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So the opposite of jingoism is jingoism? Hmm, this really needs careful thought.
So the opposite of jingoism is jingoism? Hmm, this really needs careful thought.
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Tempers and tensions are high so somethings will be near inevitable when we discuss and get heated...
.....but please lets focus on messages not the messengers as much as we can.
We have been over this too many times already in too many places... let us try something better discussion-wise for this forum.
Our great country is immensely diverse in thought, opinion, experience and perspective let us not forget
Well said, but does that thereby mean that imprecision and hand-waving should be left to dry on the roadside, so that we can gather around the campfire in the evening and sing Kumbaya?
Come, come.
BTW, this has nothing to do with ideology, yet, although now that it has been raised, it is an interesting train of thought to follow.
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Nope no need for artificial campfire songs either. Those get stale and hoarse too just like the other extreme of unceasing extreme trolling gotchas.
Why did my interest and respect of you grow Joe?.... its the dogged tenacious resistance you put to me, patiently but stubbornly.... "ideological" or otherwise....I enjoy that kind of thing in the end.....but it is not everyone's cup of tea...or should I say cup of Joe...
I am now at stage where most of this to me is waves crashing on the beach...just thought I'd give everyone a friendly surfing tip...I finally got a nice view on a lifeguard chair....and there's no shark sightings to worry about....yet.
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Pretty detailed write up on SFF:
From Establishment 22 To Special Frontier Force: The Phantom Warriors
Who would lead such a force? What was needed was a senior Indian military officer who could win the confidence of the Tibetans, embracing th...trishul-trident.blogspot.com
Amazing detail. This is definitely a note to be 'chewed'; a couple of days, easy. Thanks for pointing me in the direction.
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Oh dear.
A reminder - my concern is not primarily with ideology, or with trolling. It's with precision and with accuracy. Remember the interest in ORBATs, and your own involvement? That should have been a hint enough for you; it's the devil in the details, not the one capering around the campfire, or even the one sitting and pontificating....if you wish, I will vanish from the thread.
Not a problem.
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Yep I myself am going through it slowly and steadily.
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Oh dear.
A reminder - my concern is not primarily with ideology, or with trolling. It's with precision and with accuracy. Remember the interest in ORBATs, and your own involvement? That should have been a hint enough for you; it's the devil in the details, not the one capering around the campfire, or even the one sitting and pontificating....if you wish, I will vanish from the thread.
Haha, nope its not that at all....it is what I have gotten used to seeing elsewhere (from certain others) leaving bad memories that wont go away for me a long time...no one is coming anything close to that here....but an artificial kumbaya would get to be like that was what I was getting at.
I suppose the balance would be something in the middle, something organic and natural but civil enough.
Anyway just speak your mind Joe....why am I even telling you this...you have been through the same....probably lot worse.
I'm overthinking and overspeaking all this again...
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C'est la vie!
M
Unless you expect me to be an expert in astrology, I truly cannot predict what might happen in the future with any amount of accuracy, only the past has accuracy, not the future. As I have already mentioned earlier in this thread, I doubt the Chinese are unwilling to involve themselves in a full-scale war where all their military assets are used and a smaller scale skirmish like Nathu la or Chola la will end up with them losing face. Galwan is unlikely to happen as the next time they come up the mountain there will be warning shots fired at them.
M
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NOBODY is being accused of being an expert on anything, but there are questions regarding the basic terms and expressions that have been used in a specific context.
Placed against the fact that after their battle against the KMT, even during the Korean War, the PLA never involved themselves in a full-scale war as defined in terms of 'all their military assets are used', this statement is confusing.
However, it is at least clear that the NathuLa/ChoLa incident is not that kind of a 'full-scale war'. This is progress.
At the end, to be informed by someone professedly detached from astrology that such and such a thing WILL happen leads to an exploration of alternatives to astrology - reading tea-leaves comes to mind.
M
Now that we are talking about accuracy, context, precision etc.. This reminded me of one of your earlier posts.
"If there is an outbreak of hostilities, we will lose, not for any other reason than for logistics. They are far better organized to supply their troops than we are."
Mind telling me what you meant by the "Outbreak of hostilities". Was it a Full-scale war, Nathula-Chola or Galwan.
