TR UAV/UCAV Programs | Anka - series | Kızılelma | TB - series

[Test7]

Gentlemens, please stay on the topic.

 

[Anmdt]

A drone is not going to change the course of the war.
Yemenis are not Armenians.

A Drone is not going to change the course of the war, hmmm.
When did i hear this before?
Oh..
Libya,
Syria,
The best was in Armenia though, the drones were not effective at all they have downed drones day and day after and hunter all operators until Azerbaijan has been forced to sign a retreat.
If lies make you happier, live by them.

 

[Philip the Arab]

A Drone is not going to change the course of the war, hmmm.
When did i hear this before?
Oh..
Libya,
Syria,
The best was in Armenia though, the drones were not effective at all they have downed drones day and day after and hunter all operators until Azerbaijan has been forced to sign a retreat.
If lies make you happier, live by them.

Syria and Libya have much better terrain than Yemen. War in Armenia was in a flatter area as well and fighting novice conscripts.

Just like drones didnt help in Afghanistan they wont help in Yemen. They both have mountainous terrain that makes ground activity way harder. Libya also has a much smaller population and isnt being supported heavily by Iran.

 

[King_West]

@Philip the Arab is right, a drone alone will not change the course of war without proper ground support. In Lybia, Syria and Azarbaijan we used ground support. We made it easier for ground support to operate with air dominance. With air dominance alone, without decent ground forces, you cant win a war.

 

[Glass🚬]

if the yemenis receive the tb2 treatment they would give up after a while but as one member here said, key for that is Turkish training and advisors and I dont know if we have such an appetite for such a move when saudi f-15 are right now in crete.

That leaves a bad taste in the mouth so the houthis can continue to trash the saudis for all i care.

 

[Nutuk]

Fighting guerilla style warfare is not easy, even the Turkish army needed several decades to master it. The US was at loss in Vietnam.

You need a very good trained army for that and I doubt that SA has such a trained army

 

[Anmdt]

Syria and Libya have much better terrain than Yemen. War in Armenia was in a flatter area as well and fighting novice conscripts.

Iraq- N.Iraq?
South Eastern part of Turkey?
Karabagh? Do you know the place is called "Daghlik-Karabagh" which Daghlik literally translates as "Mountanious"
Same Excuse Everytime:
"Syria is not N.Iraq"
"Libya is not Syria"
"Armenia is not Libya"
It is proven this argument is pointless so please move on, or console yourself with lies.

If Drones wouldn't help in the war especially in an asymmetric one,unless you are pointing out KSA makes unnecessary investment on variety of drones foolishly, then you should be also aware they are considering more logical options which any losses can be replaced in a week, no PTSD induced personnel, without loss of any personnel.

Spend sometime watching @Oryx videos to see how harsh terrains became useless to hide with some experienced operators who does "surgical strikes" by using right approach way-points with INS/GPS and pointing laser from right direction at any tiny hide-outs.

Why it didn't work in Afghanistan? Can be discussed in another thread but it is not failure of the drones, drones have done their own part.

 

[Oryx]

Whether you're high on a mountain or far out on the ocean, none of it really matters when you're faced with a fleet of Bayraktar TB2s. They will find you, and they will kill you.

However, a major difference between Yemen and for example, Idlib and Nagorno-Karabakh, is that the Houthis don't have a vast defensive network of trenches or a fleet of AFVs massed in a relatively small area of operations. In addition, the Houthis mostly rely on highly mobile fighters that move from position to position (unlike the Armenian trenches that never moved an inch since the mid-to-late 1990s).

The TB2s had no lack of targets when operating over Nagorno-Karabakh because large numbers of manpower and equipment were concentrated in a relatively small area, and were easy to find ans trike.

But Oryx, you might ask, what's so different about the way Turkey employs its UCAVs compared to the Saudis? Glad you asked! The Saudis appear to operate their UAVs over locations that are known to harbour activities by Houthi fighters. But Yemen is a big country, and when you're looking for small numbers of Houthi fighters advancing under the cover of trees (or are they civilians?) or a Toyota truck (or is it just a civilian truck?) hiding next to a building it's really difficult to achieve concrete results that also translate into a difference on the ground. On top of that, there's no cohesive strategy, and their strikes are usually not followed by offensives. The actual impact these strikes make to the situation on the ground is thus close to nihil. Let's say a drone strike kills four Houthi fighters, while at the same day 48 Yemeni citizens join the movement and take up arms. It just doesn't make a difference.

