EAST BENGAL REGIMENT AND THE 1965 WAR
By
Usman Khan Yousafzai
By
Usman Khan Yousafzai
“… Mujib, who addressed massive crowds at his meetings, lashed out mercilessly at the central government and succeeded in spreading hatred against all non-bengalis. Even the soldiers openly participated in his political meetings and fell prey to his propaganda. Meanwhile, the Bengali officers in the formation had withdrawn into a shell of their own and rarely mixed with their West Pakistani brethren. Their Families kept aloof. Every evening they would get together in small groups among themselves…….. Even during my short tenure at Jerssore, the attitude of the Bengali Officers had caused me concern. Therefore, I shared my apprehensions with the commanding officers of the West Pakistani units, and ordered them to keep half of their personal weapons and ammunitions in the barracks with the troops, to guard against surprise attacks. The suspect loyalty of the Bengali troops, particularly the pure Bengali battalions, agitated me. We Spoke of one country and one nation, and yet we were raising separate Bengali army….” [1]
Excerpt from ‘Stranger in My Own Country’ By Maj.Gen. Khadim Hussain Raja
The story of the East Bengal Regiment in the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war is one that is neither deeply studied nor is it well known. Some of the bravest men took the battlefields to defend lands thousands of kilometers away from their homes. These men stood side by side with their brethren of West Pakistan and gave the enemy a bleeding nose. The East Bengal Regiment was formed on the 15th of February 1948 and was initially largely composed of soldiers from the Bihar Regiment and the Bengal Pioneer Corps. Individuals who had opted for Pakistan. The Regiment was initially under officers commissioned from the Punjab Regiment due to shortage of junior officer staff however gradually Bengali officers and Bengali soldiers became a core part of the regiment and the regiment would later on become primarily composed of Bengali men. The first two companies composed of Bengali Muslims were formed from the first training regiment in East Pakistan and this was done under Lt. Col. V.J.E Patterson as commanding officer and Major Abdul Waheed Chaudhary as Officer Commander. Before the confrontation of 1965, over 8 battalions were raised and thus East Bengal Regiment was formed.
Before Pakistan Launched Operation Grand Slam, it had already launched Operation Gibraltar, a mass infiltration mission whose objective was to reinvigorate the Kashmiri Struggle for independence and bring back to light the Kashmir issue on the International stage. The operation was a failure with many infiltration units unable to reach their planned points and thus were forced to return. Those that did reach found the terrain improperly mapped, the local population hostile and surprised, and their objectives largely unachievable. These Units largely conducted small saboteur attacks and retreated in the face of a growing counter-attack by the Indian Forces. The two units that did manage to succeed in their objectives to an extent, struggled to gain anything major from it. Indian in retaliation launched multiple operations, including the capture of Haji Pir Pass, a major infiltration point. In light of such Pakistan launched a massive military operation named Grand Slam to counter the Indian incursion and blockade the Indian Supply Route. As Pakistan quickly advanced to choke the Indian supply lines in Kashmir, India launched an attack on Lahore through Operation Riddle and that is where we come to the stories of the East Bengal Regiment. The Public mood in East Pakistan, when the same was announced through Radio Pakistan, their only source of information, was of absolute patriotism and jingoism with Bengalis praying for victory. Whilst they rallied behind the government, their feelings were not the same to the extent as West Pakistan, after the fighting was thousands of kilometers away and the issue of Kashmir didn’t resonate in the same existential way as it did for West Pakistan, notably those of Punjab. East Pakistan relied on local and international news and was relieved to find that the rumours of Lahore falling to the Indian Army were incorrect. The whole nation of East Pakistan celebrated the bravery of Major Raza Aziz Bhatti who stalled the Indian advances at the burki area of the Bombanwala-Ravi-Bedian Canal also known as the BRB Canal, a massive canal system that flows from Bambanwala Sialkot, and covers as a defensive area for Gujranwala, sheikhupura, Lahore and Kasur as it ends at Bedian. Much was made of the Bengali Ace M.M Alam whose heroics were greatly celebrated in both wings. The news greatly publicized the September 7 attack on the Kalaikunda Air Base by Dacca Based 15th Squadron F-86Fs led by Squadron Leader Shabbir Hussain Syed in which Pakistan radio claimed it destroyed several IAF planes. While the news was met with jubilation, many in East Pakistan wondered as to why Pakistan opened such a vulnerable frontier and whether it would lead to retaliation by the Indian Airforce.[2]
Yet despite everything, the heroics of the East Bengal Regiment in the 1965 war remain lost to history. Very little is written regarding their performance and even less is written regarding their bravery. Their performance in some of the most crucial battles was airbrushed by a government desperate to prove itself the absolute victor and absolutely in the right. As junior officers and soldiers displayed their dissatisfaction due to the incompetence of the senior command, the role of a marginalized group was forever lost. So let us the microscope to war and look into the heroics of this regiment and find out what they did. This research may not prove to recreate the absolute events of the battle but it is hopeful that by the end of this paper, we will get a better understanding of their valor and bravery. It would be a dishonor to the country if their tales of bravery were forgotten in history.
