- Messages
- 1,209
- Reactions
- Nation of residence
-
- Nation of origin
-
HANDLING OF ARMOUR IN SCHOOLS OF INSTRUCTION
Handling of armour in schools of instruction also requires serious re-evaluation. During my stay in the School of Armour I observed that there were no fixed parameters or training guidelines at army level which regulated that institution. All depended on the commandant痴 personality. If there was a hard taskmaster like Sher Azam Malik everything went well but everything would suddenly transform once person 添� or 纏� came. As far as I know the school with few exceptions was a dumping ground for superseded or about to be superseded brigadiers, at least after 1971 with perhaps one or two odd exceptions. Naturally these commandants were on their way out and with few exceptions took more interest in preparing themselves for their future retired life! The same was true for instructors at Lieutenant Colonel level out of whom very few went beyond brigadier. Further the school痴 location being far away from both the armoured divisions did not allow integration of students doing courses in major armour training manoeuvres as is done in the Infantry School in Quetta. This school should be re-located somewhere in the desert in Cholistan or perhaps its outer fringes or in the Potohar plateau! This scribe in May-June 1993 had made a similar recommendation for the independent armoured squadron that he was commanding and was then stationed in Okara (through an official written letter held on record) to be shifted to the desert in Tamewali or Bahawalnagar. The recommendation made as part of unit points for the divisional conference was approved by Major General Zia ul Haq the General Officer Commanding the infantry division and implemented much to the chagrin of officers who later joined the new tank regiment raised from the Phoenix ashes of that squadron! Coming back to the main line of discussion there was no system of grading in the school and the powers of the officers in charge course, the chief instructor and the higher appointment holders to alter a tactical grading done by an instructor of major or colonel rank were not limited by any margin of plus one or two as was the practice in Infantry School. I don稚 know whether it has changed now from 1992.
The instructors posted after staff college to armour school were those majors who were not fit to be brigade majors or were there simply because no unit or other vacancy was available for them! This did not mean that these majors were not good since the system of assessment of staff college needs considerable revamping. The bad part was that these majors did not put up maximum hard work since they knew that the seal of relatively mediocre majors had been stamped on them and, however, hard they worked their chances for promotion beyond colonel rank were remote! Two buildings were completed in 1988-89 but these were hardly sufficient to meet the existing demands! The transparency of the system of grading could be gauged from the fact that the only two officers who got an alpha grade in tactical leg of the young officer痴 basic course were sons of serving generals! This scribe had the opportunity to see one of them during the basic course and was perplexed and surprised as to how he was graded alpha. On the other hand a retired three star general痴 son who had already managed a Bee Plus in the junior Staff Course (a far more tough affair than the mid career course) while his father was a serving three star general, was initially graded as Bee Minus in the Mid-Career Course whereas he certainly deserved a Bee! Later on I believe he was given a Bee, after much haggling as happened at Valtoha between 1 FF and 6 Lancers.
HIGHER ARMOUR OPERATIONAL COMMAND ORGANISATION
No major change in Pakistani higher armour command as earlier discussed in brief was made till 1987. In 1986-87 the older corps which contained both holding and striking formations were sub-divided into holding and striking corps. This arrangement although outwardly neat and superficially sound was essentially confusing and fallacious. It was regarding this change that this scribe pointed out in an article 的t is felt that during conduct of operations two formation commanders of equal rank commanding a holding and strike formation respectively in the same area of operations, cannot function effectively. Even during Exercise Zarb-e-Momin this aspect was not put to trial. Training of holding and strike formations needs to be integrated thus meriting a unified operational command vested in the person of one officer of the rank of lieutenant general. The change may require creation of Army Headquarters in certain operational areas�.94
The arrangement of holding and striking corps without any higher co-ordinating headquarter was a recipe for confusion and disaster as I witnessed while serving in a holding corps, once I personally saw the lack of communication and co-ordination in training and cooperation between the concerned strike and holding corps. Thus, I was motivated to write another article in which this scribe痴 recommendations for establishing a co-ordinating headquarters for the holding and striking corps were seconded by the worthy editor of the Citadel Magazine as ones which 田ertainly merits consideration�.95 The rationale on which these recommendations were based were: 典he concept of holding and striking formation also needs reappraisal....the bifurcation in terms of offensive and defensive role, while outwardly neat and theoretically sound is historically without a successful precedent. The issue could have been resolved in exercise Zarb-e-Momin in 1989 by subjecting it to the friction of a rigorous training manoeuvre�.96 典he shield and the spear or the hammer and the anvil can function effectively only if one head synchronises and co-ordinates their operational functions. As they say that too many cooks spoil the broth, the two formations fighting the same battle in the same operational area cannot fully realise their combat potential unless a headquarter regulates their operations.How can one main headquarters 200 or 400 miles in the rear, with loads of other matters to take care of, effectively co-ordinate the operations of a hammer and anvil�.97 典he need for an army headquarters to co-ordinate and effectively command the holding and strike corps is an indispensable necessity�.98 I believe that there has been some progress since these recommendations which are on record were made in 1998. All credit, however, goes to then commandant Major General Amjad and his team who published these two above quoted articles. Had these been written in 1987 or 1988 no editor would have dared to publish them. 99