The Turkish doctrine on the other hand sees TB2s operate in support of (upcoming) ground offensives. They go in before a major offensive commences and start striking defensive positions, tanks, staging areas, artillery pieces, supply depots and trucks carrying manpower and supplies, so that by the time the ground forces commence their advance most of the defenders are already annihilated.

When people were commenting that Turkey was so slow to advance in Afrin, or that Azerbaijani forces 'suddenly stopped advancing in Nagorno-Karabakh', little did they know that a fleet of TB2s was making sure that ground forces in either location could advance with relatively little casualties.

If Saudi Arabia manages to replicate this success (probably under Turkish guidance), by gathering a force (or proxy forces) that are well motivated, equipped and trained in mountainous warfare, and let these carry out offensives in specific areas all the while being supported by Bayraktar TB2s operating in the area beforehand and during the offensive itself, we could suddenly see advances happening in areas that were considered impenetrable in the past five years.

It's not just that the TB2 is an amazing machine, it's also the way that they're being used. The UAE started deploying its Wing Loong drones in Libya in 2016, yet they never managed to make a difference on the ground. Not in two years, not in three, not even in four! At that time the GNA didn't receive any foreign military support. They had no operation SAMs or interceptors, and the Wing Loongs were free to strike wherever they wanted. Then Turkey deploys TB2s to the country and they not only manage to secure Tripoli, but also drastically change the course of the Libyan Civil War, all that within one year. Then we witnessed what happened in Nagorno-Karabakh, a frozen conflict since the mid-1990s, but it took a small fleet of TB2s only 44 days to turn the Armenian Army into a smoldering heap of Soviet junk. Faced with a plethoria of older and newer models of Russian air defence systems, Azerbaijan lost just two TB2s (one crashed, the other shot down).

Really, there's no equivalent of the successes achieved by the TB2 in the history of warfare. Somehow everyone still talks about the revolutionary introduction of the tank during World War I, but has there ever been a piece of military equipment (supported by the right tactics) that has managed to make such an impact on the course of conflicts as the TB2? To put it bluntly: No. Of course, you won't see many analysts writing about this because being positive about Turkey appears to be highly impopular these days.

But if you look at in a neutral manner then it's no wonder that countries like Saudi Arabia are looking to replicate these successes. But don't just take my word for it, and also look what UK Defence Secrary Ben Wallace had to say: https://baykardefence.com/haber-UK-defense-chief-Turkish-use-of-drones-game-changing.html

 

[Oublious]

Whether you're high on a mountain or far out on the ocean, none of it really matters when you're faced with a fleet of Bayraktar TB2s. They will find you, and they will kill you.

However, a major difference between Yemen and for example, Idlib and Nagorno-Karabakh, is that the Houthis don't have a vast defensive network of trenches or a fleet of AFVs massed in a relatively small area of operations. In addition, the Houthis mostly rely on highly mobile fighters that move from position to position (unlike the Armenian trenches that never moved an inch since the mid-to-late 1990s).

The TB2s had no lack of targets when operating over Nagorno-Karabakh because large numbers of manpower and equipment were concentrated in a relatively small area, and were easy to find ans trike.

But Oryx, you might ask, what's so different about the way Turkey employs its UCAVs compared to the Saudis? Glad you asked! The Saudis appear to operate their UAVs over locations that are known to harbour activities by Houthi fighters. But Yemen is a big country, and when you're looking for small numbers of Houthi fighters advancing under the cover of trees (or are they civilians?) or a Toyota truck (or is it just a civilian truck?) hiding next to a building it's really difficult to achieve concrete results that also translate into a difference on the ground. On top of that, there's no cohesive strategy, and their strikes are usually not followed by offensives. The actual impact these strikes make to the situation on the ground is thus close to nihil. Let's say a drone strike kills four Houthi fighters, while at the same day 48 Yemeni citizens join the movement and take up arms. It just doesn't make a difference.

The Turkish doctrine on the other hand sees TB2s operate in support of (upcoming) ground offensives. They go in before a major offensive commences and start striking defensive positions, tanks, staging areas, artillery pieces, supply depots and trucks carrying manpower and supplies, so that by the time the ground forces commence their advance most of the defenders are already annihilated.

When people were commenting that Turkey was so slow to advance in Afrin, or that Azerbaijani forces 'suddenly stopped advancing in Nagorno-Karabakh', little did they know that a fleet of TB2s was making sure that ground forces in either location could advance with relatively little casualties.