Weird logic, Countries will use their military whenever and wherever it deems necessary. If Xi, feels like it is time to bring down India a few notches, he will need to use military force, a minor skirmish will not help him here.
You can go to twitter, everyone and their mother is attempting to predict what will happen without the need for Astrology. Nothing special here.
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Sure.
A brigade-level engagement, involving gunfire on both sides, sustained over more than seven days (the probable duration that will require sustained support is one month), requiring logistical support for further sustained engagement.
Brigade-level because any smaller formation already has materiel support from its superior organisations; there is already enough material supply at division level to supply brigades for a period longer than a month. Both sides have corps-level, i.e., multi-division level strength at major locations.
We have to go with evidence. Xi cannot afford to pull out troops from either the Taiwan confrontation, or the friction at Hong Kong. Historically, China has never been able to fight any war beyond its civil war against the KMT with its entire military strength.
Why bother with any discussion beyond Twitter, then? This kind of forum allows for detailed analysis and discussion. Mothers may join in freely.
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Before foiling Chinese moves, India worked on plan for almost a month
By the crack of dawn, Indian forces had taken dominant positions on some key heights along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), snaking through the south bank of Pangong Tso to Rechin La near Rezang La.
indianexpress.com
Before foiling Chinese moves, India worked on plan for almost a month
By the crack of dawn, Indian forces had taken dominant positions on some key heights along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), snaking through the south bank of Pangong Tso to Rechin La near Rezang La.
On the night of August 29-30, almost four months after the PLA made significant ingress into Indian territory in eastern Ladakh, India, for the first time, outplayed China with its manoeuvres.
By the crack of dawn, Indian forces had taken dominant positions on some key heights along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), snaking through the south bank of Pangong Tso to Rechin La near Rezang La.
This move threatened key Chinese positions on its side of the LAC, and provided India a bulwark against lost ground on the north bank of the lake.
The Indian Army said the move was “pre-emptive” since it noticed PLA troops moving towards previously unmanned locations.
Yet this operation to reach the unoccupied heights took almost a month of careful planning — from the drawing board to implementation on the field.
Plans for such a move, a source in the security establishment said, had the political go-ahead from Delhi because there was realisation there that Beijing was not serious about completing disengagement of troops.
After the success of Corps Commander-level talks on June 30 that led to withdrawal of troops at Patrol Point 14 in the Galwan Valley, hopes of full disengagement were high. But by July 14, the fourth round of talks, it was clear that China was not pulling back its troops fully from Gogra Post and Hot Spring areas, and the ridges of the Fingers area on the north bank of Pangong Tso.
When the August 2 meeting ended with China not even ready to accept it had violated Indian territory on Pangong Tso’s north bank, the Indian establishment realised that military action to wrest some tactical advantage was the only option.
A top source in the Army said “plans are always ready for all steps, and are shared with very few people”. “Planning does not start when talks fail,” and “forces prepare multiple plans”, keeping in mind that the outcome of talks can never be predicted. “When to get them into play is the question,” the source said.
The final plan, the source said, had been ready for over a fortnight before the action. “Two weeks before it happened, the seriousness about putting weight on this particular action started gaining. Then the ground commanders came here to give presentations.”
“The top brass and field officers sat with the drawing board. Chinese vulnerabilities were worked out vis-à-vis our own strength. Locations of tactical advantage were discussed. Strategies to achieve them were worked upon. Each and every move, to the last detail, was mapped. And just before the operations, reconnaissance was carried out. It took close to a month to do all this, in complete secrecy. With some luck on our side, it was achieved without too much fuss,” the source said.
A security establishment officer said each height on the south bank was assigned to a particular unit. “There were three forces at our disposal — the Special Frontier Force (SFF), the Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) and, of course, the Indian Army. Units were specifically picked to take over particular heights with SFF commandos leading at many places,” the officer said.
Sources said the operation – it extended to the night of August 30-31 — helped India take positions on heights surrounding Black Top and Helmet Top. “The Chinese continue to dominate Black Top and Helmet Top, but we have surrounded them on heights around it. Though perceptions of LAC differ, we are still on our side of the LAC,” an intelligence officer said.
What has riled China, the officer said, is India’s positions around Rezang La and Rechin La. “The positions we have taken in the Chushul sector on heights such as Magar Hill and Gurung Hill has exposed China’s Moldo garrison and the Spanggur Gap, strategically very important to China,” the officer said.