In the 1965 War theater, the 1st East Bengal Regiment was within the 106th Infantry Brigade under Brigadier Nawazish Ali along with the 7th Baluch Regiment and they were part of the 11th Division whose order of battle was composed of Armour composed of 6th Lancers (Placed under the 5th Armoured Brigade for the capture of Khem-karan and further operations beyond), 15th Lancers and 32 TDU, 21st Infantry Brigade under Brigadier Sahib Dad composed of 5th Frontier Force, FF and 13th Baluch, 52nd Infantry Brigade under Brigadier SRH Zaidi composed of the 2nd FF, 7th Punjab and 12th Baluch as well as 3rd Engineer Battalion composed of 3 field companies but no bridging elements and finally of Artillery Division under Brigadier SDK Niazi composed of 26th Field Regiment and 38th Field Regiment with Artillery Corp of 35th Heavy Regiment (two 8 inch howitzer batteries and one 155 mm gun battery of 30th heavy regiment) and 37th Corps locating regiment, (Less one battery). This was the entire 11th Division. Now it is important to understand that each division was meant to protect a region of Pakistan. The defense of Lahore was under the 10th Division. The battles at Burki and the BRB Canal sieges in the Lahore sector were largely conducted by the 10th Division. There is little to no evidence to suggest that the East Bengal Regiment aka the ERB was involved in the battles of Lahore. I have seen this claim from dubious sources who stated that since the ERB was deployed at the BRB Canal, they were involved in the defense of Lahore. They were not. They were deployed at the BRB but the canal is not some small headwork. It is a massive canal network and the area under the 10th division began from sidhanwali, sheikhupura till Asal Gurtuke and Ghawind, Lahore. North of the 10th Division was the responsibility of the 15th Division and south of the 10th was the responsibility of the 11th Division. The Burki battles were within the central area of the 10th Division. In further elaboration, the Pakistan Army comprised of 8 divisions in 1964 including the 1st Armoured Division and 100th Independent Armoured Brigade, which was being converted into the 6th Armoured Division and in addition there were four independent brigade groups. The 11th Division was raised in May 1965 and was barely three months old when the war started. This nascent brigade was tested through a trial of fire when it was given the task of defending and attacking the Khem Karan sector. Under the GHQ there was only one corps headquarters namely the 1st Corps, whose operational area stretched from Marala headworks to Hussainiwala headworks. The order of battle changed time from time which I will write here.
Pakistan 1st Corp Order of Battle 1964-65
- 7th Division at Peshawar
- 8th Division at Quetta
- 10th Division at Lahore
- 106th Infantry Brigade Group/Kasur Force for Kasur
- Corps Troops
- 6th Armoured Division for Gujranwala (Revert to GHQ when ordered)
- 10th Division for Lahore
- 15th Division for Sialkot
- 21st Infantry Brigade excluding the 8th Division
- 25th Infantry Brigade excluding 7th Division placed under command with effect from 31st August 1965
- 6th Armoured Division for Gujranwala (Revert to GHQ when ordered)
- 10th Division for Lahore
- 11th Division for Luliani-Kasur
- 15th Division for Sialkot
- Two heavy Regiments excluding IV Corps Artillery
With the above, we can understand the composition of the battle order and the deployment of the forces and their responsible sector. Divisions and brigades not grouped under the 1st Corp were commanded directly by the GHQ. Among these the 12th Division was virtually a Corp but without a Corp Headquarter. The 1st Armored Division and 7th Infantry Division were designated as the ‘Army Striking Force’ but without a corps headquarters to handle them as a combined force. Pakistan’s army doctrine was largely defensive in which ground was to be held by firepower instead of manpower. The underlying idea being to initially absorb the enemy’s attack and then launch counterattack to destroy said enemy. Defense was to be organized under two lawyers called ‘the killing zone’ and ‘zone of resistance’ and both were called zones of fire and they were to absorb the enemy attack after which another force called ‘Striking force’ was to attack the enemy flank, which was held back initially, against the depth of the attacking enemy in the zone of fire. This was a largely tactical plan but it influenced the upper echelons of the military and formed a core of the strategic planning. The strategic concept that penetrated the force was that the onus of the attack should be left to the enemy and then the initiative be wrested from the enemy with a quick deep-thrusting counter-attack by the strike force. Thus the objective of the army’s entire defense plan was to neutralize the invading Indian army and having done so, launch counterattacks with the strike forces and capture maximum enemy territory in the vicinity of the respective defending areas of the formations thus blunting the invasion and forcing the enemy to fight a defensive war. While the enemy was tied down by the holding formations, the task was to be given to the ‘Strike Force’ whose objective was to penetrate enemy territory at maximum length and threaten a big town or a city. There is nothing within the military planning to suggest that there was any concept or training or planning of capturing said big towns or cities and what was to be done if such capture ever succeeded. This was largely dubbed as a riposte strategy although it was never given such a name in the operational handbook. The birth and faults in this operational strategy require their own research but are added to understand the areas of responsibility and operational strategy employed by the Pakistan army and in turn the 11th Division of which the 1st ERB. The operation instruction issued by the GHQ on the eve of war stated that in case of general war, the 1st Corps was to be prepared to launch two attacks, one each in the Ravi-Chenab and Ravi-Beas corridors. In the Ravi-Chenab corridor, the 1st Corp was to launch combined operations with the 7th Division, 15th Division and 6th Armoured Brigade in the area of Akhnur-Jammu-Samba-Kathua. In the latter corridor, the Corp was to utilize the 11th Division and with 10th Division either jointly or separately to launch an offensive towards Amritsar and the 11th Division was to be one light armoured brigade from the 1st Armoured Division. The enormity of this task came to be when the pressures of the actual war forced the GHQ to assume direct control of all formations on 9th September in the area south of North Siphon, leaving the 1st Corp to conduct operations in the Sialkot region.
