If it had been realistic to produce around 160–170 Özgür-II upgrades by 2028/29 and bring the majority of the F-16 fleet up to this standard in a timely manner, there would have been no need for Eurofighters as an interim solution from Qatar, Oman or the UK.
In such a scenario, some 220–230 modernised F-16s to the Özgür II standard, supplemented by 50–60 Kızılelma and Anka-3 drones, would be able to largely bridge the capability gap until the KAAN with TF-35000 reaches series production (from around 2033/34).
In addition, systems such as the Hürjet, TB2/TB3, K2 loitering UAVs, Anka-S, Aksungur and Akinci would take on a significant proportion of missions by 2033/34+ – both independently and in conjunction with other assets. This creates a transitional capability which, whilst not perfect, is operationally sufficient given that Kizilelma and Anka 3 would also be available.
In combination with existing air defence systems such as Korkut, Gürz, Sungur, Hisar, Siper, extensive drone swarms and a broad arsenal of ground-to-ground and stand-off weapons (TRG/TRLG series, Bora, Tayfun Block 1–4, Kara ATMACA etc.), a networked overall picture emerges by 2028/29+. This is difficult to neutralise, as a large proportion of the weapons can also be deployed from the air and from deep within our own territory with ranges of 500+ km, e.g. SOM, IHA 300 & Co.
Bottom line: Whilst the situation is not ideal, it is significantly more robust than is often portrayed – particularly thanks to the combination of manned aircraft, drones and long-range precision weapons operating in concert.
The only thing that worries me is how quickly the upgrade process will be implemented for the F-16, and whether we can produce enough disposable K2 kamikaze drones – 600–800 units – to prevent a cordon forming around us, as the French and Israelis are beginning to transfer equipment to the Aegean Sea around Cyprus and, because of Iran, have the opportunity to make arguments, however flimsy they may seem.