I am still wondering if to believe him or not as per the author :
1) Kulbhushan Jadhav was noy an Intelligence Officer , how may Pakistanis will agree to that .
2) Fat bureaucratic Organization like R&AW can move from Afghanistan to Peshawar and Quetta.
3) I am not able to decide whether to laugh or cry when he said Indian officers went and settled in POK
4) He claimed R&AW has infiltrated in the LET and other grps.
Biggest joke is R&AW can use proxies LoL
The fact is ISI is far superior then R&AW and R&AW sucks in very very basic things major failures KArgil infiltration , Chinese infiltration in Bhutan and list is long , while ISI has bled India from 2002 to 2014 , Indian Mujahiddin was the best thought creation , Indian agencies sucked even to figure out who they were .......
I still believe IB is doing far better job then R&AW
@Nilgiri check this out
Intelligence networks, more than any other realm, require sound trust within itself.
It is invariably very sensitive and reliant on a few core people and their teams....more than any other realm I can think of.
Hence they are especially vulnerable in their early days of formation and gestation given the psychology needing to be nurtured inside it in steady basis (if you study how Mossad went about it, as the size of their country had no option otherwise unlike India which often falls back on it like a lounging elephant)
It is somewhat long awry subject to both look into and imagine the full impact of the effect just one Indian PM (Desai) had on RAW given its relative infancy (w.r.t R.N Kao + B. Raman impetus and having 1971 to cut its teeth on and learn from) at the time.
It would be something of the scale of JFK or Jimmy Carter taking some political revenge on their immediate predecessors and dousing a tree and many saplings around it with a whole bunch of potent herbicides....and ruining all the gardening work of Dulles et al...and basically gutting the CIA in a fell swoop (and bearing out the impact of that in the cold war).
This presents serious setback to the whole organisation psychologically (can it ever take wing under any other leader again?).
Consider this marine vs naval officer exchange (some might know the movie its from):
J.N: Ever put your life in another man's hands, ask him to put his life in yours?
T.C: No, sir.
J.N: We follow orders, son. We follow orders or people die. It's that simple. Are we clear?
This takes an altogether higher intense dimension (the good, the bad, the ugly of it) in intel agencies given its covert realm (that armed forces dont experience).
What PM I.G did was wrong (regarding the emergency and her various other dabbles in authoritarianism)....but going after RAW in the particular manner her successor did (by whatever combination of malice and incompetence) was one of the worst decisions a PM has ever done in context of its derived accumulated cost on the nation.
He even got a Nishan-E-Pak for what he did, adding the biggest insult to injury.
It has borne out a real impact on RAW....doubt it ever could or did recover....much less fulfill the potential it heralded in case of East Pakistan.
IB never faced something like that (given its particular formation + gestation period well removed and thus carrying flourished institutional heft more resilient to political revenge etc).
Hence the differences you (and others) have noticed.
The nature of exploring these opaque realms does provide lot of interest for writers, journalists and the larger audience seeking answers and intrigue.
But the catch 22 is this very much relies on a number of leaks and mess-ups of the opaque box, its not the usual transparent flow of info such people are used to.
So I listen and nod when I come across it (if it is able to retain my interest in first place), but who really knows the actual details (trying to being aired out) even 50 or 100 years later.
Ever tried a jigsaw puzzle with way too many pieces missing?