POOR INTER-ARM/INTER- UNIT COOPERATION AND LACK OF DIVISIONAL SPIRIT
Poor inter-arm cooperation seriously retarded the combat potential of the Pakistan Armoured Corps right from 1947. This was the worst British legacy that both the Indo-Pak armies inherited. A British observer in WW Two noted that 妬n the training of the armoured division, I stressed the need for co-operation of all arms in battle. One had to check a pernicious doctrine which had grown up in recent years, aided by certain civilian writers, that tank units were capable of winning an action without the assistance of other arms. The Chief agent in debunking this and many other fallacies of our pre-war pundits were the German�.100 The secret of the German Blitzkrieg tactics which revolutionised warfare lay in intimate inter-arm cooperation. The US concept of Combined Arms Teams is actually the old German inter-arm cooperation within the Panzer Division concept 層ine in new bottles�. The British tanks in WW II on the other hand repeatedly failed to function effectively because of poor inter-arm cooperation based on inter-unit rivalry and excess of regimentation. The Pakistan Army inherited this disease and this disease instead of getting reduced became more pronounced after 1947. The army remained infantry dominated since all the chiefs from 1948 to 1972 were from infantry. From 1977 to 1988 the army remained armour dominated and preference in promotion was given to those close to Zia. Poor inter-arm cooperation led to serious operational failures in Khem Karan and in Grand Slam in 1965 and at Bara Pind in 1971. The similarity between the lack of infantry tank cooperation in Grand Slam and in Khem Karan and those of similar incidents in the case of British infantry and tanks at Gazala etc is remarkable. Even when I was commissioned in 11 Cavalry in March 1983, 29 Cavalry (in which this scribe later served for some time) being a new unit was regarded as second among equals, 7 FF the mechanised infantry unit of our brigade was viewed as an enemy and 15 SP the artillery unit was despised and considered too insignificant even to be considered an enemy. The Supply and Transport unit was regarded as a bunch of untouchables! The EME was not liked but feared, for their nuisance value in inspections, though secretly despised. It was out of question to visit the messes of these units and my friendship with an officer of 7 FF was viewed by many seniors as disloyalty to the regiment! Officers from armoured regiments were mostly friendly with officers from other armoured regiments. It was rare that any officer of the infantry division met any officer of the armoured division in Kharian.
Even within the very small armoured corps of the 1950s and 1960s there were glaring differences from regiment to regiment. There were regiments with a much higher representation in the top hierarchy dating from 1947 and there were fatherless regiments who had done well in war but had no patrons beyond the brigadier rank. The negative factor here for the armoured corps was the fact that while the regiment in infantry had a much larger number of units like the Punjab and FF group, each armoured regiment was as different from each other as France from Germany and an officer from any tank regiment only believed in patronising his very own regiment!
Parallels can be found in battle of Bir El Gubi in 1941 where the 22 Armoured Brigade frontally charged the Italians with the support of just one battery of 25 Pounders 101 and failed to capture it suffering in the process huge losses and in the Battle of Bara Pind where Pakistan痴 8 Armoured Brigade did a similar thing. The German tank general and illustrious staff officer Von Mellenthin noted this failing when he said, 鍍heir commanders would not concentrate tanks and guns for a co-ordinated battle�.102
On the other hand notorious examples of non-cooperation in 1965 and 1971 wars can be compared with the conduct of the British armour at Gazala in 1942 when the 2nd Highland infantry was destroyed by German tanks while a superior British tank force merely looked on, or in the case of the 1/6th Rajputana Rifles who were abandoned to German Panzers simply because the British armour had to go into leaguer!103
One of the most notorious examples of lack of inter-arm co-operation took place in Chawinda when first the Indian tanks withdrew from Jassoran-Buttur Dograndi-Sodreke area on their own104, and later when Indian tanks ordered to re-attack the same area later were not informed about the failure of the last night痴 infantry attack!105 An Indian general frankly admitted this lack of inter arm cooperation when he said, 典here were misunderstandings galore between the infantry and armour commanders in the second battle of Chawinda. A lack of rapport seems to be the only explanation..�.106 This lack of cooperation was something like 13th century inter-arm and individual rivalry which led to the failure of the Crusaders or the Mongols against the Mamelukes.Toynbee the great historian thus wrote, 鍍he individual Mongol champion was promptly overcome by the disciplined heavy cavalry of the Egyptian Mamlukes (mostly kidnapped slaves of Slav/European origin converted to Islam after being bought by the Kurds etc). These had given warning of the supremacy of their technique at the Battle of Mansurah in AD 1250, when Frankish army of Saint Louis had paid a disastrous penalty for the thoughtless individualism of its knights, each anxious for personal honour at the expense of the disciplined formation�.107 I can state with confidence that as late as 1993 that almost each tank regiment (having seen five tank regiments and one tank squadron) or infantry regiment behaved at least symbolically like these thirteenth century knights described by Toynbee, at least in garrisons and on field manoeuvres! I am sure that the Indian army being the chip of the same block and led by as mediocre and orders oriented men is no different! At least in strength of reservoirs of mediocrity the subcontinent consists of men belonging to one nation!
