Are small fighters practical on carriers without catapults? India abandoned the idea of using their navalised version of Tejas because the load it could carry was too limited for the aircraft to be useful.
Indian navy had found a long time ago that operating a single engine light fighter from an Aircraft carrier with limited payload and Range is a terrible idea with the whole NLCA program itself. Navy now wants 56 rafale m and only wants tejas naval as a trainer aircraft.
Both of these are worth addressing together because they're related but they conflate two separate questions: Why Tejas Naval struggled structurally, and what role light platforms should play in a carrier air wing. On the aerodynamic side first. India's issue with Tejas Naval wasn't primarily payload: it was approach speed, and payload limitation was a downstream consequence of that. The aircraft's delta wing without leading-edge slats produces a CLmax in the 1.4–1.6 range. Running the carrier approach speed formula: Vapp = 1.3 x √[ (2W) / (ρ . S . CLmax) ]
At a realistic recovery weight of ~8,500 kg, wing area ~38 m², CLmax ~1.5, Tejas Naval's approach speed comes out around 150–155 knots. INS Vikrant's certified recovery limit sits at approximately 140-145 knots. That's the core problem, not the hardpoints. Because the aircraft had to recover light to stay within that envelope, usable payload at recovery became severely constrained. IMHO It's an aerodynamic problem wearing a payload mask.
A conventional swept wing with full high-lift devices typically achieves CLmax values in the 2.0–2.2 range in approach configuration, a reasonable design target for a navalised platform of this class. For a navalized Hürjet at ~7,000 kg recovery weight, ~25 m² wing area, CLmax ~2.0:
Vapp ≈ 118–122 knots, quite likely inside any STOBAR carrier's recovery envelope, with meaningful payload still on the rails.
Now, the broader point about payload and range from a ski-jump deck. This is a real constraint and worth being honest about, but it's also frequently overstated. A 12degree ramp doesn't just redirect the aircraft upward, it decouples the climb and acceleration phases. At ramp exit the aircraft already has a vertical velocity component, so the engine's full thrust goes toward accelerating to flying speed rather than fighting gravity simultaneously. The practical result is that a STOBAR platform can achieve a safe departure at a meaningfully lower TWR than a flat-deck rolling takeoff would require, operationally the 0.72–0.78 band is well-established across existing STOBAR types, which opens up more of the payload envelope than the raw weight numbers suggest at first glance.
On the fuel side specifically, this is where engine selection actually matters beyond raw thrust. The EJ200's specific fuel consumption sits at approximately 0.74–0.76 lb/lbf/hr in cruise compared to the F404's ~0.84 lb/lbf/hr. On a platform in Hürjet's weight class with roughly 2,400–2,600 kg internal fuel capacity, that SFC difference translates to a meaningful combat radius improvement, roughly 15% better fuel economy at cruise, which on a 500 nm profile is not a trivial number. Add a single 1,100L centerline drop tank and you're looking at a combat radius in the 500–600 nm range in a hi-lo-hi profile operationally relevant for most Mediterranean threat scenarios.
And here's the part that the Indian Navy story actually illustrates rather than contradicts: the Indian Navy's solution was not to abandon light naval aviation, it was to separate roles. 26 Rafale M for the heavy combat lift, Tejas Naval as the trainer and currency platform. That's a rational division of labor, and it's almost exactly the architecture being discussed for MUGEM. A navalized Hürjet doesn't need to be the Rafale M. It needs to fill the gap, train the pilots, and handle the missions within its envelope, while KAAN Naval matures into the primary combat platform.
About carrier based Hürjet, I am starting to have doubts regarding how much of a Hürjet will that be, just aside from obivious design changes
A LCA might be a complementary aircraft for a larger naval aviation fleet but ours is not that large. We have one bet and I don't think Hürjet with LCA-level capabilities is a big enough card. The carrier-based Hürjet will likely end up being way larger (And this is not only wing area) as it is supposed to be the main combat aircraft for MUGEM.
So, even one EJ200 might not cut it for what is in works.
I will try to get an answer on that matter when I go to SAHA EXPO next week.
This is probably the most technically substantive concern for all of us, and it deserves an honest answer. First, the TWR picture across realistic mission profiles. Using EJ200 afterburner thrust at 90 kN and a navalised Hürjet empty weight estimate of ~6,700 kg (baseline ~6,200 kg plus a conservative 500 kg STOBAR penalty):
| Configuration | Fuel | Payload | Gross Weight | TWR |
| CAP / Light load | 60% internal (~1,440 kg) | 2x Gökdoğan + 4x Bozdoğan (~900 kg) | ~9,000 kg | ~1.01 |
| CAP / Extended | 80% internal + 1x drop tank (~2,700 kg) | same as CAP | ~10,300 kg | ~0.90 |
| ASuW / Strike | 100% internal (2,400 kg) | 2x Atmaca + 2x drop tanks + EO pod (~3,350 kg) | ~12,450 kg | ~0.74 |
Also, need to add, one more variable worth factoring in: the navalisation weight penalty isn't fixed. Hürjet is already a composite-heavy platform, and if the structural reinforcement package, is engineered from the outset in thermoplastic composites rather than conventional aluminium alloys, the same structural targets can be met at roughly 20–25% lower weight for those components. PEEK and PPS-based thermoplastics also offer superior moisture and corrosion resistance compared to thermoset composites, which is a relevant double advantage in a naval operating environment. The non-optimizable portion of the penalty, -arresting hook assembly, corrosion protection systems, folding mechanism actuators- remains largely fixed. But on a realistic best-case basis, this pushes the total navalisation penalty toward the 350–400 kg range rather than the 500+ kg conservative estimate, which keeps the CAP configuration TWR comfortably above 1.10 even at standard fuel loads.
The 0.74 TWR in the heaviest configuration is within STOBAR departure parameters, MiG-29K routinely operates in this band from INS Vikramaditya. The ski-jump geometry handles the rest as discussed above.
Now, the single-engine question more broadly. The concern is legitimate for a
primary strike platform operating at the heavy end of that table consistently. A twin-engine configuration would obviously improve both the payload-range envelope and the single-engine-failure survivability picture over water, both real considerations for a carrier-based aircraft. Nobody's going to pretend otherwise.
But here's the framing that matters: the question isn't whether a twin-engine naval platform would be preferable in an ideal world. Of course it would. The question is what's achievable within a realistic development window. India's (which is usually our main reference source on this subject) own TEDBF 'Twin Engine Deck Based Fighter' is essentially the acknowledgment that Tejas Naval hit its single-engine ceiling and a clean-sheet twin is needed for the primary strike role. That program is currently projecting a first flight around 2030s and carrier qualification well into the late 2030s. Turkiye doesn't have a parallel twin-engine LCA program at any stage of development currently.
So the realistic choice isn't single-engine Hürjet Naval versus some twin-engine alternative that already exists. It's single-engine Hürjet Naval in the 2030s versus nothing fixed-wing until KAAN Naval qualifies, which on an optimistic timeline is mid-to-late 2030s at the absolute earliest, and KAAN Naval itself hasn't been formally launched as a program yet. A single-engine platform that's actually there is operationally more valuable than a twin-engine platform that isn't.
The "how much of a Hürjet will it be" question is also interesting because it cuts both ways. Yes, a navalised variant with a larger wing, reinforced structure, folding wingtips and a new engine is meaningfully different from the baseline aircraft. But that's also exactly how the MiG-29K relates to the MiG-29, how the F/A-18C relates to the YF-17, how the Rafale M relates to the Rafale C. Naval derivatives are always substantially evolved platforms. IMHO That evolution doesn't make them a different aircraft, it makes them a mature one.