The army striking force comprising of 1st Armoured Division and 7th Infanty Division has been concentrated in the areas of the Chhanga Manga forest and balloki during the Rann of Kutch Conflict. 1st Armoured Division and 7th Infantry Division has been moved out from Kharian and Peshawar in early May. The two division commanders moved to HQ 10th Division to carry out operational planning for their joint role. No record is available of this planning which states that these meetings were conducted with such secrecy that not even the brigade commanders of these Divisions knew what was happening or what their role was however one thing was clear that till 6th September, neither one of these divisions had any maps of Khem Karan which means that somewhere the counter striking area changed and was not originally to be launched at the Ravi-Beas Corridor. The 1st Armoured Division gave a report, that limited reconnaissance was carried out at the Kasur-Bedian sectors assigned to the 11th Division and was carried out by the 4th Armoured Brigade but this was deception as the attack was to be launched somewhere else.[3]
From East Punjab, there are three main approaches to Lahore. The shortest is from Amritsar to Lahore astride the Grand Trunk Road, the second approach is along the Harike-Khalra-Barki and the third approach is a conjunction at Kasur through two other approaches from Ferozepur and Khemkaran. The former two approaches were to be defended by the 10th Division and the last approach was within the domain of the 11th Division.
The strategy adopted by the Indian Army was space-oriented and not destruction oriented as professed by Indian Army Chief, General Chaudhari. The Pakistani strategy was to be force-oriented but from the performance of the war, it is hard to say if either side consciously applied any strategy at all. Russel Brines stated in his work ‘Indo-Pakistan conflict’,
“……Operations were begun in unprepared phase for purpose of quick and sometimes desperate reprisal. Each offensive attack by the rival armies appeared on the surface as well planned and calculated maneuver to offset the previous actions of the adversary. They were predictable military reactions but operations on both sides were marred by grave mistakes and by certain amount of battlefield hysteria.” [4]
Despite the strategies and the planning, one thing is clear that Pakistan enjoyed an overwhelming advantage over the Indian Army in terms of assembly of forces. In the words of General Kaul,
“Pakistan lulled us into a false sense of security by outwardly laying low after the truce of Kutch…. Our high command remained blind to this ruse and off guard, allowing our forces to relapse into peacetime..” [5]
Despite such an advantage and the ruse of General Musa in keeping all formations in the field, close to their locations, Pakistan still dropped the ball. Apart from the 15th Division, no other division was given clear and concise executive orders from the GHQ to move to their formations. The 10th and 11th divisions moved to their formations on the night when Indians launched the attack across the International Border! And this was not the only formation that was caught sleeping and sluggish. It is a matter of great irony that despite intelligence reports, formation reports and onfield formations, Pakistan still allowed itself to be surprised by the Indian attack. This was largely due to the GHQ belief that if formations were present at their locations on the eve of the attack across the Ceasefire Line, then it might provoke India to attack across the International Border. The buildup by India on 3rd September made clear that an attack was to happen. The Pakistani high command held the key to success in the palm of their hands for a critical moment but lost the initiative and with it the nerve, which they never recovered during the war.
Now before we go even further into the role of ERB, it is important to highlight what the 11th division, of which the ERB was composed of, was doing at the eve of the war. Only by doing such can we truly trace the performance of the ERB in the 1965 war. Now preparedness has been one of the most controversial issues of the war and I would like to touch upon it to understand the delayed field positioning of the 11th Division. In an interview[6], Brig. Inam ul haq, who was GSO-2 Operations at headquarters 10th division stated that he had accompanied General Sarfaraz to the C-inCs conference held at Kharian on 31st August 1965 for all the formation commanders where after the said conference they were officially informed of the operations in Kashmir and general Sarfaraz spoke to Lt.Gen Bakhtiar Rana within the earshot of Brig. Inam and solicited his permission to move the 10th Division to the battle location but Bakhtiar refused. However, Bakhtiar in his interview[7] stated that he does not remember such an event. He stated that the conference was held on 3rd September in which he ordered the Divisions 10th and 11th to move to their positions and occupy the defenses but General Sarfaraz spoke privately to President Ayub and had his formation movement postponed and the reason for such was unknown to the good general as to why General Sarfaraz was so callous in the defense of perhaps one of the most important cities, if not the most important city of the country. Brigadier Afzal tells a different story in his interview.[8] He states that General Sarfaraz begged General Rana to be allowed to occupy the defensive positions but general Rana said, “Sarfraz, don’t panic.” On a copy of the 10th Division’s battle account, General Sarfaraz wrote in his own handwriting the following,
“….on 3rd September, GOC 10th Division had asked Lt. Gen Rana, the Corps Commander’s permission to occupy battle positions, which was denied lest it provoke the Indians.” [9]
In addition to the above, there are several facts which tend to prove that the occupation of defenses by the 10th Division as well as the 11th Division was delayed because of vacillation at the GHQ and due to lack of clear orders from HQ 1st Corps instead of any reluctance on the part of the two divisions to take the field. The accusations of lethargy placed on the Divisions is clearly unfounded and a cop-out for the senior command to be exonerated from what was clearly an absolute command failure. It is quite clear that it is by chance and coincidence that the 11th Division occupied its position on the night of 4-5th September as it was located closer to its occupying position, Kasur than its counterpart the 10th Division which occupied its position in the next night when India started to begin its attack. Thus the war began and with it, the 11th Division was to face the 4th Mountain Division attack from Khem Karan.