THE CAVALRY CHARGE TRADITION
The Armoured Corps inherited a typically British cavalry charge tradition, an irrational urge of being 澱rave to the point of foolhardiness�.108 The Indians suffered from a similar malady and lost many tanks in attacks delivered in a cavalry charge manner at Gadgor, Phillora, Buttur, Dograndi, Sodreke, etc. Brigadier Riaz ul Karim who was sent as Deputy GOC of 6 Armoured Division described these encounters as 適abbadi Matches�. Riaz thus observed 典he normal practice on both sides was to despatch one armoured regiment at a time to probe and infiltrate (with infantry following) and the other side reacted with launching one of their own armoured regiments to stop and destroy that force. With this type of battle, there were heavy tank casualties on both sides�.109 Riaz states that 典he first thing that I did was to stop the 銭abbadi Game� i.e for one regiment sailing into the blues and coming back with a bloody nose�.110
NATURE OF EMPLOYMENT IN WW TWO AND INFLUENCE OF CONSERVATIVE BRITISH DOCTRINE
In all fairness the nature of Indian Army痴 employment as far as the armoured corps was concerned did not make things any easier for the armoured corps of both the countries. The Indian Armoured Corps was either employed in a screen/scout role or in conditions where their opponent as in Burma was vastly inferior both numerically and quantitatively in number of tanks. Indians were not groomed for higher ranks and even the British despite better education superior literacy level and technically and qualitatively superior position did not produce a single good tank commander at any level higher than tank regiment. No wonder that they failed the Germans in France and North Africa from 1940 till 1942 when finally the scales were turned, not because of better generalship but by virtue of overwhelming numerical superiority. Further the conservative British tank doctrine which both the armies inherited and made no effort to change that armour commanders beyond unit level remained as mediocre as they were on the British side in WW II. It is no credit to the quality of British armoured corps that General Mellenthin who saw the British Army as its direct opponent for some two years noted that � The British Artillery was the best trained and best commanded element in the British Army�.111
MISCELLANEOUS PSYCHOLOGICAL HANGUPS
The armoured corps of 1947 inherited many psychological hang-ups. The subconscious emphasis inherited from the British was on being an 殿rm of fashion and wealth� 殿ffected carelessness� and worst of all 殿n arrogant non-chalance towards the duller aspects of their work�.112 During a winter collective which this scribes unit had to conduct for another armoured brigade, the other brigades units insisted that their tank commanders cannot advance unless there is a visible track going through the desert. In this case there was none! Finally the problem was resolved by asking for engineer support and a track was made with the help of earthmoving equipment! During my service I frequently heard many officers saying that a fourth tank troop in a squadron was good and added flexibility while many said that it was difficult to manage. These officers probably never understood that the Germans performed miracles with armoured divisions, which had just one Panzer Regiment (tank brigade).
LACK OF OPERATIONAL PHILOSOPHY AT BRIGADE/BEYOND AND DOCTRINAL AMBIGUITY AND CONFUSION AT SPECIAL TO ARM TACTICAL LEVEL
Firstly we shall discuss the leaguer concept which seriously jeopardised the success of Pakistani armour operations in Khem Karan. The British mostly withdrew from the final battle positions in North Africa because they feared the German 88 Anti-Tank Guns and wanted to have a peaceful next morning. In any case the operational situation in North Africa was not area oriented, as in Punjab but mobility oriented since any outflanked force could easily move in any direction and regain its equilibrium. In Punjab where defence was a relatively far more superior type of warfare than in the desert and holding every inch of captured territory was important, the operational situation was totally different from North Africa. Here every locality once captured had to be held since manoeuvre was far more difficult due to heavy terrain, friction and large number of artificial and natural obstacles and bottlenecks. This was a serious doctrinal failing which should have been resolved in the School of Armour. No one gave it a serious thought since it was thought that the Pattons were invincible. These pedants failed to realise that the British repeatedly failed to defeat Rommel despite possessing numerical and qualitative superiority as was admitted by Captain B.H Liddell Hart.