If Saudi Arabia manages to replicate this success (probably under Turkish guidance), by gathering a force (or proxy forces) that are well motivated, equipped and trained in mountainous warfare, and let these carry out offensives in specific areas all the while being supported by Bayraktar TB2s operating in the area beforehand and during the offensive itself, we could suddenly see advances happening in areas that were considered impenetrable in the past five years.

It's not just that the TB2 is an amazing machine, it's also the way that they're being used. The UAE started deploying its Wing Loong drones in Libya in 2016, yet they never managed to make a difference on the ground. Not in two years, not in three, not even in four! At that time the GNA didn't receive any foreign military support. They had no operation SAMs or interceptors, and the Wing Loongs were free to strike wherever they wanted. Then Turkey deploys TB2s to the country and they not only manage to secure Tripoli, but also drastically change the course of the Libyan Civil War, all that within one year. Then we witnessed what happened in Nagorno-Karabakh, a frozen conflict since the mid-1990s, but it took a small fleet of TB2s only 44 days to turn the Armenian Army into a smoldering heap of Soviet junk. Faced with a plethoria of older and newer models of Russian air defence systems, Azerbaijan lost just two TB2s (one crashed, the other shot down).

Really, there's no equivalent of the successes achieved by the TB2 in the history of warfare. Somehow everyone still talks about the revolutionary introduction of the tank during World War I, but has there ever been a piece of military equipment (supported by the right tactics) that has managed to make such an impact on the course of conflicts as the TB2? To put it bluntly: No. Of course, you won't see many analysts writing about this because being positive about Turkey appears to be highly impopular these days.

But if you look at in a neutral manner then it's no wonder that countries like Saudi Arabia are looking to replicate these successes. But don't just take my word for it, and also look what UK Defence Secrary Ben Wallace had to say: https://baykardefence.com/haber-UK-defense-chief-Turkish-use-of-drones-game-changing.html

Not only Uk Defence are talking about Turkish doctrine, even Italians are looking to our doctrine.

La Turchia vuole trasformare la LHD Anadolu in una piattaforma per droni

Ci sono poche marine al mondo che si possono permettere una portaerei, in tutto sono dieci. La Marina Militare turca, quest’anno si sarebbe dovuta aggiungere a quelle che possiedono tali piattaforme navali. Tuttavia l’estromissione dal programma F-35 (una commessa da 100 velivoli), causa...

www.difesaonline.it

 

[Fuzuli NL]

Fact is, after the Karabagh war, suddenly everybody's focus was on UCAVs, I think because that drew more attention than Syria and Libya.
UCAVs alone don't change the course of a war but in a combination with good training, sharp tactical minds and expert officers, they may well do.

 

[Hexciter]

Whether you're high on a mountain or far out on the ocean, none of it really matters when you're faced with a fleet of Bayraktar TB2s. They will find you, and they will kill you.

However, a major difference between Yemen and for example, Idlib and Nagorno-Karabakh, is that the Houthis don't have a vast defensive network of trenches or a fleet of AFVs massed in a relatively small area of operations. In addition, the Houthis mostly rely on highly mobile fighters that move from position to position (unlike the Armenian trenches that never moved an inch since the mid-to-late 1990s).

The TB2s had no lack of targets when operating over Nagorno-Karabakh because large numbers of manpower and equipment were concentrated in a relatively small area, and were easy to find ans trike.

But Oryx, you might ask, what's so different about the way Turkey employs its UCAVs compared to the Saudis? Glad you asked! The Saudis appear to operate their UAVs over locations that are known to harbour activities by Houthi fighters. But Yemen is a big country, and when you're looking for small numbers of Houthi fighters advancing under the cover of trees (or are they civilians?) or a Toyota truck (or is it just a civilian truck?) hiding next to a building it's really difficult to achieve concrete results that also translate into a difference on the ground. On top of that, there's no cohesive strategy, and their strikes are usually not followed by offensives. The actual impact these strikes make to the situation on the ground is thus close to nihil. Let's say a drone strike kills four Houthi fighters, while at the same day 48 Yemeni citizens join the movement and take up arms. It just doesn't make a difference.

The Turkish doctrine on the other hand sees TB2s operate in support of (upcoming) ground offensives. They go in before a major offensive commences and start striking defensive positions, tanks, staging areas, artillery pieces, supply depots and trucks carrying manpower and supplies, so that by the time the ground forces commence their advance most of the defenders are already annihilated.

When people were commenting that Turkey was so slow to advance in Afrin, or that Azerbaijani forces 'suddenly stopped advancing in Nagorno-Karabakh', little did they know that a fleet of TB2s was making sure that ground forces in either location could advance with relatively little casualties.

