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India Historical Indian War History Thread
- Thread starter Jackdaws
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Apologies, @hellfire2006.
Are you the old @hellfire in a new avatar, or someone completely different?
26th Kargil Vijay Diwas: Indian Army honours the families of Kargil war heroes in special outreach programme
As part of the 26th Kargil Vijay Diwas commemorations, the Indian Army launched a nationwide outreach initiative to honour the valour and sacrifices of the Kargil War heroes and express heartfelt gratitude to their Next of Kin (NoK). This meaningful effort was not only a tribute to the fallen heroes but also a reaffirmation of the Army's enduring bond with their families.
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https://www.hindustantimes.com/htci...ecial-outreach-programme-101751701655217.html26th Kargil Vijay Diwas: Indian Army honours the families of Kargil war heroes in special outreach programme - Hindustan Times
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The operation, involving the 2nd Battalion of the Indian Army's Parachute Regiment (2 Para) is often regarded as one of the largest - if not the largest - airborne operation following World War II.
Tangail Airdrop - Wikipedia
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The operation, involving the 2nd Battalion of the Indian Army's Parachute Regiment (2 Para) is often regarded as one of the largest - if not the largest - airborne operation following World War II.
Tangail Airdrop - Wikipedia
en.wikipedia.org
A random fun fact, I read somewhere Indian paratroopers later eat paratha with mukti bahini soldiers.
JOYDEEPGHOSH
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Film 120 Bahadur & Battle of Rezang La (Updated)
Film 120 Bahadur & Battle of Rezang La (Updated)
A. 120 Bahadur 120 Bahadur or 120 बहादुर (transl. 120 Bravehearts) is an upcoming Indian Hindi-language historical war film dir...
rbt-defense.blogspot.com
The 1965 Airborne Fiasco: How Pakistani SSG Commandos Were Captured by Punjab Farmers, Police, and NCC Cadets
On the night of September 6–7, 1965, the Special Services Group (SSG) of the Pakistan Army launched a clandestine airborne operation code-named to target three major Indian Air Force (IAF) bases: Pathankot, Adampur, and Halwara.
1. The Flawed Plan
The Mission: About 180 elite SSG commandos were split into three groups of ~60 and dropped via C-130 Hercules aircraft. Their objective was to infiltrate the perimeter, destroy fighter jets on the tarmac, blow up radar installations, and disable fuel dumps.
Flawed Execution: Rushed without proper inter-service coordination, the drops were executed hastily. According to Pakistani military historian Air Commodore Kaiser Tufail (Retd.), around 40% of the planned trained force was missing (already deployed in Jammu & Kashmir), forcing last-minute troop stitching. Topographical maps used were outdated, and no extraction plan was set up to bring them back across the border.
2. Scattered Drops & Early Alarm
Instead of landing inside or right next to the airbases under cover of night, aircraft dropped the paratroopers miles off-target into open fields, sugarcane crops, and near residential villages.
As parachutes drifted down around 2:30 AM, barking dogs and heavy drops alerted the local Punjabi villagers.
3. The Local Response
Rather than engaging frontline Indian Army combat units, the elite commandos found themselves surrounded by an improvised local coalition:
Punjabi Villagers & Farmers: Local villagers armed themselves with lathis (wooden staffs), axes, farming tools, and licensed shotguns. They formed search parties, combed sugarcane fields, and cornered paratroopers hiding in ditches or tube-well huts.
Punjab Armed Police (PAP) & NCC Cadets: Local police stations and National Cadet Corps (NCC) units mobilized immediately. Cadets and police officers set up road blocks and swept the countryside.
Army Support Units: Non-combat support elements nearby—including the Army Transport Corps (muleteers)—joined the combing operations.
4. The Final Breakdown
Out of the ~180 SSG commandos dropped:
~138 Captured: Over three-quarters of the force was rounded up and sent to POW camps (including almost all operational commanders and officers).
22 Killed: In skirmishes during civilian and police search operations.
~20 Escaped: Only a small group from the Pathankot drop (which was closest to the International Border) managed to slip back into Pakistan.
Primary Sources & Documentation
1. Pakistani Military Analyses:
Air Commodore Kaiser Tufail (PAF): Detailed in his historical write-up "The Fateful Para-Commando Assault - 1965 War", pointing out how missing manpower, lack of aerial recon, and absent retrieval plans led to a complete failure.