There was an inclination in some strike formations to use French terms in operational orders! On one occasion shortly before retirement while this scribe was an umpire with a strike infantry division, I read the term 鼎oup de Main� describing the division痴 main attack. My knowledge of French was limited but as far as I then knew 鼎oup de Main� in the British military sense was a term used for a surprise attack launched in a manner which was not very deliberate or conventional. Once I pointed this out the majority was outraged and two colonels who had done the French Staff Course insisted that 鼎oup de Main� was the right word for describing 溺ain Attack or Effort�.
Then we come to brigade level. The Khem Karan failure was essentially the failure of 5 Armoured brigade. On the first day the brigade was dispersed without any coherent plan one tank regiment going for Assal Uttar from the centre and left, one tank regiment (some 19 tanks) going for Valtoha without any sizeable infantry support and the brigade headquarters sitting in Khem Karan as if it was the headquarters of Mountbatten痴 South East Asia Command rather than a brigade tactical headquarter. It appears that there was no operational philosophy of handling armour at brigade level. The brigade was thus doing what a German Panzer Division could not do i.e attacking on some three axis instead of developing the operations on what the Germans called the 鉄chwerpunkt�.113 The concept of all arms cooperation was not understood and 6 Lancers was despatched to Valtoha on its own . Its Commanding Officer did make a request for infantry114 but this was brushed aside and mechanised infantry which was available that day did little, regardless of whatever they may claim now in their regimental histories.
Major failures in both Indian and Pakistan Armies in handling of armour occurred at brigade and division level. It appears that no lessons were derived from these failures. In my thirteen years service I witnessed changes in concept of employment of armoured brigade and division with change of brigade and divisional commanders. Thus what was executed by Brigadier Inayatullah Niazi for two years was disregarded in near totality once Inayat departed and was endorsed by the same commanding officers who had served earlier under Inayat as the Gospel truth! One i.e my second commanding officer, who had dissented under both the commanders albeit tactfully retired as a colonel! This is just one example out of innumerable examples. The School of Armour as far as I know till 1992 had no concrete or tangible set of recommendations about concept of employment or doctrine of employment of an armoured brigade or division in the various types of terrain/scenarios where employment was likely. I was in charge of all the scripts held in the Tactical Wing from December 1991 to December 1992 and did not find any such thing! Even in the School, concepts of employment changed with change of commandant or change of chief instructor! The Divisional Battle Schools of Armoured Divisions were dumping grounds of superseded or near superseded majors and colonels and their cardinal attribute was 都ilence of a graveyard� as I pointed out to a letter to editor of Citadel magazine in mid-1998. There was no specific to corps area of operations doctrine of operations of armour at least till 1994, at a time when the existence of a multiple number of formations like mechanised brigade, corps reserve, army reserve operating in the same area made a clarity of role/mission/doctrine of employment all the more necessary! Infantry lieutenant colonels who had done foreign staff college had rudimentary ideas about the non-linear armoured battle and the behaviour of enemy armour in the post-breakout stage! Armour after all in all three wars has failed to breakout successfully as far as both sides are concerned!