The Gurung Hill and Magar Hill are located north and south of the Spanggur Gap, and Indian positions can dominate the pass to effectively close it for any Chinese movement — in 1962, China had used the 2-km wide pass to launch an offensive against Indian forces.
It was in the Chushul sector that SFF soldier Nyima Tenzin lost his life during the August 29-30 operation when he stepped on a landmine while he and a younger colleague were moving ahead of the troops.
The importance of the operation at Rezang La is also underscored by the fact that since August 29, there have been two instances of firing in the area – for the first time in 45 years along the LAC. While China reacted to an incident of firing on September 7, calling it a “grave provocation”, sources said the first shot was fired on the night of August 30.
“This was when the PLA tried to push Indian forces near Rezang La where they had captured some key heights. There was firing in the air. On September 7 too, the firing happened in the same sector for the same reason,” a security establishment officer said.
While neither side commented on the first incident of firing, they blamed each other for the firing on September 7. The Indian Army denied it had opened fire along the LAC, or that it had crossed the LAC.
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From all the available evidence, I think the "provacative actions" the Indian army accused the PLA of undertaking was building up around black top. We reacted by taking the surrounding heights, such as Gurung, negating the advantage they would have gained. I think China was indeed trying to create a new front in the normally calm shushul sector, so we simply took the initiative to preempt them. Not only do we surround them at black top, but we also overlook the Spangur Gap and their Moldo post. It's not just the tactics, but the message that is important. If they try and use their superior position at black top to change the status quo at lac, we will do the same between rezang la and rechin. Based on GT's rants, the message was delivered loud and clear. The constant harping by the media about black and helmet tops completely missed the point, as can be expected of Indian media.Before foiling Chinese moves, India worked on plan for almost a month
By the crack of dawn, Indian forces had taken dominant positions on some key heights along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), snaking through the south bank of Pangong Tso to Rechin La near Rezang La.
Before foiling Chinese moves, India worked on plan for almost a month
By the crack of dawn, Indian forces had taken dominant positions on some key heights along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), snaking through the south bank of Pangong Tso to Rechin La near Rezang La.
On the night of August 29-30, almost four months after the PLA made significant ingress into Indian territory in eastern Ladakh, India, for the first time, outplayed China with its manoeuvres.
By the crack of dawn, Indian forces had taken dominant positions on some key heights along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), snaking through the south bank of Pangong Tso to Rechin La near Rezang La.
This move threatened key Chinese positions on its side of the LAC, and provided India a bulwark against lost ground on the north bank of the lake.
The Indian Army said the move was “pre-emptive” since it noticed PLA troops moving towards previously unmanned locations.
Yet this operation to reach the unoccupied heights took almost a month of careful planning — from the drawing board to implementation on the field.
Plans for such a move, a source in the security establishment said, had the political go-ahead from Delhi because there was realisation there that Beijing was not serious about completing disengagement of troops.
After the success of Corps Commander-level talks on June 30 that led to withdrawal of troops at Patrol Point 14 in the Galwan Valley, hopes of full disengagement were high. But by July 14, the fourth round of talks, it was clear that China was not pulling back its troops fully from Gogra Post and Hot Spring areas, and the ridges of the Fingers area on the north bank of Pangong Tso.
When the August 2 meeting ended with China not even ready to accept it had violated Indian territory on Pangong Tso’s north bank, the Indian establishment realised that military action to wrest some tactical advantage was the only option.
A top source in the Army said “plans are always ready for all steps, and are shared with very few people”. “Planning does not start when talks fail,” and “forces prepare multiple plans”, keeping in mind that the outcome of talks can never be predicted. “When to get them into play is the question,” the source said.
The final plan, the source said, had been ready for over a fortnight before the action. “Two weeks before it happened, the seriousness about putting weight on this particular action started gaining. Then the ground commanders came here to give presentations.”
“The top brass and field officers sat with the drawing board. Chinese vulnerabilities were worked out vis-à-vis our own strength. Locations of tactical advantage were discussed. Strategies to achieve them were worked upon. Each and every move, to the last detail, was mapped. And just before the operations, reconnaissance was carried out. It took close to a month to do all this, in complete secrecy. With some luck on our side, it was achieved without too much fuss,” the source said.