Lt. Gen. (Retd) Mahmud Ahmed (Pakistan Army): Documented in his 1965 war analysis (republished in DAWN newspaper), outlining the dispersion of troops into irrigation channels and sugarcane fields around Adampur and Halwara.
Brigadier Z. A. Khan (SSG): Detailed in his memoir "The Way It Was", citing outdated maps and flawed intelligence as major factors.
2. Official Records & News Reports:
Ministry of Defence Archives (History of the Indo-Pak War 1965): Records the ground mobilization of the Punjab Armed Police, NCC units, and civilian search parties in round-up operations.
Media Reports (The Tribune, The Print): Contemporary and historical retrospectives detailing the civilian involvement in cornering the paratroopers.
On the night of September 6–7, 1965, the Special Services Group (SSG) of the Pakistan Army launched a clandestine airborne operation code-named to target three major Indian Air Force (IAF) bases: Pathankot, Adampur, and Halwara.
1. The Flawed Plan
The Mission: About 180 elite SSG commandos were split into three groups of ~60 and dropped via C-130 Hercules aircraft. Their objective was to infiltrate the perimeter, destroy fighter jets on the tarmac, blow up radar installations, and disable fuel dumps.
Flawed Execution: Rushed without proper inter-service coordination, the drops were executed hastily. According to Pakistani military historian Air Commodore Kaiser Tufail (Retd.), around 40% of the planned trained force was missing (already deployed in Jammu & Kashmir), forcing last-minute troop stitching. Topographical maps used were outdated, and no extraction plan was set up to bring them back across the border.
2. Scattered Drops & Early Alarm
Instead of landing inside or right next to the airbases under cover of night, aircraft dropped the paratroopers miles off-target into open fields, sugarcane crops, and near residential villages.
As parachutes drifted down around 2:30 AM, barking dogs and heavy drops alerted the local Punjabi villagers.
3. The Local Response
Rather than engaging frontline Indian Army combat units, the elite commandos found themselves surrounded by an improvised local coalition:
Punjabi Villagers & Farmers: Local villagers armed themselves with lathis (wooden staffs), axes, farming tools, and licensed shotguns. They formed search parties, combed sugarcane fields, and cornered paratroopers hiding in ditches or tube-well huts.
Punjab Armed Police (PAP) & NCC Cadets: Local police stations and National Cadet Corps (NCC) units mobilized immediately. Cadets and police officers set up road blocks and swept the countryside.
Army Support Units: Non-combat support elements nearby—including the Army Transport Corps (muleteers)—joined the combing operations.
4. The Final Breakdown
Out of the ~180 SSG commandos dropped:
~138 Captured: Over three-quarters of the force was rounded up and sent to POW camps (including almost all operational commanders and officers).
22 Killed: In skirmishes during civilian and police search operations.
~20 Escaped: Only a small group from the Pathankot drop (which was closest to the International Border) managed to slip back into Pakistan.
Primary Sources & Documentation
1. Pakistani Military Analyses:
Air Commodore Kaiser Tufail (PAF): Detailed in his historical write-up "The Fateful Para-Commando Assault - 1965 War", pointing out how missing manpower, lack of aerial recon, and absent retrieval plans led to a complete failure.
Lt. Gen. (Retd) Mahmud Ahmed (Pakistan Army): Documented in his 1965 war analysis (republished in DAWN newspaper), outlining the dispersion of troops into irrigation channels and sugarcane fields around Adampur and Halwara.
Brigadier Z. A. Khan (SSG): Detailed in his memoir "The Way It Was", citing outdated maps and flawed intelligence as major factors.
2. Official Records & News Reports:
Ministry of Defence Archives (History of the Indo-Pak War 1965): Records the ground mobilization of the Punjab Armed Police, NCC units, and civilian search parties in round-up operations.
Media Reports (The Tribune, The Print): Contemporary and historical retrospectives detailing the civilian involvement in cornering the paratroopers.
On X and social media, I see lots of chatter on 1965 war. Meanwhile from Pak’s SEATO CENTO ally - USA CIA
https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/doc...ever,,(the Sialkot and Lahore sectors), but a.
https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/doc...ever,,(the Sialkot and Lahore sectors), but a.