TRADITION OF LEADING FROM THE REAR AT BRIGADE AND BEYOND
One of the main reasons of slowness of British armour operations was the fact that brigade commanders with few exception like the great Jock Campbell, VC who was an artillery man, there was a tradition of leading from the rear and this certainly contributed to many failures in Grand Slam and in Khem Karan. Decision making was thus done at a snail痴 pace. All sorts of false and exaggerated reports were accepted as the Gospel truth etc. The British tradition of leading from the rear had a deep connection with the level of esteem in which their staff officers were held by their field commanders. The layman reader may note that unlike the German General Staff the British never had a permanent cadre of general staff officers. In their army as in both the Indo-Pak armies attending the staff course was just a hole punching business and general staff was not a highly specialised corps in the British Army unlike the German Army where the staff officer with a crimson stripe on his uniform was a highly qualified man belonging to a corps d elite. Thus while German commanders of the rank of brigade, divisional and corps level could lead from the front staying close to the leading tank regiment, the British commanders could not do so, since they looked down on their staff officers as men who were incapable of manning their main headquarters. Thus the profound truth in Mellenthin痴 observation that 鍍he officers of the German General Staff were not mere clerks or mouthpieces of their higher commanders (Mellenthin hints without saying so that the British ones were!!!!), but were trained to accept responsibility to give grave decisions and were respected accordingly. In contrast the British fighting commanders tended to look down on the staff, and the British show a curious reluctance to appoint capable staff officers to operational commands�.115
Handling of armour in schools of instruction also requires serious re-evaluation. During my stay in the School of Armour I observed that there were no fixed parameters or training guidelines at army level which regulated that institution. All depended on the commandant痴 personality. If there was a hard taskmaster like Sher Azam Malik everything went well but everything would suddenly transform once person 添� or 纏� came. As far as I know the school with few exceptions was a dumping ground for superseded or about to be superseded brigadiers, at least after 1971 with perhaps one or two odd exceptions. Naturally these commandants were on their way out and with few exceptions took more interest in preparing themselves for their future retired life! The same was true for instructors at Lieutenant Colonel level out of whom very few went beyond brigadier. Further the school痴 location being far away from both the armoured divisions did not allow integration of students doing courses in major armour training manoeuvres as is done in the Infantry School in Quetta. This school should be re-located somewhere in the desert in Cholistan or perhaps its outer fringes or in the Potohar plateau! This scribe in May-June 1993 had made a similar recommendation for the independent armoured squadron that he was commanding and was then stationed in Okara (through an official written letter held on record) to be shifted to the desert in Tamewali or Bahawalnagar. The recommendation made as part of unit points for the divisional conference was approved by Major General Zia ul Haq the General Officer Commanding the infantry division and implemented much to the chagrin of officers who later joined the new tank regiment raised from the Phoenix ashes of that squadron! Coming back to the main line of discussion there was no system of grading in the school and the powers of the officers in charge course, the chief instructor and the higher appointment holders to alter a tactical grading done by an instructor of major or colonel rank were not limited by any margin of plus one or two as was the practice in Infantry School. I don稚 know whether it has changed now from 1992.
The instructors posted after staff college to armour school were those majors who were not fit to be brigade majors or were there simply because no unit or other vacancy was available for them! This did not mean that these majors were not good since the system of assessment of staff college needs considerable revamping. The bad part was that these majors did not put up maximum hard work since they knew that the seal of relatively mediocre majors had been stamped on them and, however, hard they worked their chances for promotion beyond colonel rank were remote! Two buildings were completed in 1988-89 but these were hardly sufficient to meet the existing demands! The transparency of the system of grading could be gauged from the fact that the only two officers who got an alpha grade in tactical leg of the young officer痴 basic course were sons of serving generals! This scribe had the opportunity to see one of them during the basic course and was perplexed and surprised as to how he was graded alpha. On the other hand a retired three star general痴 son who had already managed a Bee Plus in the junior Staff Course (a far more tough affair than the mid career course) while his father was a serving three star general, was initially graded as Bee Minus in the Mid-Career Course whereas he certainly deserved a Bee! Later on I believe he was given a Bee, after much haggling as happened at Valtoha between 1 FF and 6 Lancers.
HIGHER ARMOUR OPERATIONAL COMMAND ORGANISATION
No major change in Pakistani higher armour command as earlier discussed in brief was made till 1987. In 1986-87 the older corps which contained both holding and striking formations were sub-divided into holding and striking corps. This arrangement although outwardly neat and superficially sound was essentially confusing and fallacious. It was regarding this change that this scribe pointed out in an article 的t is felt that during conduct of operations two formation commanders of equal rank commanding a holding and strike formation respectively in the same area of operations, cannot function effectively. Even during Exercise Zarb-e-Momin this aspect was not put to trial. Training of holding and strike formations needs to be integrated thus meriting a unified operational command vested in the person of one officer of the rank of lieutenant general. The change may require creation of Army Headquarters in certain operational areas�.94
