IC3M@N FX
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It would have been strategically sound to design the Hürjet from the outset as a twin‑engine platform, powered by two TEI TF‑10000 engines. This configuration would have provided not only engine redundancy — a critical factor for naval operations — but also greater total thrust than a single F404. Such a design would have allowed the aircraft to be approximately 25% larger, improving internal volume for fuel, avionics, and even a small internal weapons bay capable of carrying three to four air‑to‑air missiles, thereby reducing its radar cross section (RCS) and enhancing survivability.
With a thrust‑to‑weight ratio between 0.9 and 1.1, depending on loadout and mission profile, and a combat radius in the range of 900–1000 km, this version of the Hürjet would have been slightly more expensive than the current design. However, it would have been capable of fulfilling a wider array of roles — including light air superiority, carrier‑borne operations, and limited strike missions — and could have partially replaced the F‑16 as the Turkish Air Force’s workhorse in certain missions. This approach would also have positioned the aircraft more competitively on the export market, particularly for navies and air forces seeking a compact, multirole, carrier‑capable jet in the light fighter class.
Furthermore, the decision to replace the GE F110 engine in the future with the domestically developed TEI TF‑35000 by around 2032 is also well‑founded. In the interim, the F110 remains a viable option, as its supply cannot easily be politically blocked by the United States. This is partly because Pakistan already operates the J‑10C equipped with the Chinese WS‑10C/D engine, which itself is derived from the F‑110/F‑101 family — the result of reverse‑engineering efforts in the 1990s with Israeli assistance. The WS‑10 matches the F‑110 in size, weight, diameter, and thrust class, and has evolved to include modern features like FADEC.
If necessary, Pakistan could supply the WS‑10 to Turkey, either under license or rebranded, effectively sidestepping direct Chinese involvement. Geopolitically, such an arrangement would exist in a gray zone, avoiding direct U.S. or Chinese scrutiny. Although the WS‑10 has a lower time‑between‑overhaul (roughly 2000–3000? hours compared to the F‑110’s 6000–8000), this limitation would be acceptable, since these engines would serve as an interim solution for the first 20–30 aircraft before transitioning fully to the TF‑35000.
With a thrust‑to‑weight ratio between 0.9 and 1.1, depending on loadout and mission profile, and a combat radius in the range of 900–1000 km, this version of the Hürjet would have been slightly more expensive than the current design. However, it would have been capable of fulfilling a wider array of roles — including light air superiority, carrier‑borne operations, and limited strike missions — and could have partially replaced the F‑16 as the Turkish Air Force’s workhorse in certain missions. This approach would also have positioned the aircraft more competitively on the export market, particularly for navies and air forces seeking a compact, multirole, carrier‑capable jet in the light fighter class.
Furthermore, the decision to replace the GE F110 engine in the future with the domestically developed TEI TF‑35000 by around 2032 is also well‑founded. In the interim, the F110 remains a viable option, as its supply cannot easily be politically blocked by the United States. This is partly because Pakistan already operates the J‑10C equipped with the Chinese WS‑10C/D engine, which itself is derived from the F‑110/F‑101 family — the result of reverse‑engineering efforts in the 1990s with Israeli assistance. The WS‑10 matches the F‑110 in size, weight, diameter, and thrust class, and has evolved to include modern features like FADEC.
If necessary, Pakistan could supply the WS‑10 to Turkey, either under license or rebranded, effectively sidestepping direct Chinese involvement. Geopolitically, such an arrangement would exist in a gray zone, avoiding direct U.S. or Chinese scrutiny. Although the WS‑10 has a lower time‑between‑overhaul (roughly 2000–3000? hours compared to the F‑110’s 6000–8000), this limitation would be acceptable, since these engines would serve as an interim solution for the first 20–30 aircraft before transitioning fully to the TF‑35000.