A security establishment officer said each height on the south bank was assigned to a particular unit. “There were three forces at our disposal — the Special Frontier Force (SFF), the Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) and, of course, the Indian Army. Units were specifically picked to take over particular heights with SFF commandos leading at many places,” the officer said.
Sources said the operation – it extended to the night of August 30-31 — helped India take positions on heights surrounding Black Top and Helmet Top. “The Chinese continue to dominate Black Top and Helmet Top, but we have surrounded them on heights around it. Though perceptions of LAC differ, we are still on our side of the LAC,” an intelligence officer said.
What has riled China, the officer said, is India’s positions around Rezang La and Rechin La. “The positions we have taken in the Chushul sector on heights such as Magar Hill and Gurung Hill has exposed China’s Moldo garrison and the Spanggur Gap, strategically very important to China,” the officer said.
The Gurung Hill and Magar Hill are located north and south of the Spanggur Gap, and Indian positions can dominate the pass to effectively close it for any Chinese movement — in 1962, China had used the 2-km wide pass to launch an offensive against Indian forces.
It was in the Chushul sector that SFF soldier Nyima Tenzin lost his life during the August 29-30 operation when he stepped on a landmine while he and a younger colleague were moving ahead of the troops.
The importance of the operation at Rezang La is also underscored by the fact that since August 29, there have been two instances of firing in the area – for the first time in 45 years along the LAC. While China reacted to an incident of firing on September 7, calling it a “grave provocation”, sources said the first shot was fired on the night of August 30.
“This was when the PLA tried to push Indian forces near Rezang La where they had captured some key heights. There was firing in the air. On September 7 too, the firing happened in the same sector for the same reason,” a security establishment officer said.
While neither side commented on the first incident of firing, they blamed each other for the firing on September 7. The Indian Army denied it had opened fire along the LAC, or that it had crossed the LAC.
Now the question is whether the PLA will risk an all-out war knowing our ability to preempt them as well as our positions overlooking black top and moldo. Obviously China is in a tough spot, because it simply was not expecting India to do anything like this. hopefully China learns its lesson and negotiates a face-saving deal with India that will allow both sides to retreat. Although I am not optimistic.
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India shows the way in checkmating a rampaging China
Troops carrying arms and grabbing of No-Man’s Land is the new normal
India shows the way in checkmating a rampaging China
Troops carrying arms and grabbing of No-Man’s Land is the new normal
Ranjit Bhushan
The only thing positive about the five-point Sino-India road map to address the standoff on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Ladakh is the `joint statement’ issued by the two countries on the side-lines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) meet in Moscow on September 10.
The rest, say experts, is diplomatic grandstanding, which does not count for much. The consensus on the five points was reached during talks between external affairs minister S Jaishankar and his Chinese counterpart, Wang Yi.
Former Foreign Secretary Kanwal Sibal believes that the so-called five-point consensus are merely a rehash of old platitudes. “The joint statement does not mention return to status quo. It talks about joint de-escalation and disengagement. Not surprisingly, it is silent on the critical points,” he told this writer.
According to Sibal, President Xi Jinping’s megalomaniacal behaviour has ensured that there is no backing out of the status quo ante in Ladakh: neither India nor China can move from their positions in Kailash Hills and Depsang plains respectively, without losing face, which turns the situation into a deadly impasse, heightening the chances of an armed conflict in the near future. Once a conflict begins, then it is difficult to either contain or predict their trajectory, he points out.
Chinese caught napping
By all credible accounts, news of the Indian Army’s swift moves in the vicinity of the Spanggur gap in the Kailash area, has surprised the Chinese PLA as much as they had surprised the Indians at Depsang Plains earlier this year.
This area - all of which comes under the strategically critical Chushul sub-sector, also the scene of heavy fighting in 1962 - has come into focus in the standoff between the Indian and PLA troops following the movement that took place on the intervening night of August 29 and 30.
The Chushul sub-sector lies south of Pangong Tso in eastern Ladakh. It comprises high, broken mountains and heights of Thatung, Black Top, Helmet Top, Gurung Hill and Magger Hill besides passes such as Rezang La and Rechin La, the Spanggur Gap, and the Chushul valley. At least five of these peaks are now under Indian control.
Experts believe that this one single move by India has neutralised the advantage that China gained when it secured areas between Finger 4 and Finger 8 on the northern bank of the Pangong Tso.