Perhaps of all the events that surround the 1965 Indo-Pak War, none is so baffling or frustrating than the Khem-Karan sector. The blunders of the 1st Armoured Division have been a great deal of mystery. Perhaps the best way to write the performance of the 1st Armoured Division is in the following.
When General Sher Bahadur, Chief of General Staff was asked by his students at the command and staff college in Quetta about why the 1st Division was deployed prematurely, he replied
“The armoured division was laying in chhanga Manga—It has to do something.” [10]
This was further corroborated by Major General Naseer Ahmed who was GOC of 1st Armoured Division when he stated,
“No sooner had the Indians attacked than the GHQ started pestering me with such orders, ‘God’s sake do something!’. So I said do something.” [11]
Within these nightmarish revelations, the ‘Mailed Fist’ took birth which was what the plan of employment was called as a striking force in conjunction with the 11th Division. The defensive task required the newly raised 11th Division to undertake a counter-penetration role with the offensive task for the 1st Armoured Division to execute offensive operations through the Ravi-Beas Corridor. The Mailed Fist was to be launched and within it was the East Bengal Regiment.
Since 1964, General Musa had been stressing that Pakistan needed two infantry divisions. Consequently, the 11th Infantry Division, originally called the 20th Division but was changed to the 11th at the request of Maj.Gen Hamid. On 2nd June, General Hamid, accompanied by Major Shakoor Malik, his GSO-2 Operation established a skeleton division HQ at Rukhunwala and took over the operational responsibility of the Kasur Sector. The first few members of the division HQ staff got busy in the raising process at Rawalpindi while the others were posted later. One such person was Lt. Col Muhammad Zia Ul Haq. Upon its creation, the 11th Division was assigned dual roles. In its defensive role, it was tasked to defend the Kasur communication center as a pivot, destroy enemy advance on the axes Ferozepur—Kasur and Khem Karan—Kasur area and capture the western end of Ferozepur Headworks. The second role was an offensive one in which the division was to secure the general line joining Rajoke, the crossing over the Kasur Branch Canal near 29 Mile—bahadurnagar, a village southeast of valtoha on the escarpment along the River Sutlej. The purpose of this offensive was to facilitate the operations of ‘Striking Force South’. To accomplish the offensive task the 11th Division planned to use the 21st Brigade to secure Rajoke and the area upto Rohi Nala. 52nd Brigade was to attack and destroy the enemy in Khem Karan and establish itself in Asal Uttar. 106th Brigade was to wait till the completion of the task by the former two brigades and then breakout with Armour and secure the Rajoke-Bahadurnagar line. However, the offensive task of the 11th Division was revised just before the war started which required the creation of a bigger bridge head upto the line of Patti-Harike.[12]
In the defensive role, the positions of the 11th Division were to be along the BRB Canal. Its left flank rested on the boundary with the 10th division while on the right, its area of responsibility stretched all the way upto Kanganpur, a frontage of nearly 100,000 yards. According to the original plan 21st Brigade was to hold the area from the boundary with the 10th Division to the bridge on the BRB Canal opposite Chathanwala. On its right, the 106th Brigade, which included the EBR, was responsible for the Nathuwala Siphon while the 52nd Brigade’s defensive area went upto Mianwala. The plan was later on changed. It had resorted to the conventional two-up deployment with the 106th Brigade as the left forward brigade from the inter-division boundary to Nathuwala Siphon and the 52nd Brigade as the right forward from but excluding Nathunwala Siphon to Hussainiwala enclave.
Now if we take the microscope to the 11th Division, we cannot skirt around the issue as to why the 11th Division's move to their defensive position was delayed. We have already seen the aforementioned interviews. Further scrutiny of the record is required. Having placed the 11th Division on 12 hours notice on 2nd September, at 2100 hours on 4th September, General Hamid ordered the two forward brigades, 52nd and 106th to move into battle positions within the hours of darkness.[13] The positions of the 52nd Brigade along the Rohi Nala were to be occupied at dusk each day and vacated the next dawn. The division’s account describes the move as
“….Anticipation of the GOC….” [14]
Infact the war records inform us that the 11 Division’s forward movement was motivated by a telephone message from the GHQ at Rawalpindi. 52nd Brigade’s war diary records
“During night 4-5 September, a flash message was received on telephone by brigade major from GSO-2 HQ 11 Division instructing the brigade to occupy their positions.”[15]
On the other hand the war diary of the 106th Brigade informs us,
“At 2100 Hours the following orders were received from HQ 11th Division:-
Brigade to move in the vicinity of battle locations. No Move beyond BRB.
Digging for main weapons (machine guns) only and on home (West) bank of BRB allowed during night. First line ammunition will continue to be kept in sealed boxes.
Observation posts and section/platoon posts, on important bridges over BRB continue to be maintained in ‘civies’ (civilian clothes) and rangers uniform.
No provocative move to be made.” [16]
It is clear from the perusal of the aforementioned entries that there were no clear orders to occupy the defensive positions nor to enhance the defensive line. Caution was the message sent which was a poor order to be given considering the fact that by this time, it was clear to both General Musa and the GHQ that India was about to launch a massive operation across the International Border. It would not be wrong to suggest that the two GOCs, Maj. Gen Sarfaraz and Hamid moved their divisions forward on their own judgment. Maj. General Shaukat Riza wrote that General Hamid occupied the defences on the night of 5-6 September.[17] He further stated in his work that both the 10th and 11th Divisions were prohibited from taking any provocative action to such an extent that even mines in the area were removed thus when the two brigades moved forward in the night, they had to reestablish defenses anew and no digging was carried out till the night of 5th September.
