We dont need AC for now because we dont have aircrafts , money and we just need to protect Mavi vatan which is closse to Turkiye.
Even Russia dont have AC .
Those AC are needed by USA which mess with countries around the world .
Turkish navy power in
2030 should be:
(24 frigates + 14 OPV / corvertes)
12 - I class frigates
6 - Tf 4500
4 Barbaros MLU
4 Perry class
4 milgem
10 class hisar Opv
(SUBMARINES) - 24
8 Preveze/gur class submarine
6 Reis class
8 Stm 500
2 Milden (8 on order)
In my humble opinion, I would like to remind that platform planning is not created by a few people writing on paper. Once you extend your scope beyond coastal defenses, It is a complex equation shaped by the geopolitical balances and dynamic conditions we are in. What matters is doctrines and organization which we develope against all these conditions, so platform planning can shape accordingly. Yes all these inventories with whole of their their service life will be carried by the country's economy, but just as the navy will carry the country's economic stability, interests and security on its shoulders.
If you allow, I would like to underline a few details that we always talk about between the lines, but which came to the fore with the last SSIK meeting.
The planned 3rd and 4th modern LSTs are coming. 2 LHD platforms are coming. This group of 6 ships, together with fast landing craft and support elements, can land almost a division-sized military unit in any place of 7 seas 'in one go'!
In short, there is a contrast between the current amphibious force organization and the platform planning for the next 10 years. What I am trying to say is that we are likely to see very important changes in the organizational structure of the Naval Forces Command in the near future, the main one of which could be an amphibious naval command with its own armoured brigades.
The other thing, which is no longer a secret, is the acquisition of a fixed-wing combat air force within the Navy. The third pillar is strategic deterrence, will come from under the seas.
The fact that the navy has begun to spread its wings is indicative of many things, and it sends a very clear message about the next 50 years of Turkish geopolitics.
From today's perspective, perhaps the AC acquisition seems meaningless. Our attempt to make sense of it is often based on what we know and how we assess the current conjuncture. This expansion may also be a matter of necessity, otherwise such a globally impactful move would not have been made in the first place. Also, our NATO relationship has turned into a forced alliance to protect ourselves from it. I am not saying that we will leave NATO, but it is not too far in the future for us to become NATO's second largest naval power. We can discuss at length the next 50 years of the Gulf of Guinea, Somalia and East Africa, or the line from Basra to the East Indian Seas, but there are things right under our noses that we cannot make sense of. We have found gas in the Eastern Mediterranean but we cannot announce it.
The Turkish navy's planning for the next 50 years is clearly evolving in two layers. The first is to start the defense of the homeland from the high seas. The second is to reach the strategic capability to carry the tension to the areas of interest and influence of those who want to bring tension to our doorstep. If this transformation is completed, the Turkish politics will be capable of effective dominance in all geographies that are within the Turkish hinterland or feel historical and cultural affinity.
