Maybe we can continue the topic here, if you'd like? It would be too much off topic in the other thread.This. China knows it cannot be both a land power and a sea power. The budget they have will be only be enough for a buildup in the Pacific, don't matter what vows china made before the invasion, they knew they'll not be able to divide their attention for a (land) war in Europe..Not without risking strategic competition with Washington in the Pacific.
Russia is by all account alone...
Seizing on Weakness: Allied Strategy for Competing With China’s Globalizing Military | CSBA
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First, composite land-sea powers cannot be very strong in the maritime and continental directions simultaneously over the long term. They must abide by the principle of strategic concentration, choosing clearly and decisively one orientation over the other. Second, land-sea powers are always in danger of being squeezed by hostile powers on the landward and seaward flanks concurrently. Indeed, two-front wars have invariably spelled disaster for past great powers. Third, land-sea powers must devote resources against liabilities and commitments in the continental and maritime directions. As such, they constantly run the risk of diluting scarce resources. Finally, high-quality leadership is essential for composite land-sea powers to navigate the geostrategic dangers.80
Liu Zhongmin, a professor at Shanghai International Studies University, draws similar lessons from his study of Imperial Germany, Tsarist Russia, and the Soviet Union. To him, Wilhelmine Germany’s “excessive worship” and “blind development” of seapower led Berlin to turn its back on its vital interests on the European continent. The Kaiser’s challenge to British naval supremacy led to the emergence of the Triple Entente between Britain, France, and Russia, a countervailing coalition on land and at sea that encircled Germany.81 Liu discerns similar strategic errors by Tsarist and Soviet leaders. Russia’s quest for seapower not only added an unnecessary burden to its existing landward commitments, but it also compelled great power competitors to form counterbalancing maritime-continental coalitions.82 Concurring, Gu Tianjiao of Jilin University cautions that composite land-sea powers must recognize and obey the limits imposed by natural geographic conditions. Countries that exceed those constraints, like Germany and Russia in the past, are likely to bring about misfortune.83
The modern chinese situation is even more complex than the historical examples of great powers trying to simultaneously have strong naval and land militaries. China borders 14 countries, which is as many as Russia does and the most in the world, with the major difference being that Russia borders only one other nuclear armed nation, whereas China borders 4. This results in vastly more possibilities for a conflict on land than the CCCP or Germany could have had, ergo a greater dilution of force than the other examples had to deal with. Germany also had the benefit of being allied to Austria-Hungary, the nation with which it shared the longest direct border, and the Soviet Union was able to build a protective shield of puppet regimes on it's most important border.
It's maritime boundaries, the SCS quagmire aside, are also relatively dangerous, with the constraints posed by the first and second island chain and the overwhelming sea and air power the US alone can bring to bear in an outright war, it's allies on top of that. In comparison to the german and russian/soviet example, these constraints were not as extreme. Russia had access to the open ocean during the summer time, and could build naval facilities on the pacific coast of the Kamchatka peninsula, whereas Germany wasn't as constrained by the North Sea as one would assume, as submarines still managed to easily penetrate the allied blockade. And submarines were an incredibly potent weapon in the great war, only that germany didn't use them to their fullest extent. In the second world war they even managed to overcome the north sea via the conquest of Norway and access to the open Atlantic via the bay of Biscay.