“…during night of 4-5 September that the commanding officers of 7th Punjab and 12th Baluch were ordered by the Brigade commander to fully prepare their positions which had earlier been dismantled and filled up. They were to be prepared by first light of 6th September.” [18]
In the other Brigade,
“unit commanders were called to HQ 106th Brigade at 2200 hours (4 September) and given order for move which to be completed during night 4-5 September.” [19]
The orders by Brigadier Nawazish to the 106th were,
“Digging to be done upto LMG weapons pits.
All outposts on BRBL Canal bridges to be reinforced.
Active and round-the-clock liaison with Rangers posts in the area to be maintained.
Since breaking of first line ammunition seals was not allowed, units were to send vehicles to Lahore and bring forward practice ammunition for distribution to the men.” [20]
The 106th Brigade occupied an area from the inter-division boundary in the north to Nathuwala Siphon in the south. In September 1965, it was composed of two Infantry Battalions which were the 1st East Bengal Regiment and the 7th Baluch Regiment along with two squadrons of armour and one R&S Company. 35 Heavy regiment (two batteries of 8-inch howitzers) was in direct support of this brigade. C Company 15th FF (R&S) was deployed from Burj to Kirka from where the 1st EBR area of responsibility extended south of Bedian Head-works. 7th Baluch was deployed from Pannuwan area all the way to the Inter-Brigade boundary with the 52nd Brigade. Towards midday on 6th September, A squadron 15 Lancers was moved from Luliani to Bedian Headworks. On the same day, Number 2 Link Troop A Squadron 15 Lancers was despatched to guard the Pannuwan bridge in the 7th Baluch area.
Now on the morning of 3rd September, Maj. Gen Gurbaksh Singh, GOC of the 4th Indian Mountain Division was called to a conference at HQ Western Command. His division was to be the third prong of the XI Corps drive towards the BRBL, (the L stands for Lulliani. Commonly known as BRB or by Indian authors as Ichogil Canal). The task given to this division was:
“Secure Pak territory upto the east bank of the Ichogil Canal from Ganda Singhwala (12 kilometers, South of Khem Karan) to a point where this canal crosses the Upper Bari Doab Canal near Bedian (about 20 kilometers noth of Khem Karan). Destroy the bridge on the Ichogil canal on the Khem Karan-Kasur road, Occupy a defended sector to contain a possible enemy offensive by one armoured division and two infantry brigades, particularly along the Kasur-Khem Karannand Ganda Singhwala_Khem Karan axes. For this support of 2nd Independent Armoured Brigade would be available on priority.” [21]
The formation of the 4th Mountain Division as well as the ailments that the Division suffered is another study in itself and is not relevant to the history of the EBR. However, the Indian phase of the attack needs to be mentioned here in brief for a better understanding of the heroics of the EBR. General Gurbaksh Singh planned his operation in two phases. The attack was to be launched from a division firm base which was to be established by the 62nd Mountain Brigade with the help of 1/9 Gurkha Rifles and 9th Deccan Horse less A and C squadrons. The firm base was to be established southwest of Khem Karan covering the roads to Kasur and Ganda Singhwala. In the first phase, the 62nd Brigade, commanded by Brig. H.C Gahlaut was to advance simultaneously on axes Khem Karan-Kasur and Khem Karan-Ganda Singhwala and capture the area upto and including the eastern bank of the Rohi Nala, the area held by B Company of 7th Punjab. In the second phase, the 7th Mountain Brigade was tasked to secure Pak territory upto the east bank of the Ichogil Canal from Ganda Singhwala (12 kilometers, South of Khem Karan) to a point where this canal crosses the Upper Bari Doab Canal near Bedian (about 20 kilometers north of Khem Karan). The areas held by 7th Baluch and 1st EBR respectively. The attack by the 62nd Mountain Brigade was to be done simultaneously with the 7th Brigade across the Rohi Nala and capture the east bank of BRBL Canal which was practically the entire area of the 52nd Brigade.
As the attack at Lahore began, it is a sad tale that the HQ 1st Corps was too busy with the Indian attack at Lahore to inform the 11th Division that hostilities had broken out. By the dawn of 6th September, in accordance with the plans, the 11th Division was withdrawing to their rest positions west of Rohi Nala, ignorant of the impending Indian attack. B company of the 7th Punjab began withdrawal at 0500 Hours and the situation is best described by Lt. Col Syed Shirazie, battalion commander,
“The platoon commander himself had just reached the area when he heard firing ahead. For a moment he was confused and thought that the enemy had crossed the Rohi Nala and was firing from his positions, but he soon realized that this was not so as tracers were seen coming over the Rohi Nala Embankment. He rushed back with his platoon and quickly reoccupied his position. If the Indians had not attacked the Ranger Post on the border and crept up silently to the Rohi Nala, they would have crossed it without any opposition.” [22]
In relation to the Ranger Post the Indian account is the following.