India’s domination of the ridgeline in the Chushul sub-sector gives it bargaining chip in negotiations for the disengagement process because Chushul is the gateway to Leh.
Srikant Kondapalli, professor in Chinese Studies at JNU and one of India’s foremost Sinologists, however, believes that there is very little chance of a protracted conflict because both China and India do not want a war. While agreeing that the Moscow agreement is a face saver, he says many things have changed since the Galwan Valley clash of June 15.
"There is a new normal. Troops on both sides are carrying arms, which was not the case earlier. Second, with Chinese aggression in Western Ladakh and Depsang, virtually all No-Man Lands are up for grabs all along the LAC. The situation is materially different,” he told this writer.
An inflection point
According to him, the Galwan incident will remain the turning point. ``The aura of Chinese invincibility and President Xi Jinping’s ambitious plans have taken a beating. My information is that the local Chinese commander at Chushul refused to act against the Indians occupying heights in that area. Chinese casualties, which according to one source reached 103 in Galwan Valley, is a big deterrent against misadventure,” he states.
Indian military experts believe that the taking of Spanggur Gap is seen as a humiliation by the PLA, which set off frantic reactions from China — eight press statements in the 12 hours after the news broke!
Lt Gen Utpal Bhattacharyya (retd), who served in the Indian Army for 40 years and has extensive experience in regions bordering China, believes that the taking of the Spanggur Gap has come as a relief to the country.
Writing in The Week magazine, he is convinced that the 1.2 billion people of this country, mostly, repose faith in the Indian Army’s ability to be the vanguard of national power and pride.
"Some of the more-exaggerated reports from ‘interested’ sources did have an impact on the national morale of this demographically young nation. So, the news from earlier this week has certainly brought about a perceptible swing in the national mood and has also provided swagger to the national leadership, including Rajnath Singh and S. Jaishankar’s incipient dialogues with their Chinese counterparts in Moscow,” he noted with pleasure in his column.
Despite the Jaishankar-Wang diplomatic initiative, there is little doubt that Sino-Indian ties have entered a more turbulent phase of confrontation just prior to the onset of winter. In a few weeks’ time, the remote higher reaches of Ladakh would be snow bound, which means that both the armies will be prepared to dig in for the extreme winters.
The harsh winter that lasts for eight months poses a big challenge. It is very difficult to dig in and make shelters on the ridgeline. The mercury plummets to minus 30 degrees Celsius, and there are frequent snowstorms, making it difficult to launch major operations. In addition, the Pangong Tso also freezes, which means that movement between its north and south banks are impossible. Naturally then, to expect that armies that dig in for the winters will move out on their own accord with the onset of summer, is ambitious.
Some other specialists like diplomat G Parthasarathy – himself a former military man – believes that the current Chinese army is not Mao Zedong’s army of the 1960s. ``This army is used to creature comforts. I doubt very much whether they have what it takes to fight a war in the higher, icy cold reaches of Ladakh,” he told this writer.
A veteran of many negotiations with tricky adversaries, Parthasarathy too believes that the diplomatic road ahead looks far from promising. ``Foreign Minister Jaishankar has not got much out of the dialogue; not that he had too many options. It is also important to remember that with the Chinese, their statement and their actions are always going to be at odds with each other,” he says.
Military observers say that given the shocker of losing Spanggur Gap and occupation of Chushul heights, the failure of making a diplomatic headway and the onset of terrible winters, some PLA moves to restore its honour before mid-November could be expected. It is this unfolding scenario that India must prepare for in the days ahead.
Gen Bhattacharyya predicts that the "PLA has wound itself into a corner and a face-saving exit is no longer sufficient. It needs to come out a winner.”
When both diplomatic and military pundits believe in the inevitability of conflict, then the road ahead could be jittery. Yet, there have been foreign minister-level talks and five rounds of high-level military dialogue between the two sides to stave off a skirmish.
Sibal believes that both India and China are holding talks to show the world that they tried hard before deciding to pull the trigger. With Americans going into the poll mode, the chances of a third-party intervention are bleak until a new government comes in.
And if that new government happens to be Democrats, it could take several months to figure out the contours of a fresh foreign policy initiative in Asia. Will President Jinping wait that long, given his tearing hurry to dominate the world?
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Paro
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