lancet):

Launched: 13,315

Intercepted: 8,836 (63%)

These drones were heavily targeted by air defense, resulting in a moderate interception success rate.


Ballistic Missiles (Iskander, Tochka-U, KN-23):

Launched: 1,388

Interception Rate: 4.5%

Extremely low interception rate, making these missiles a significant threat, particularly to civilian infrastructure.


Anti-Aircraft Missiles Modified to Hit Ground (S-300, S-400):

Launched: 3,008

Interception Rate: 0.63%

These missiles targeted 4,293 objects, primarily civilian (3,196) but also military (1,097).


Kh-22 and Kh-32 Missiles:

Launched: 362

Intercepted: 2 (0.55%)

These missiles, launched from Tu-22M3 bombers, require modern interception systems due to their speed and trajectory.


"Onyx" Missile:

Launched: 211

Intercepted: 12 (5.7%)

High-speed missile with a low interception rate, posing a significant risk to both civilian and military targets.


Hypersonic Weapons (Kh-47M2 "Kinzhal"):

Launched: 111

Intercepted: 28 (25%)

These hypersonic missiles mainly targeted civilian infrastructure, with a notable portion being intercepted.


"Zircon" Missile:

Launched: 6

Intercepted: 2

Struck civilian targets four times, demonstrating the challenges of intercepting truly hypersonic weapons.


Source:

Сирський розкрив, скільки об’єктів в Україні потрапили під удар РФ

Головнокомандувач ЗСУ Олександр Сирський повідомив, що за період з 24 лютого 2022 року в Україні російські ракети та дрони уразили 11 879 об’єктів, з яких більшість цивільні - 6 203, решта військові - 5 676.

www.pravda.com.ua

>print Tayfun and Cenk

 

[Afif]

I mean, yes. But personally I think Ukraine situation is not ideal to derive conclusion on BM success rate against competent BMD. It has a huge land mass to cover and so many critical assets, yet too few BMD systems to provide protection. You can bet most of the BM that made successful hit landed outside the very small protective bubbles. Worse yet, Ukraine didn't have any MIM-104 in the first year of the war.

Same goes for the interception rate of other weapon systems. They did not have (not even remotely close) the numbers of AD systems they needed. IMO, only those penetrated that protection of AMD systems should count in determinimg interception success rate. Not those that simply struck targets outside the AMD coverage.

 

[Samba]

I mean, yes. But personally I think Ukraine situation is not ideal to derive conclusion on BM success rate against competent BMD. It has a huge land mass to cover and so many critical assets, yet too few BMD systems to provide protection. You can bet most of the BM that made successful hit landed outside the very small protective bubbles. Worse yet, Ukraine didn't have any MIM-104 in the first year of the war.

Same goes for the interception rate of other weapon systems. They did not have (not even remotely close) the numbers of AD systems they needed. IMO, only those penetrated that protection of AMD systems should count in determinimg interception success rate. Not those that simply struck targets outside the AMD coverage.

Given the vast number of ADS support by the West, I would say Russians have reached a huge success. Especially modified S300s and S400s along with KH22 and KH32 are a huge threat to strategic assets.

 

[Afif]

Given the vast number of ADS support by the West, I would say Russians have reached a huge success.

Vast number?

 

[zio]

The only way to resist GPS jamming is low altitue GPS satellites. But they are prone to be destroyed by long range missiles, and also are very expensive. Because they need more satellites. The other way to counter low altitude GPS satellite systems is to increase the power of noise jamming. The ultimate solution is Quantum navigation system.As far as I know meteksan did not finished GPS jamming system called as seymen.However who is making this jamming on Turkiye.See the map below.During wartime we can not use crypted GPS signals so we should uncrypte it if possible.We can use alternative navigation procuders,roketsan make it by using stars,but you can use it at medium range balistic missiles like tayfun and cenk ,thats why these missiles are so important for ofensive uses.The other indirect solution is use laser guidance and INS.Laser illumination do not work on bad wheather and over cloud,and also allow for short range ammunution or missile usage.INS dont give you pinpoint strike.Under GPS jamming and cryption based block of the GPS signals we have to make missiles with more heavy and or effective warheads.If we make bigger warheads on current missiles SOM,Kara Atmaca their effectice range reduce significantly.Kale arge should make turbojet engines with a power of 5K newton,so our missiles can hit target without pinpoint accuracy but with 450 kg warhead,the job can be partially done.

 

[TheInsider]

Highly debatable numbers depending on what counts as interception. You can jam GPS/Glonass and the missile might fall 100 meters off target. Does that count as an interception?

 

[Huelague]

Does that count as an interception?

Yes. (Soft-kill/EW System)

 

[Anmdt]

The only way to resist GPS jamming is low altitue GPS satellites. But they are prone to be destroyed by long range missiles, and also are very expensive. Because they need more satellites. The other way to counter low altitude GPS satellite systems is to increase the power of noise jamming. The ultimate solution is Quantum navigation system.As far as I know meteksan did not finished GPS jamming system called as seymen.However who is making this jamming on Turkiye.See the map below.During wartime we can not use crypted GPS signals so we should uncrypte it if possible.We can use alternative navigation procuders,roketsan make it by using stars,but you can use it at medium range balistic missiles like tayfun and cenk ,thats why these missiles are so important for ofensive uses.The other indirect solution is use laser guidance and INS.Laser illumination do not work on bad wheather and over cloud,and also allow for short range ammunution or missile usage.INS dont give you pinpoint strike.Under GPS jamming and cryption based block of the GPS signals we have to make missiles with more heavy and or effective warheads.If we make bigger warheads on current missiles SOM,Kara Atmaca their effectice range reduce significantly.Kale arge should make turbojet engines with a power of 5K newton,so our missiles can hit target without pinpoint accuracy but with 450 kg warhead,the job can be partially done.