“Border checkpost on our side has been in charge of the Punjab Armed Police while those on the Pak side were manned by the Sutlej Rangers. A couple of hours before the attack, the PAP had withdrawn from the post on the Khem Karan-Kasur road and the Sutlej Rangers had promptly occupied it. The PAP post thus became the first objective of the J&K Rifles.” [23]
Another account corroborates this event,
“The personnel of PAP had been withdrawn at 0330 hours. The start line was crossed at 0530 hours but the alert Pakistan Rangers occupied the vacated PAP post and it became the first obstacle in the path of Company of J&K.” [24]
This prompt occupation by the Sutlej rangers, unknown to those who had acted in the field, changed the entire scenario of the sector. Perhaps some background to the occupation is in order. Late in the evening on 5th September, Lt. Col Shirazie was returning from a visit to his B Company when at about 1800 Hours, near the crossing of the Kasur-Khem Karan road over the Rohi Nala he saw a vehicle loaded with chairs and tables and teapots. On enquiring from the NCO rangers for the purpose of this, he was informed that the monthly joint meeting was to be held between the border officials and it was their turn to provide refreshments.
Nevertheless, it was clear that war had now reached the sector. Brigadier Gahlaut’s attack was in three phases. The first phase, 9th J&K Rifles (Lt.Col Ajit Singh) with under command A Squadron 9 Horse, was to capture Rohi Nala on Axis Khem Karan-Kasur and then push forward a company to secure the East Bank of the Ichogil Canal. Simultaneously 13th Dogra, Lt Col G.C Khosla was to secure Area High Ground 45r, 18th Rajputana Rifles was to be in reserve in Area South West of Khem Karan. Second, the Rajputana Rifles were to secure the East bank of the Ichogil Canal. In the third phase, the brigade was to occupy a defended sector as follows
- 18th Rajputana Rifles less two companies, to act as a screen along the East Bank of Ichogil Canal. The remaining two companies to occupy the Area southwest of Khem Karan.
- 13th Dogra less one company and one platoon to continue holding the Area High Ground; one company, to secure Area Logarh with a platoon in Area Forward of Bund
- 1/9 Gurkha Rifles to be in depth in area, slightly northwest of Mianwala Uttar.
- 9th J&K Rifles to continue in position on Rohi Nala, as in Phase 1.[25]
The situation was not good on the Southern Axis as the 13th Dogra attacking astride the Khem Karan—Ganda Singhwala met with a similar fate. The heroics of the defense are largely attributed to the 7th Punjab and the 52nd Brigade and their tale of heroics is not the topic of this research. The attack by the Indian Force faced severe difficulties and both Phase 3 and Phase 2 were thrown to the bin. Any advantage that the 4th Mountain Brigade had gained was subsequently reversed and areas captured were abandoned.
The 106th Brigade records the outbreak of hostilities on the left flank,
“BM was woken up at 0345 hours by Adjutant 1st EB (East Bengal) and informed of the shelling noise from the direction of Bedian Rangers Posts…. Within minutes information about enemy attack all along the front was received from the units….. The enemy attacks came at three placed i.e Bedian, Pannunwan and Ballanwala… All three places were attacked by about a battalion each supported by armour, artillery and air….. Our own troops not only repulsed the repeated enemy attacks but also managed to push the enemy back from the far bank of the canal at Pannunwan and its vicinity.” [29]
When the A Squadron 15 Lancers reached the HQ of 1st EB at Ibrahimabad, it was instructed by HQ to dispatch link troops to 7th Baluch for defence of Pannuwan bridge. The rest of the squadron reached the Bedian Headworks area at 1500 hours of 6th September where B Company 1st EB was in defence. The tanks were in positioned by Major Aziz ur Rehman by last light. The Bedian area remained under constant shelling during the day. According to the 15th Lancer War account,
“Around midnight 6-7 September the enemy launched a determined infantry assault to capture the headworks. Tanks of number 1 link troop along with B Company of 1st East Bengal Regiment immediately engaged the enemy and beat off the attack with heacy losses to the enemy. The Presence of tanks on the far east bank and their use at night came as a complete surprise to the enemy…” [30]
The enemy had attacked the bedian headwork with the 17th Rajput belonging to the 7th Indian Division which was operating on the Khalra—Barki Axis. The tank attack at Waigal is described to having been launched at 1135 Hours with approx. a squadron. 106th Brigade diary credits Pakistan artillery with the destruction of one of these tanks opposite Waigal. HQ 106th Brigade was also subjected to shelling and starfing on 6th September. The Brigade HQ was shifted from the Katlohi Khurd barely 2000 yards west of the bridge at Pannuwan to Bholeke which was further west. The bridge near Pannuwan, which had been attacked by the 4th Grenadier Indian had been attacked in vain as Brig. Nawazish Ali, commander of the 106th had ordered this bridge and the one south of Chathanwala to be demolished.