The arrangement of holding and striking corps without any higher co-ordinating headquarter was a recipe for confusion and disaster as I witnessed while serving in a holding corps, once I personally saw the lack of communication and co-ordination in training and cooperation between the concerned strike and holding corps. Thus, I was motivated to write another article in which this scribe痴 recommendations for establishing a co-ordinating headquarters for the holding and striking corps were seconded by the worthy editor of the Citadel Magazine as ones which 田ertainly merits consideration�.95 The rationale on which these recommendations were based were: 典he concept of holding and striking formation also needs reappraisal....the bifurcation in terms of offensive and defensive role, while outwardly neat and theoretically sound is historically without a successful precedent. The issue could have been resolved in exercise Zarb-e-Momin in 1989 by subjecting it to the friction of a rigorous training manoeuvre�.96 典he shield and the spear or the hammer and the anvil can function effectively only if one head synchronises and co-ordinates their operational functions. As they say that too many cooks spoil the broth, the two formations fighting the same battle in the same operational area cannot fully realise their combat potential unless a headquarter regulates their operations.How can one main headquarters 200 or 400 miles in the rear, with loads of other matters to take care of, effectively co-ordinate the operations of a hammer and anvil�.97 典he need for an army headquarters to co-ordinate and effectively command the holding and strike corps is an indispensable necessity�.98 I believe that there has been some progress since these recommendations which are on record were made in 1998. All credit, however, goes to then commandant Major General Amjad and his team who published these two above quoted articles. Had these been written in 1987 or 1988 no editor would have dared to publish them. 99
POOR INTER-ARM/INTER- UNIT COOPERATION AND LACK OF DIVISIONAL SPIRIT
Poor inter-arm cooperation seriously retarded the combat potential of the Pakistan Armoured Corps right from 1947. This was the worst British legacy that both the Indo-Pak armies inherited. A British observer in WW Two noted that 妬n the training of the armoured division, I stressed the need for co-operation of all arms in battle. One had to check a pernicious doctrine which had grown up in recent years, aided by certain civilian writers, that tank units were capable of winning an action without the assistance of other arms. The Chief agent in debunking this and many other fallacies of our pre-war pundits were the German�.100 The secret of the German Blitzkrieg tactics which revolutionised warfare lay in intimate inter-arm cooperation. The US concept of Combined Arms Teams is actually the old German inter-arm cooperation within the Panzer Division concept 層ine in new bottles�. The British tanks in WW II on the other hand repeatedly failed to function effectively because of poor inter-arm cooperation based on inter-unit rivalry and excess of regimentation. The Pakistan Army inherited this disease and this disease instead of getting reduced became more pronounced after 1947. The army remained infantry dominated since all the chiefs from 1948 to 1972 were from infantry. From 1977 to 1988 the army remained armour dominated and preference in promotion was given to those close to Zia. Poor inter-arm cooperation led to serious operational failures in Khem Karan and in Grand Slam in 1965 and at Bara Pind in 1971. The similarity between the lack of infantry tank cooperation in Grand Slam and in Khem Karan and those of similar incidents in the case of British infantry and tanks at Gazala etc is remarkable. Even when I was commissioned in 11 Cavalry in March 1983, 29 Cavalry (in which this scribe later served for some time) being a new unit was regarded as second among equals, 7 FF the mechanised infantry unit of our brigade was viewed as an enemy and 15 SP the artillery unit was despised and considered too insignificant even to be considered an enemy. The Supply and Transport unit was regarded as a bunch of untouchables! The EME was not liked but feared, for their nuisance value in inspections, though secretly despised. It was out of question to visit the messes of these units and my friendship with an officer of 7 FF was viewed by many seniors as disloyalty to the regiment! Officers from armoured regiments were mostly friendly with officers from other armoured regiments. It was rare that any officer of the infantry division met any officer of the armoured division in Kharian.
Even within the very small armoured corps of the 1950s and 1960s there were glaring differences from regiment to regiment. There were regiments with a much higher representation in the top hierarchy dating from 1947 and there were fatherless regiments who had done well in war but had no patrons beyond the brigadier rank. The negative factor here for the armoured corps was the fact that while the regiment in infantry had a much larger number of units like the Punjab and FF group, each armoured regiment was as different from each other as France from Germany and an officer from any tank regiment only believed in patronising his very own regiment!
Parallels can be found in battle of Bir El Gubi in 1941 where the 22 Armoured Brigade frontally charged the Italians with the support of just one battery of 25 Pounders 101 and failed to capture it suffering in the process huge losses and in the Battle of Bara Pind where Pakistan痴 8 Armoured Brigade did a similar thing. The German tank general and illustrious staff officer Von Mellenthin noted this failing when he said, 鍍heir commanders would not concentrate tanks and guns for a co-ordinated battle�.102
On the other hand notorious examples of non-cooperation in 1965 and 1971 wars can be compared with the conduct of the British armour at Gazala in 1942 when the 2nd Highland infantry was destroyed by German tanks while a superior British tank force merely looked on, or in the case of the 1/6th Rajputana Rifles who were abandoned to German Panzers simply because the British armour had to go into leaguer!103
One of the most notorious examples of lack of inter-arm co-operation took place in Chawinda when first the Indian tanks withdrew from Jassoran-Buttur Dograndi-Sodreke area on their own104, and later when Indian tanks ordered to re-attack the same area later were not informed about the failure of the last night痴 infantry attack!105 An Indian general frankly admitted this lack of inter arm cooperation when he said, 典here were misunderstandings galore between the infantry and armour commanders in the second battle of Chawinda. A lack of rapport seems to be the only explanation..�.106 This lack of cooperation was something like 13th century inter-arm and individual rivalry which led to the failure of the Crusaders or the Mongols against the Mamelukes.Toynbee the great historian thus wrote, 鍍he individual Mongol champion was promptly overcome by the disciplined heavy cavalry of the Egyptian Mamlukes (mostly kidnapped slaves of Slav/European origin converted to Islam after being bought by the Kurds etc). These had given warning of the supremacy of their technique at the Battle of Mansurah in AD 1250, when Frankish army of Saint Louis had paid a disastrous penalty for the thoughtless individualism of its knights, each anxious for personal honour at the expense of the disciplined formation�.107 I can state with confidence that as late as 1993 that almost each tank regiment (having seen five tank regiments and one tank squadron) or infantry regiment behaved at least symbolically like these thirteenth century knights described by Toynbee, at least in garrisons and on field manoeuvres! I am sure that the Indian army being the chip of the same block and led by as mediocre and orders oriented men is no different! At least in strength of reservoirs of mediocrity the subcontinent consists of men belonging to one nation!
