When viewed in this light, it even has a tangible advantage: the platform can participate in NATO operations without any major concerns and land in friendly NATO countries without having to constantly worry about industrial espionage. For the Turkish armed forces, 30–40 aircraft should be perfectly adequate as a core fleet.
The KAAN will not "share" any sensitive mission or sensor data with the F-35 anyway. And even if something accidentally leaks in the wrong direction via Link 16/22, it is very likely that technical protective measures will be put in place: a kind of kill/safe mode, hard data filters at the protocol and hardware level – and, in case of doubt, a switch to national data links such as T-Link.
At the same time, even without "data sharing", an F-35 can be evaluated very thoroughly – not only via radar and EM profiles, but also via IR signatures, metadata from sensor images and observable behaviour in the mission profile. These findings can then be consistently reflected in the development of one's own guided missiles – whether AAM or anti-aircraft missiles, including modern (hybrid) seeker heads and anti-ECCM logic.
Israel may be able to adapt a lot in terms of EW/ECM and software parameters – but the basic geometry and thus the physical radar and IR signature of a platform cannot simply be "configured away". This is precisely where the leverage lies: silhouette, signature and pattern remain measurable in the end.