Yet among the troops of the 11th Division that were the most hard-pressed, none stood near the 1st EB which was deployed to hold the area from Bedian to Waigal. The task of destroying the Bedian Headworks had been given to the 7th Indian Division’s 19th Rajput. The attack began at dawn of 6th September, B company of 1st EB and A squadron of 15th Lancers deployed around the Headworks were repeatedly attacked by the Indians during the first three days of the war. However, the enemy was kept at bay by the sheer determination and resilience of the defenders and this coupled with an ingenious plan effected during the night of 6-7 September. The Upper Bari doab Canal aka UBDC is a pre-partition channel which enters Pakistan northeast of Bedian between the village of Jahman and Dal. It was dry ever since the signing of the Indus Water Treaty and hence offered no obstacle to an invading force. The Bengal force shut all the sluice gates except those for the BRBL Canal, affecting a dam which forced the overflowing water to flood the UBDC. The left bank of the UBDC was now breached at a point close to its junction with the BRBL Canal to inundate the area towards Chathanwala. The enemy was shown that they would not be able to take the sector without a fight. On the night of 8-9 September, the enemy launched a two-pronged attack towards Bedian Headworks; one of these came from the direction of Jahman and the other frontally. Number 2 Link Troop of A squadron 15 Lancers which had bogged down near Katlohi Inspection Bungalow on 6th September, extricated itself on the 8th and rejoined its parent squadron at Bedian, just in time to augment the defenses. These attacks were successfully repulsed. On 9th September, D Company of 13th Baluch, (on its return from Kharian on the 7th ) was moved from Luliani to Bhoja on the UBDC and placed under the command of the Bengal Battalion as reserve. As the enemy was repulsed and failures at other sectors, the enemy attacks slowly decreased.
The hopes of the 4th Mountain Division to gain its objectives died with the setting sun. As darkness fell, panic began to creep into the indian ranks as Pakistan accurately bombarded their positions. K.C Paraval writes,
“Opposite Ballanwala, caught in the Rohi Nala by the deadly fire of the defenders and denied support of its own artillery, an unwilling 7th Grenadiers wavered and began to fall back until the battalion reached Valtoha, 10000 yards east of the border in small parties.” [31]
The 13th Dogras fared no different as stated,
“..during the night (6-7 September) Pakistan shelling proved too much for the Dogras and they even abandoned their firm base that has been established earlier at the Sutlej Rangers Post. The battalion had practically disintegrated." [32]
The fate of the 9th J&K was no different. It was time to counter-attack and this task was given to Lt. Col Fateh Khan, Co of the 2nd FF who was given the task to establish a bridgehead across Rohi Nala by 2300 Hours on the night of 6-7 September. The area allotted for this attack was the site selected for bridgehead fell in the area left vacant by the 62nd Mountain Brigade, the area between the customs post on the Kasur-Khem Karan and the village Mainwala Uttar. The enemy picture was unknown to the FF so they had no idea that the area was actually empty. The plan had two phases. The first phase was to create a horse-shoe bridgehead by Company A and Company D whereas in the second phase were to enlarge the bridgehead to include the second railway culvert and the track Mainwala Uttar. To the events unfolded namely the initial assaults across Khem Karan, make no mention of the presence of the 1st EBR. The regiment was still at the BRBL Canal at its line of defense whereas the strike force, Gul, Ali and Shabbir were in Khem Karan. They were not part of the initial strike force. Thus the invasion of Bhura Karimpur, Punjab Police HQ and further inward assaults are not needed to be researched for this paper.
Between the 10th and 17th of September, the Bengal Tigers, as the regiment was called, adjusted their defenses. D company was taken out of Waigal and ordered to deploy all its three platoons on the UBDC to guard the routes leading to Jahman, Theh Charolean and Kirka. In order to divert the enemy’s attention from Khem Karan, General Hamid had ordered the 106th Brigade to undertake small actions inside the Indian Territory. Accordingly, the 1st EB ordered its three companies on the BRBL Canal to probe forward by sending out patrols and screen positions. The Bengal Tigers first occupied the vacant Sutlej Rangers post on the border and then the deserted village Palos and an Indian border post opposite Rajoke. The Bengali B company having been under enemy attacks directed at the Bedian Headworks since 6th September was interchanged with their C company at Lil. During the remainder of the conflict, the Bengalis and the Indians opposite them vied for positions of local tactical advantage however the Bengali Tigers performed superbly and B company of the same crept some distance inside Indian territory in Thatti Jaimal Singh area and was placed under the 7th Baluch for ease of command.
With the success of the defense of the headwork and forward positioning of 1st East Bengal west of Thatti Jaimal Singh, the 106th Brigade southern battalion, 7th Baluch had been ordered to capture Kalia-Sankhatra sector as early as 8th September but the attack was not launched due to lack of offensive infantry units, a problem that had shown in the battles of Khem Karan. On 11th September, B Company of 7th Baluch was placed under the 1st EB and was to comb the area north of Bedian between the two canals and evict Indian troops suspected to have infiltrated there however this was unfounded since no enemy was to be found and B company returned to its own battalion and occupied positions in Waigal which has been vacated by D company of 1st EB. After securing the positions, attacks were launched into the Indian territory and by 15th September, 7th Baluch captured the twin villages of Kalia-Sankhatra in conjunction with the 1st EBR and initially positioned their own D company around them. Two troops of the 24th Cavalry were moved to strengthen this position. After which the 1st EBR remained in that position having not only defended the BRBL line but repulsing the enemy across the border and capturing enemy territory to create a secure forward position.