THE CAVALRY CHARGE TRADITION
The Armoured Corps inherited a typically British cavalry charge tradition, an irrational urge of being 澱rave to the point of foolhardiness�.108 The Indians suffered from a similar malady and lost many tanks in attacks delivered in a cavalry charge manner at Gadgor, Phillora, Buttur, Dograndi, Sodreke, etc. Brigadier Riaz ul Karim who was sent as Deputy GOC of 6 Armoured Division described these encounters as 適abbadi Matches�. Riaz thus observed 典he normal practice on both sides was to despatch one armoured regiment at a time to probe and infiltrate (with infantry following) and the other side reacted with launching one of their own armoured regiments to stop and destroy that force. With this type of battle, there were heavy tank casualties on both sides�.109 Riaz states that 典he first thing that I did was to stop the 銭abbadi Game� i.e for one regiment sailing into the blues and coming back with a bloody nose�.110
NATURE OF EMPLOYMENT IN WW TWO AND INFLUENCE OF CONSERVATIVE BRITISH DOCTRINE
In all fairness the nature of Indian Army痴 employment as far as the armoured corps was concerned did not make things any easier for the armoured corps of both the countries. The Indian Armoured Corps was either employed in a screen/scout role or in conditions where their opponent as in Burma was vastly inferior both numerically and quantitatively in number of tanks. Indians were not groomed for higher ranks and even the British despite better education superior literacy level and technically and qualitatively superior position did not produce a single good tank commander at any level higher than tank regiment. No wonder that they failed the Germans in France and North Africa from 1940 till 1942 when finally the scales were turned, not because of better generalship but by virtue of overwhelming numerical superiority. Further the conservative British tank doctrine which both the armies inherited and made no effort to change that armour commanders beyond unit level remained as mediocre as they were on the British side in WW II. It is no credit to the quality of British armoured corps that General Mellenthin who saw the British Army as its direct opponent for some two years noted that � The British Artillery was the best trained and best commanded element in the British Army�.111
MISCELLANEOUS PSYCHOLOGICAL HANGUPS
The armoured corps of 1947 inherited many psychological hang-ups. The subconscious emphasis inherited from the British was on being an 殿rm of fashion and wealth� 殿ffected carelessness� and worst of all 殿n arrogant non-chalance towards the duller aspects of their work�.112 During a winter collective which this scribes unit had to conduct for another armoured brigade, the other brigades units insisted that their tank commanders cannot advance unless there is a visible track going through the desert. In this case there was none! Finally the problem was resolved by asking for engineer support and a track was made with the help of earthmoving equipment! During my service I frequently heard many officers saying that a fourth tank troop in a squadron was good and added flexibility while many said that it was difficult to manage. These officers probably never understood that the Germans performed miracles with armoured divisions, which had just one Panzer Regiment (tank brigade).
LACK OF OPERATIONAL PHILOSOPHY AT BRIGADE/BEYOND AND DOCTRINAL AMBIGUITY AND CONFUSION AT SPECIAL TO ARM TACTICAL LEVEL
Firstly we shall discuss the leaguer concept which seriously jeopardised the success of Pakistani armour operations in Khem Karan. The British mostly withdrew from the final battle positions in North Africa because they feared the German 88 Anti-Tank Guns and wanted to have a peaceful next morning. In any case the operational situation in North Africa was not area oriented, as in Punjab but mobility oriented since any outflanked force could easily move in any direction and regain its equilibrium. In Punjab where defence was a relatively far more superior type of warfare than in the desert and holding every inch of captured territory was important, the operational situation was totally different from North Africa. Here every locality once captured had to be held since manoeuvre was far more difficult due to heavy terrain, friction and large number of artificial and natural obstacles and bottlenecks. This was a serious doctrinal failing which should have been resolved in the School of Armour. No one gave it a serious thought since it was thought that the Pattons were invincible. These pedants failed to realise that the British repeatedly failed to defeat Rommel despite possessing numerical and qualitative superiority as was admitted by Captain B.H Liddell Hart.
