Question probably best directed to
@500
I am unsure to level of area domination needed in this particular environment for effective UAV strategy.
It is very different to anywhere in world given this whole area is pretty much one large nearly continuous urbanised area seeing what it is seeing....and covering what it is covering too.
i.e how much of these saturation launches are done from single platform (like a large truck or dedicated barrage launcher) versus multiple platforms (Smaller vehicles) involved in stockpiling and then gathering for launch quickly and intensely and nearby etc....for say rudimentary barrage launchers.
I mean in this case the thing is a truck, you put a tarp over it and it looks like any other goods truck. How many such goods truck exist in gaza and where, what are their regular patterns etc...can things be discriminated based on these etc.
To say get last few minutes of it (when it presents itself clearly as what it is) needs extreme amount of surveillance for feasible interdiction window....that too in urban areas.
I saw some videos barrage launchers from hamas propaganda video (out in more desert scrub rural area), I would assume those are more easily detectable by IDF....so they are probably not that much in use relative to the more mobile means.
In the end its known by IDF intel as to what they know, what they dont know and what is the optimal strategy from their end.
I am sure they have ballistics backtraced all known trajectories seen by their radars and iron dome etc....as to what are the launch site areas and if they are concentrated enough for area-domination + UAV strategy....and if not so, where that threshold would have to be done by IDF anyway (i.e say iron dome interceptors start to run low or get exhausted).
That latter part would need IDF mobilisation and ramp up to some kind of war theatre level I would assume....i.e iron dome is more or less designed for more regular setting and maybe cpl tiers above that to buy some time and buffer for resolution within that and reduce risks of larger conflict (that simply was not available to Israel before and thus lot of flareups turned highly violent before compared to post-iron dome).
But you go past it (say IDF intel misjudged level of raw materials like fertiliser that got through the smuggling networks anyway) and earlier pre-iron dome situation arrives anyway, so we would have to be prepared to see that.
But these are all closely guarded intel secrets etc, like who knows exactly how many iron dome interceptors IDF has, and at what tiers/reserves they have them organised w.r.t their strategy and doctrine.
In the end we have to wait and see how it plays out again.