If Saudi Arabia manages to replicate this success (probably under Turkish guidance), by gathering a force (or proxy forces) that are well motivated, equipped and trained in mountainous warfare, and let these carry out offensives in specific areas all the while being supported by Bayraktar TB2s operating in the area beforehand and during the offensive itself, we could suddenly see advances happening in areas that were considered impenetrable in the past five years.

It's not just that the TB2 is an amazing machine, it's also the way that they're being used. The UAE started deploying its Wing Loong drones in Libya in 2016, yet they never managed to make a difference on the ground. Not in two years, not in three, not even in four! At that time the GNA didn't receive any foreign military support. They had no operation SAMs or interceptors, and the Wing Loongs were free to strike wherever they wanted. Then Turkey deploys TB2s to the country and they not only manage to secure Tripoli, but also drastically change the course of the Libyan Civil War, all that within one year. Then we witnessed what happened in Nagorno-Karabakh, a frozen conflict since the mid-1990s, but it took a small fleet of TB2s only 44 days to turn the Armenian Army into a smoldering heap of Soviet junk. Faced with a plethoria of older and newer models of Russian air defence systems, Azerbaijan lost just two TB2s (one crashed, the other shot down).

Really, there's no equivalent of the successes achieved by the TB2 in the history of warfare. Somehow everyone still talks about the revolutionary introduction of the tank during World War I, but has there ever been a piece of military equipment (supported by the right tactics) that has managed to make such an impact on the course of conflicts as the TB2? To put it bluntly: No. Of course, you won't see many analysts writing about this because being positive about Turkey appears to be highly impopular these days.

But if you look at in a neutral manner then it's no wonder that countries like Saudi Arabia are looking to replicate these successes. But don't just take my word for it, and also look what UK Defence Secrary Ben Wallace had to say: https://baykardefence.com/haber-UK-defense-chief-Turkish-use-of-drones-game-changing.html

Master talk! Thank you!
Talking in against Turks always been a positive and favorable thing in Western Populations. In fact, it’s a well established tradition. Everyone must accept this fact.

 

[Blackeyes90]

 

[Ecderha]

What are missiles type on the right side under wing. Air to ground?

 

[Blackeyes90]

What are missiles type on the right side under wing. Air to ground?

It kinda looks like a cirit pod. But i dont know for sure.
This is Cirit Pod ;

 

[Fuzuli NL]

Looks like a screenshot from STARWARS!

 

[ekemenirtu]

It may be unwise to assist the Saudi regime in Yemen without extracting major concessions.

Since the Saudi regime opposed Turkish stand in Egypt, in Sudan, in Syria (by withdrawing their assistance for the anti-Assad protesters) and is increasingly cozying up to Greece and "Israel"/Zionist regime, President Erdogan should only assist the Saudis after securing major concessions from them (such as 200 billion TL/Lira worth of foreign exchange deposited in Turkish central bank), withdraw financial assistance to El-Sisi regime, Turkish military presence securing the Hejaz region and specially the holy cities, change of stance on Turkish-Greek-others dispute in the Eastern Mediterranean, Turkish military presence in at least two major oil fields in Eastern Saudi Arabia and such.

Without extracting any concessions, if the Turkish President gives away the hard earned crown jewels of Turkish industry for "peanuts". that will be a blunder of epic proportions and certainly, not wise.

 

[yusuf]

old soviet tech radars can not see TB2 and addionally ammos range is improving,no chance for yemenis,a russian news man said during syrian war “a motorbike even is not safe”,so if it is realised should ‘oryx’ ready to couinting

 

[Ryder]

Saudi Armed forces have very good equipment.

But look at their command structure and it has tribalism all written all over it. Commanders come from who are loyal to the king.

Irony is when Saudi Arabia was founded they employed ex Ottoman soldiers and officers into the army some were Turks and Arabs this process began a long modernisation process of their army. The problem they have not left their tribalism and loyalty.

With the Saudi armed forces its the King who chooses who gets to be commanders guess what the King of Saudi Arabia knows not to make the Saudi armed forces too powerful if not it will lead to their overthrow. Hence why all the commanders have to be loyal to the king.

Forget training and experience its all about loyalty. Thats why the Saudis are suffering the same problems with a lot of Arab armies.

 

[Zafer]

Looks badass.

A self propelled munition on a Turkish drone, a first.
Pod aerodynamics should be improved.

 

[dustdevil]

https://tayfunkalafat.artstation.com/projects/2xgV6J (there are some photos with Cirit pod on the ground, but this one is a good artwork, credit goes to the artist)