There was an inclination in some strike formations to use French terms in operational orders! On one occasion shortly before retirement while this scribe was an umpire with a strike infantry division, I read the term 鼎oup de Main� describing the division痴 main attack. My knowledge of French was limited but as far as I then knew 鼎oup de Main� in the British military sense was a term used for a surprise attack launched in a manner which was not very deliberate or conventional. Once I pointed this out the majority was outraged and two colonels who had done the French Staff Course insisted that 鼎oup de Main� was the right word for describing 溺ain Attack or Effort�.
Then we come to brigade level. The Khem Karan failure was essentially the failure of 5 Armoured brigade. On the first day the brigade was dispersed without any coherent plan one tank regiment going for Assal Uttar from the centre and left, one tank regiment (some 19 tanks) going for Valtoha without any sizeable infantry support and the brigade headquarters sitting in Khem Karan as if it was the headquarters of Mountbatten痴 South East Asia Command rather than a brigade tactical headquarter. It appears that there was no operational philosophy of handling armour at brigade level. The brigade was thus doing what a German Panzer Division could not do i.e attacking on some three axis instead of developing the operations on what the Germans called the 鉄chwerpunkt�.113 The concept of all arms cooperation was not understood and 6 Lancers was despatched to Valtoha on its own . Its Commanding Officer did make a request for infantry114 but this was brushed aside and mechanised infantry which was available that day did little, regardless of whatever they may claim now in their regimental histories.
Major failures in both Indian and Pakistan Armies in handling of armour occurred at brigade and division level. It appears that no lessons were derived from these failures. In my thirteen years service I witnessed changes in concept of employment of armoured brigade and division with change of brigade and divisional commanders. Thus what was executed by Brigadier Inayatullah Niazi for two years was disregarded in near totality once Inayat departed and was endorsed by the same commanding officers who had served earlier under Inayat as the Gospel truth! One i.e my second commanding officer, who had dissented under both the commanders albeit tactfully retired as a colonel! This is just one example out of innumerable examples. The School of Armour as far as I know till 1992 had no concrete or tangible set of recommendations about concept of employment or doctrine of employment of an armoured brigade or division in the various types of terrain/scenarios where employment was likely. I was in charge of all the scripts held in the Tactical Wing from December 1991 to December 1992 and did not find any such thing! Even in the School, concepts of employment changed with change of commandant or change of chief instructor! The Divisional Battle Schools of Armoured Divisions were dumping grounds of superseded or near superseded majors and colonels and their cardinal attribute was 都ilence of a graveyard� as I pointed out to a letter to editor of Citadel magazine in mid-1998. There was no specific to corps area of operations doctrine of operations of armour at least till 1994, at a time when the existence of a multiple number of formations like mechanised brigade, corps reserve, army reserve operating in the same area made a clarity of role/mission/doctrine of employment all the more necessary! Infantry lieutenant colonels who had done foreign staff college had rudimentary ideas about the non-linear armoured battle and the behaviour of enemy armour in the post-breakout stage! Armour after all in all three wars has failed to breakout successfully as far as both sides are concerned!
TRADITION OF LEADING FROM THE REAR AT BRIGADE AND BEYOND
One of the main reasons of slowness of British armour operations was the fact that brigade commanders with few exception like the great Jock Campbell, VC who was an artillery man, there was a tradition of leading from the rear and this certainly contributed to many failures in Grand Slam and in Khem Karan. Decision making was thus done at a snail痴 pace. All sorts of false and exaggerated reports were accepted as the Gospel truth etc. The British tradition of leading from the rear had a deep connection with the level of esteem in which their staff officers were held by their field commanders. The layman reader may note that unlike the German General Staff the British never had a permanent cadre of general staff officers. In their army as in both the Indo-Pak armies attending the staff course was just a hole punching business and general staff was not a highly specialised corps in the British Army unlike the German Army where the staff officer with a crimson stripe on his uniform was a highly qualified man belonging to a corps d elite. Thus while German commanders of the rank of brigade, divisional and corps level could lead from the front staying close to the leading tank regiment, the British commanders could not do so, since they looked down on their staff officers as men who were incapable of manning their main headquarters. Thus the profound truth in Mellenthin痴 observation that 鍍he officers of the German General Staff were not mere clerks or mouthpieces of their higher commanders (Mellenthin hints without saying so that the British ones were!!!!), but were trained to accept responsibility to give grave decisions and were respected accordingly. In contrast the British fighting commanders tended to look down on the staff, and the British show a curious reluctance to appoint capable staff officers to operational commands�.115