Terrain based navigation (tons of stuff going on here it is not contour matching anymore, it is 21st century boys, peope uses lasers, SAR, NIR visuals) , INS correction, automatic target acquisition through a library. GPS is more a secondary and assured way of navigation considered unreliable and not relied upon.

What essentially makes a cruise missile 'deadly' and hard to make is these features, or anyone with a turbojet capable of running at lease 12 hours, a warhead and a hobby level GPS board and flight controller could introduce a new cruise missile everyday (and they do it indeed, they call flying hobby jet planes a cruise missile).

In 21st century armies heavy rely on updated digitized maps and target libraries (RF, IIR, visual signature) for a reason. Scientific satellites do not only serve to scientific purposes.

To me the GPS is more of an issue for long range AA interception systems that rely on GPS for midcourse guidance. We either need long range illumination radars for beam riding or doubting if INS will do any magic there.

 

[zio]

Terrain based navigation (tons of stuff going on here it is not contour matching anymore, it is 21st century boys, peope uses lasers, SAR, NIR visuals) , INS correction, automatic target acquisition through a library. GPS is more a secondary and assured way of navigation considered unreliable and not relied upon.

What essentially makes a cruise missile 'deadly' and hard to make is these features, or anyone with a turbojet capable of running at lease 12 hours, a warhead and a hobby level GPS board and flight controller could introduce a new cruise missile everyday (and they do it indeed, they call flying hobby jet planes a cruise missile).

In 21st century armies heavy rely on updated digitized maps and target libraries (RF, IIR, visual signature) for a reason. Scientific satellites do not only serve to scientific purposes.

To me the GPS is more of an issue for long range AA interception systems that rely on GPS for midcourse guidance. We either need long range illumination radars for beam riding or doubting if INS will do any magic there.

Terrain based navigation can not be used on open seas

 

[Anmdt]

Terrain based navigation can not be used on open seas

Are we talking about LACM or anti-ship missiles? Anti ship missiles enable RF - IIR seeker before the terminal phase and launches search pattern to look for an echo/source, which is usually a point standing out in an open sea and the shift by INS is negligible for the search area of the seeker.

If it is a LACM then eventually the missile passes through a shore line and make use of tercom. Make is pass through islets / islands for more precision. The need of GNSS is indispensable but even if we had our own satellite, it can be jammed through alternative means or rendered useless.

 

[zio]

Low altitute GPS satellite signals are powerful and hard to jamm it.It is expensive but if your area coverage is limited it demans less satallite and make them not expensive.

 

[Oublious]

Canik shooting down cruise missile .

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1828013685920411825

 

[UkroTurk]

Canik shooting down cruise missile .

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1828013685920411825

Canik became a war lord

 

[AzeriTank]

I mean, yes. But personally I think Ukraine situation is not ideal to derive conclusion on BM success rate against competent BMD. It has a huge land mass to cover and so many critical assets, yet too few BMD systems to provide protection. You can bet most of the BM that made successful hit landed outside the very small protective bubbles. Worse yet, Ukraine didn't have any MIM-104 in the first year of the war.

Same goes for the interception rate of other weapon systems. They did not have (not even remotely close) the numbers of AD systems they needed. IMO, only those penetrated that protection of AMD systems should count in determinimg interception success rate. Not those that simply struck targets outside the AMD coverage.

in some cases Russia destroyed several jets with ballistic missiles in their airbase, is there anything more important than that? if those anti ballistic missiles cannot protect those expensive jets, what else its designed to protect then?

 

[Afif]

in some cases Russia destroyed several jets with ballistic missiles in their airbase, is there anything more important than that? if those anti ballistic missiles cannot protect those expensive jets, what else its designed to protect then?

Because there wasn't any ABM system at those air bases to begin with.

 

[AzeriTank]

Because there wasn't any ABM system at those air bases to begin with.

how about destroyong KKB base in Kiev or some other targets? where reported that many foreigners died and even a general from Poland? it just doesnt add up as there are so many important targets get hit.

 

[Afif]

where reported that many foreigners died and even a general from Poland?

Conspiracy. No Polish general was killed. Anyway, this is going off topic now.

 

[AzeriTank]

Conspiracy. No Polish general was killed. Anyway, this is going off topic now.

you saying that there were no air defense near those air bases are also a conspiracy. When we know that Ukraine use air deffence these days close to the border. Russia shared the name of the general that has not been seen after that at least, but nothing about destroyed targets?

 

[Afif]

When we know that Ukraine use air deffence these days close to the border. Russia shared the name of the general that has not been seen after that at least, but nothing about destroyed targets?

You are making wild claims without any proof or evidence. If someone dies and Russia share his name, doesn't mean Russians actually killed him. Poland officially confirmed the death of an army general due to natural cause. Believe it or not, people dies for normal reasons. And Frankly, Poles are lot more trustworthy than Russians.

you saying that there were no air defense near those air bases are also a conspiracy.

Nope, Ukraine operates four MIM-104 batteries as of now and it is well known that those are deployed at Kiev and Kharkiv. Sometimes one is utilized for SAM ambushes.

Three Iskander SRBM strike happened in two Ukrainian air bases destroying several aircrafts in July and August. Those bases are Myrhorod and Dolgintsevo. Neither is remotely close to Kiev or Kharkiv.