It speaks volumes to the determination of the men of the 11th Division that they hastily prepared half-occupied defenses and in such a proper formation that the enemy believed that either Pakistan had prepared a massive counter-force already[33] or there was a tunnel from which the Pakistani force was ferried into the battlefield[34]. Needless to say both are wrong since there was no tunnel of any sort and there was no overwhelming force as evidenced by the accounts and formation of the 11th Division. The nearest armoured infantry was around Raiwind and as for tanks, none were allotted to the 52nd Brigade until 2000 hours on 7th September. It is a testament to the bravery and professionalism to the men of the 11th Division and their commanders who did not panic and counterattacked immediately to break down the Indian assault. Much can be written on the reasons behind the failure of the 4th Mountain Division but that is for another day. For a formation that was barely six months old, the 11th Division had acquitted itself well in the opening battle of the war. It had withstood a very strong assault and not only did it defend its position, it retook the area lost and pushed the enemy back into its own territory and while the trial by fire for the 11th Division continued as it entered the areas of Khem Karan, the tale of the East Bengal Regiment would end here. They remained in their position till the ceasefire of 23rd September. The Indian Army tried to evict the Pakistan forces in the sector but they remained in their positions. Each attack was pushed away. In the battles around the Khem Karan, many brave Pakistani soldiers and Officers sacrificed their lives to alter the course of the war. On the last day of the war, the steadfastness and stout-heartedness of the infantry, the indomitable courage of 6th Lancers and 24th cavalry, and the constancy and consistency of artillery shattered the Myths of Khem Karan.[35]
It is a misconception that the events at Khem Karan ended after the Pakistani Assault and the Battle of Asal Uttar. It was merely the start of the battles of Khem Karan. Neither Side rested and both repeatedly locked horns in intense battles to gain the ground. For the Pakistanis, it was clear that either they fight the Indians at their territory at Khem Karan or they would fight the Indians at the BRBL canal on their own. For the Indian side, the presence of the Pakistani Force at Khem Karan was a dagger that had to be removed. No day nor night went without an assault and even in the day before the ceasefire, the artillery bombarded each other killing. The brief moment to be an eternity where many did not live to see the sunrise of the 23rd of September.
The East Bengali Regiment was a newly formed unit. It was neither battle tested nor were the mean of the Regiment borne of those that spoke of Martial history. It was the moment for the Bengalis to prove that the concept that only select races could fight and Bengalis could not, was not only wrong but an obstacle for Pakistan to realize its true military potential. It is said that Colonel Osmani, then a senior Bengali officer, often known as Papa Tiger, hastily addressed the assembled officers and men of the Bengal Regiment and ended his passionate speech with the following,
“Here is your chance of a lifetime. Show them what stuff you are made of!!” [36]
He did not refer just to Indians but to Pakistanis as well who did not think much of this newly raised regiment. Their bravery and effort in defending Pakistan could not be understated and whilst they won 12 Gallantry Awards, their story was removed from history. In this microscopic effort to unveil the performance of EBR, we saw the crucial role they played in the defense of West Pakistan. It is a sad thing that only 6 years later this brave regiment, which fought with Pakistani soldiers against the Indian Army, would stand shoulder to shoulder against the same enemy in opposition to their Pakistani brethren and the only ones that can be blamed in such a sad turn of events, is the one that turned Stranger in its own country.
[1] A Stranger in my own country 1969-1971 Maj.Gen.Rtd Khadim Hussain Raja
[2] 1965 war; A view from the East by Mumtaz Iqbal, Article at Rediff News Dated 05/10/2005
[3] The 1965 Indo-Pakistan war by Lt-Gen Mahmud Ahmed
[4] Russel Brines, Indo Pakistan Conflict published 1968
[5] Lt. Gen Kaul B.M Confrontation with Pakistan Published 1971
[6] Brig. Inam ul haq interview on 10th august 1978 at the command and staff college, Quetta.
[7] Lt. gen Bakhtiar Rana’s Interview on 23rd and 24th August 1978 at the command and staff college, Quetta.
[8] Brig. Afzal Khan’s Interview on 12th October 1978, at command and staff college, Quetta
[9] Indo-Pak war 1965-Conduct of Operation 10th Division
[10] Maj.General Malik Sher Bahadur, CGS 1965, Interview on 13th and 14th November 1977 at command and staff college, Quetta
[11] Maj.Gen Naseer Ahmed GOC 1st Armoured Division Interview on 16th June 1978 at the command and staff college, Quetta
[12] Chronology of events 11th Division Letter No. 0101/8/gs dated 31st May 1966
[13] 52nd Brigade—Operations Letter no
[14] Account of 11 Division’s battle Letter No. 0101/8/GS dated 31st May 1966
[15] Ibid 13
[16] 106 Brigade war diary.
[17] Izzat o Iqbal by Maj. Gen Shaukat Riza Published 1980
[18] Ibid 13
[19] Ibid 16
[20] Ibid 16
[21] The red eagles, History of the Fourth Division of India by K.C Paraval Published 1982
[22] The battle of Rohi Nala, Article by Lt. col syed shirazie
[23] Ibid K. C Praval
[24] History of the Regiment of Artillery Indian Army by Maj. Gen Palit Published 1972
[25] War Despatches—Indo-Pak Conflict 1965 by Lt. Gen Harbaksh singh
[26] Ibid History of Indian Artillery
[27] Ibid 26
[28] Ibid 26
[29] Ibid 106th Brigade War diaries
[30] 15th Lancers war account6-23 September 1965
[31] Ibid K.C Paraval
[32] Ibid History of Indian Artillery
[33] 1965 war-role of tanks in Indian-Pakistan war of 1965 by Bhupinder Singh Published 1982
[34] Ibid russel brines who states that the Indians state that they had such an extensive force because they had built a secret tunnel beneath the waterway.
[35] Ibid Mahmud Ahmed
[36] The myths of martial race, Article by Dr. Adbul Momin Chowdhury
All Maps are Courtesy of book the Indo-Pakistan War 1965 by Mahmud ahmed
